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This thesis is concerned with an analysis of British governmental attitudes and responses 
to communism in the United Kingdom during the early years of the Cold War, from the 
election of the Attlee government in July 1945 up until the election of the Wilson 
government in October 1964. Until recently the topic has been difficult to assess 
accurately, due to the scarcity of available original source material. However, as a result 
of multiple declassifications of both Cabinet Office and Security Service files over the 
past five years it is now possible to analyse the subject in greater depth and detail than 
had been previously feasible. The work is predominantly concerned with four key areas: 
firstly, why domestic communism continued to be viewed as a significant threat by 
successive governments – even despite both the ideology’s relatively limited popular 
support amongst the general public and Whitehall’s realisation that the Communist Party 
of Great Britain presented little by way of a direct challenge to British political stability. 
Secondly, how Whitehall’s understanding of the nature and severity of the threat posed by 
British communism developed between the late 1940s and early ‘60s, from a problem 
considered mainly of importance only to civil service security practices to one which 
directly impacted upon the conduct of educational policy and labour relations. Thirdly, 
how official counter-subversion methods were formulated and enacted over the period – 
from remarkably limited beginnings as small-scale vetting reform to a wide-ranging 
program of surveillance and counter-propaganda by the early 1960s. And finally, whether 
such responses can be judged as proportional with the benefit of historical hindsight, or if 
the British government’s conduct should be regarded as an egregious example of 
reactionary censorship and infringement of civil liberties in the modern era. 
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Introduction 
 
During the early years of the Cold War, the problem of communist subversion was a 
subject of particular importance for British domestic security policy. Despite being 
consistently limited both in terms of relative numerical size and political influence, the 
communist movement was regarded by the British government as the central threat to the 
domestic stability of the United Kingdom for the better part of twenty years. Owing to 
the, at best, loose official definition of subversion, counter-measures designed to combat 
domestic communism were wide ranging, and directly impacted upon a wide swathe of 
British civil society. Despite the resources invested, anti-communist measures 
experienced only mixed success however, and from the evidence available it seems clear 
that British communism’s decline was caused as much by the movement’s own structural 
weaknesses as it was by official efforts to undermine it. Uneven results prolonged official 
attention, whilst concern was perpetuated still further by shifting official understandings 
of the communist movement and the manner of the threat it posed to British stability and 
security. Though communist subversion initially provoked concern primarily due to fears 
related to Soviet espionage, as the Cold War progressed, successive governments became 
more interested in the communist movement’s broader ideological appeal as well as 
influence within the trade union movement. Altered understanding served to keep 
communism at the heart of domestic security concerns – as successive problems were 
resolved during the nineteen year period, other facets of the issue were identified, 
ensuring that official focus was maintained long past the point where the threat of 
communism, as understood during the late 1940s, had been mitigated. 
Defining ‘Subversion’ 
The concept of ‘subversion’, as understood by the British government during the early 
Cold War period was broad and relatively nebulous. Importantly, throughout the entirety 
of the period covered by this thesis ‘subversion’ as a concept was never formally defined 
by either ministers or the intelligence services. Indeed, the Security Service actively 
refrained from creating a strict definition until 1972, when John Jones (then Director of F 
Division, counter-subversion) finally defined the term as: ‘activities threatening the safety 
or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means’ (A definition which was subsequently 
accepted by the wider government, as proved by its quotation in both the House of 
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Commons and House of Lords in 1978 and 1975 respectively).1 In the absence of a 
formalised definition, ‘subversion’ appears to have been something of a catch-all term, 
understood perhaps less as a fixed concept than a term to describe those activities which 
did not fit neatly into the more tangible categories of espionage and sabotage. Subversive 
movements were defined broadly as those ‘which might threaten the security of the 
State’2, though the exact nature of this threat was left ambiguous. ‘Subversion’ was 
therefore an open-ended term, which was used by the British government to describe a 
multitude of political and economic threats which were unable to be classified as formal 
espionage or sabotage. 
This being said, though subversion and espionage were understood to be separate 
phenomena, it is also clear that ministers and the intelligence services believed the two 
concepts to be inherently linked. As stated by Norman Brook (Cabinet Secretary 1946-
1964) in his 1951 review of Britain’s intelligence apparatus: 
‘It is the first duty of a Security Service to counter subversive activities by Communists… This study of the 
British Communist Party makes a direct contribution to the work of counter-espionage… Study of British 
Communism and its adherents covers the field in which clues are most likely to be found to the identity of 
agents working for the intelligence services of Russia and her satellites.’3 
For reasons which shall be discussed in chapters one and two, communist subversion, at 
least until the early 1960s, was viewed as the mechanism via which Soviet espionage was 
facilitated. As such, to fully appreciate the concerns guiding the development of counter-
subversive policy, some examination of espionage is also required. 
Meanwhile, it follows that as ‘subversion’ was never accorded a strict definition, the 
concept of the individual ‘subversive’ remained equally nebulous. In the absence of either 
a fixed legal or semantic definition, the notion of what exactly constituted ‘subversive’ 
traits was left wholly for the government to dictate. Categorisation of an individual as a 
‘subversive’ therefore essentially occurred at the discretion of the Security Service 
officer, Civil Servant or minister who happened to be commenting upon a particular 
report. 
This thesis therefore assumes two key points. The first: that that ‘subversion’ was not a 
fixed concept, but was rather a nebulous ‘catch-all’ phrase, used to denote activities 
                                                          
1 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, (Allen Lane, London, 2009), p. 591 
2 Report of Enquiry by Sir Norman Brook into the Secret Intelligence and Security Services, 1951, TNA, 
CAB 301/17 
3 Ibid 
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which the government believed to be antithetical to domestic security and stability, yet 
were unable to be classified under more fixed terminology such as ‘espionage’ or 
‘sabotage’. As such, ‘subversive’ was a description able to be used unilaterally by 
officials almost at whim. An individual or group was ‘subversive’ simply because the 
government said so. The second: that despite official categorisation of ‘subversion’ as an 
independent concept, due to frequent overlap between counter-subversion and counter-
espionage policy (particularly during the period from 1945-1955) adequate understanding 
of the development of counter-subversive measures cannot be obtained without reference 
to counter-espionage concerns. 
 
Historical Background 
The roots of Whitehall’s post-war campaign of counter-subversion can be found in the 
inter-war period. From the founding of the Third Communist International (Comintern) in 
March 1919, the domestic communist movement was regarded as a potential source of 
subversion by successive governments. In particular, the Communist Party of Great 
Britain was consistently viewed as a body under the thrall of the USSR and therefore 
susceptible to exploitation as a tool of hostile Soviet foreign policy. Such a view of the 
Party was justifiable, as the CPGB was fundamentally tied to Soviet policy from its very 
beginnings in 1920. Though the history of British communism can be traced back to the 
very genesis of the political philosophy – the first Marxist political party, the Communist 
League, was founded in London in 1847 and it was on their behalf that Marx and Engels 
penned the world-changing tract The Communist Manifesto in early 1848 – it was not 
until 1920 that Britain possessed a nationally-organised communist party.4 British 
communism prior to 1920 was represented by a series of disparate Marxist groups of 
varying size and influence, for example the British Socialist Party founded in 1911 and 
Socialist Labour Party founded in 1903, which rather than being avowedly communist 
tended to oscillate position between supporting socialism via parliamentary democracy as 
advocated by the nascent Labour Party and advocating the necessity of full proletarian 
revolution.5 Such a state of affairs changed with the founding of the Comintern in March 
                                                          
4 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, 
(HarperCollins, London, 1997), p. 33 
5 Which inevitably lead to fragmentation. A portion of the BSP, under Henry Hyndman was subsumed by 
the Labour Party, the other half was instrumental in the founding of the CPGB. James Kluggman, History of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain, Vol. I, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968), p. 17 
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1919 by Vladimir Lenin. The organisation aimed to create an international network of 
explicitly communist political parties, united in their desire for the ‘overthrow of the 
international bourgeoisie’, with policy directed centrally by Moscow.6 Following 
attendance at the 1st Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in March 1919 the 
majority of British Marxist groups amalgamated to form the Communist Party (British 
Section of the Third International) and Scottish-based Communist Labour Party in June 
and September 1920 respectively. These groups then amalgamated again in January 1921 
to form the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
The Communist Party of Great Britain was therefore fundamentally tied to the Soviet 
Union from the outset. The Party’s very founding was a product of Soviet policy and its 
political position was consistently supportive of the prevailing line taken by the CPSU. 
From the government’s perspective the Communist Party represented a subversive 
movement which would seek to extend its influence wherever possible and seek to 
undermine the foundations of the British state. The Comintern itself had proclaimed its 
subversive nature openly via the ‘twenty-one conditions’ which were announced as 
prerequisites for membership at its Second Congress, held in the summer of 1920: 
‘The obligation to spread Communist ideas includes the persistent necessity of persistent, systematic 
propaganda in the army. Wherever such propaganda is forbidden by exceptional laws, it must be carried on 
illegally. The abandonment of such work would be equivalent to the betrayal of revolutionary duty and is 
incompatible with membership in the Third International.’7 
Given that the CPGB voluntarily signed up to the full twenty-one conditions as a 
condition of its membership of the Comintern, official concern regarding the Party is 
understandable. Responsibility for opposing such activity fell principally to two 
departments, MI5 and police Special Branch. Importantly, due to its initial conception as 
a military intelligence organisation, MI5 at this early stage held responsibility only for 
countering communist activity within the Armed Forces. All communist-related 
investigations within civilian society remained the sole preserve of Special Branch. This 
being said, it was the military aspect of the communist subversive threat which most 
worried the governments of David Lloyd George, Andrew Bonar-Law and Stanley 
Baldwin and thus MI5 assumed a central counter-communist role during the early 1920s 
despite its theoretically limited remit. In 1920 and 1921 alone, the Service investigated 
                                                          
6 Robert Service, Comrades: Communism: A World History, (Macmillan, London, 2007), pp. 107-108  
7 O. Piatnitskiy, The Twenty-One Conditions of Admission Into the Communist International, 1934, p. 29, 
accessed via: http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735061539171.pdf 
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circa ninety-five cases of ‘suspected communism’, whilst cultivating a watch-list of 
suspected ‘persons potentially dangerous to national defence’ to 25,250 names by 1925.8 
Indeed, between the First and Second World Wars, more Security Service resources were 
devoted to the investigation and surveillance of CPGB related targets than any other 
matter.9 
Curiously, and in direct contrast to later Labour administrations, the first Labour 
government under Ramsay MacDonald exhibited little interest in subversive threats. 
Indeed, MacDonald was wholly dismissive – appearing to regard subversion as something 
of a joke - when approached on the matter by Sir Wyndham Childs (head of Special 
Branch) two days after assuming office in 1924: 
‘It might be made at once attractive and indeed entertaining if its survey were extended to cover not only 
communistic activities but also other political activities of an extreme tendency. For instance a little 
knowledge in regard to the Fascist movement in this country… or possibly some information as to the 
source of the ‘Morning Post’ funds might give an exhilarating flavour to the document and by enlarging its 
scope convert it into a complete and finished work of art.’10 
Arguably, such a high-handed approach by MacDonald later proved highly politically 
damaging as a result of the Zinoviev letter affair, a scandal which circulated around a 
letter published in the Daily Mail mere days before the October 1924 General Election. 
The document, later proved to be a forgery,11 was purported to have been sent from the 
Moscow headquarters of the Comintern to the Communist Party of Great Britain and 
made a number of damaging claims against the Labour Party. Chiefly that Labour would 
restore full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and thus as a result hasten the 
progress of Britain’s workers to militant class consciousness and revolution.12 Such 
charges appeared to confirm right-wing suspicions that Labour was ‘soft’ on 
Bolshevism,13 and Labour went on to lose the election. The Conservative Party won a 
landslide victory, with a net gain of 154 seats, a turn of events some within the Labour 
party blamed directly on the letter, whilst believing members of British intelligence to be 
                                                          
8 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 142-143 
9 Ibid, p. 142 
10 Ramsay MacDonald to Sir Wyndham Childs, 24th January 1924, p. cit. Christopher Andrew, Secret 
Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community, (William Heinemann, London, 1985), p. 299 
11 Richard J. Aldrich & Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence & British Prime 
Ministers, (William Collins, London, 2016), p. 49 
12 Sibyl Crowe, ‘The Zinoviev Letter: A Reappraisal’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 10, No. 3 
(July, 1975), p. 407 
13 Aldrich & Cormac, The Black Door, pp. 48-49 
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the root cause of its publication.14 The importance of ensuring that public perceptions of 
the Labor Party were not tainted by association with communism was thus learned the 
hard way by PLP leadership. 
Damagingly, subversive concerns became increasingly politicised under the second 
Baldwin government. In May 1927 Baldwin hastily authorised a raid on the All-Russian 
Co-operative Society (ARCOS, the organisation which orchestrated Anglo-Russian trade) 
in the hope of securing proof that the group was acting as a front organisation for Soviet 
Intelligence.15 Meanwhile, the Baldwin government came under considerable pressure 
from Conservative MPs – including Winston Churchill – to sever diplomatic ties with the 
Soviet Union. Keen to justify such a move as grounded in security, rather than political, 
concerns, Baldwin turned to the material obtained in the ARCOS raid in the hope of 
finding useable evidence of Soviet espionage. Unfortunately the raid, hastily planned and 
poorly executed, had failed to uncover any such ‘smoking gun’. In desperation, Baldwin 
took the unprecedented step of quoting from intercepted Soviet telegrams in the House of 
Commons which had been decrypted by the Government Communications and Cypher 
School (forerunner to GCHQ). As stated by Christopher Andrew: ‘the debate… 
developed into an orgy of governmental indiscretion about secret intelligence for which 
there is not parallel in modern history’.16 As a direct result, realising that its 
communications were vulnerable, the Soviet government switched to the ‘one-time pad’ 
system of encryption – a decision which consequently left British intelligence unable to 
decrypt the vast majority of high-level Soviet messages until the end of the Second World 
War.17 The only silver lining was that the debacle proved a valuable learning experience 
for Churchill. Despite the prevalence of subversive concerns during his second tenure as 
Prime Minister, Churchill refused to succumb to the temptation of using secret 
intelligence as formal justification for official counter-measures.18 Indeed, so damaging 
was Baldwin’s misuse of signals intelligence, that even during the 1970s new Cabinet 
Ministers were still informed of the story, as an example of how the use of secret material 
for short-term political gain could have very long-term negative consequences.19 
                                                          
14 Andrew Williams, Labour and Russia: The Attitude of the Labour Party to the USSR, 1924-1934, 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989), p.18 
15 Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, pp. 54-56 
16 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 155 
17 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 156 
18 See Chapter Two. 
19 Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, p. 58 
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Meanwhile, during the later 1920s the system which had prevailed since 1909 – under 
which the Security Service had remit over security matters related only to the Armed 
Forces, whilst Special Branch handled civil affairs – was slowly recognised as 
counterproductive and somewhat antiquated. As was belatedly recognised by the Service, 
such a system was inherently disjointed and wholly unsuited for tackling subversive 
activity: 
‘A Communist, working in naval or military circles at Portsmouth of Aldershot, may spend his Sundays 
making revolutionary speeches in Hyde Park. The former of these occupations is a matter for research by 
MI5; his week-end relaxations bring him into the preserve of the Special Branch.’20 
Such an impractical arrangement could not have lasted for any great length of time. 
Therefore, in many ways it was the investigation of communist subversives during the 
1920s which spurred the transformation of the Service from a small military intelligence 
unit to the main domestic security agency of the British state. The awkward delineation of 
responsibility between MI5 and Special Branch necessitated a considerable degree of 
what in modern parlance might be termed ‘mission creep’ with regards to the Service’s 
counter-communist activities. As it was the civilian communist movement which was 
attempting to subvert the armed forces, MI5’s responsibility for military counter-
subversion meant, by the Service’s interpretation, that it had to expand its surveillance 
activities to encompass civilian targets (much to the irritation of Special Branch).21 
Jostling for position between the two branches on matters of counter-subversion 
continued until 1928 and the discovery by MI5 that Special Branch officers had been 
bribed by a Soviet espionage ring to provide regular updates on the status of surveillance 
targets. The ring, which utilised journalism as a cover for its activities and was led by the 
pro-Soviet foreign editor of the Daily Herald William Norman Ewer, had purchased the 
services of Inspector Ginhoven and Sergeant Jane of Metropolitan Police Special Branch 
in order to procure weekly updates regarding individuals who were the subject of Home 
Office surveillance warrants or who were listed to be questioned on arrival at British 
ports. The information was then passed on by Ewer and his associates to Soviet 
intelligence, to whom it was of clear use in the running of agent operations. As a result of 
Ginhoven and Jane’s indiscretions, MI5 concluded that ‘any information regarding 
subversive organisations and individuals supplied to Scotland Yard by SIS or MI5, which 
had become the subject of Special Branch enquiry, would have to be regarded as having 
                                                          
20 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 141  
21 Ibid, pp. 142-143 
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been betrayed to Ewer’s group’.22 Though Ewer, Ginhoven and Jane all escaped 
prosecution owing to political concerns,23 the episode was greatly influential in securing 
the transfer of all domestic counter-subversive responsibilities to MI5 – where they have 
remained until the present day. 
Counter-subversion measures remained predominantly focused on the Armed Forces and 
defence industry during the 1930s. A series of serious dockyard sabotages between 1933 
and 1936 in particular served to keep the issue at the forefront of the Service’s concerns. 
Meanwhile, by the late ‘30s MI5 had established a relatively pervasive system of 
surveillance, comprised both of agents within the CPGB itself as well as a highly 
effective signals intelligence program (co-run with the Government Code and Cypher 
School) known as operation MASK, which successfully intercepted the vast majority of 
telecommunication traffic between the Comintern and CPGB.24 Said surveillance network 
provided intelligence which indicated that the Comintern was instructing the CPGB to 
moderate its civil propaganda efforts as part of its broader anti-fascist ‘Popular Front’ 
strategy, therefore seemingly reducing the need for the monitoring of subversion within 
civil society. A defence-oriented focus again seemed to be vindicated following the 
discovery of a Soviet spy ring operating inside of the Woolwich Arsenal in January 
1938.25 Though the discovery of the spy ring was undoubtedly a blow to Soviet 
intelligence operations, unfortunately due to lack of resources (MI5 was composed of a 
mere 26 officers in 1938)26 the Service proved incapable of following up many of the 
leads gained from the case. Had they done so, it seems likely that MI5 would have 
discovered the far larger NKVD recruitment network in operation in Britain during the 
1930s.27 As it was, the discovery of the Woolwich Arsenal ring proved something of a 
pyrrhic victory. Though it disrupted Soviet intelligence gathering regarding British 
armament manufacture, the success of the case helped convince Vernon Kell (head of the 
Service since 1909) that ‘Soviet activity in England is non-existent, in terms of both 
intelligence and political subversion’.28 Due to this complacency, the vast majority of 
                                                          
22 Serial 809a, 8th January 1930, TNA, KV 2/1016 
23 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 158-159 
24 See Nigel West, MASK: MI5’s Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain, (Routledge, 
London, 2005) 
25 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 179-182 
26 Ibid, p. 182 
27 Crucially, Arnold Deutsch, recruiter of the Cambridge Five, remained undiscovered 
28 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 185 
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Soviet operations remained undiscovered and waiting to wreak havoc on official 
confidence come the 1950s. 
With the outbreak of war on 3rd September 1939, security priorities shifted 
overwhelmingly towards Britain’s conflict with Nazi Germany. The CPGB did, however, 
remain an object of interest during the early years of the war, due largely to the Party’s 
continued support for the Soviet Union despite the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact on 23rd August 1939.29 Importantly, the continuation of concern lead to the 
installation of eavesdropping devices within the CPGB’s London headquarters, an action 
which was to prove hugely beneficial to the Service’s post-war counter-subversion 
efforts.30 The signing of the 1942 British-Soviet treaty and subsequent political 
rehabilitation efforts by the CPGB made the Service’s attempts to maintain accurate 
records regarding the Party’s activities futile however. As CPGB membership expanded 
to some 56’000 members by 1945,31 attempts to maintain current records were 
discontinued. Though certain elements of the Security Service remained wary of CPGB 
activity – most notably F (counter-subversion) division under Roger Hollis – countering 
communist subversion was relegated to a distinctly peripheral concern. 
The progress of events during the inter-war period therefore established many of the 
conditions which would come to shape the development of domestic counter-subversion 
policy during the early Cold War period. The nature of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain’s founding as essentially a tool of Soviet foreign policy ensured that from the 
outset the Party was viewed with concern by successive British governments. Meanwhile, 
governmental focus upon subversion in the Armed Forces, coupled with security failings 
within Special Branch served to steadily elevate the Security Service to a position of 
central responsibility over counter-subversive investigation and practice by the end of the 
1920s. However, though some disruption of communist activity was achieved during the 
inter-war period, most notably the Ewer and Woolwich Arsenal spy rings, the Security 
Service failed to detect the most damaging of the Soviet Union’s long-term espionage 
plots, namely the recruitment of well-placed British communist sympathisers who would 
go on to achieve employment within sensitive positions throughout Whitehall. Moreover, 
                                                          
29 Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 85 
30 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 274-275 
31 Though this figure had declined to around 42,000 by April 1945. Andrew Thorpe, ‘The Membership of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1920-1946’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, September 
2000, p. 781 
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as a result of short-sighted attempts to exploit subversive concerns for political gain, the 
Baldwin government succeeded in destroying British intelligence’s capacity to read high-
level Soviet communications for the best part of twenty years. Though a certain amount 
of counter-subversive experience was gained over the period 1919 to 1945, this was to 
large degree offset by successive failures to accurately assess the nature of the communist 
threat and to keep information current. As it was, Britain emerged from the Second World 
War with only limited knowledge of domestic communism and a misplaced sense of 
confidence regarding official ability to contain the threat. Though British intelligence 
believed that it had the problem under control as of August 1945, it was shortly to be 
firmly disabused of this notion. 
 
Literature Review 
Despite the importance of domestic counter-subversion policy to understanding the wider 
history of British involvement in the Cold War, the topic has remained relatively 
understudied, predominantly due to a lack of available primary source material. However, 
due to multiple recent declassifications of archival material by the Cabinet Office, 
Security Service and Foreign Office, it is now possible to thoroughly examine the 
development of British domestic counter-subversive policy and assess its efficacy. Whilst 
it has been possible in the past to study certain elements of domestic counter-communist 
policy, it is only within the last four years that a full survey of its development, from 
escalation under the Attlee government to the eventual reduction of concern under 
Macmillan, has been academically feasible. Understandably, due to said lack of publically 
available source material, wider scholarship regarding the development of British 
domestic counter-subversion policy in the early Cold War era is extremely limited. The 
doctoral thesis of Christian Schlaepfer, Counter-Subversion in Britain, circa 1945-62, 
arguably constitutes the most significant prior examination of the topic. Submitted in 
2012, Schlaepfer’s thesis provided a solid analysis of how links between the Labour Party 
and British trade unionism helped to isolate communist influence during the immediate 
post-war period. At the time of Schlaepfer’s submission however, the vast majority of 
archival material related specifically to the formulation of counter-subversive policy was 
yet to be publically released. Counter-Subversion in Britain provides therefore only 
marginal comment on policy development, and contains little substantive analysis of 
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events post-1955. The publication of Thomas J. Maguire’s article ‘Counter-Subversion in 
Early Cold War Britain: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the 
Information Research Department, and “State-Private” Networks’, in Intelligence and 
National Security in 2015, rectified this gap in the historiography somewhat. However, 
again, Maguire wrote his piece at a point where only a small subset of the relevant 
archival materials had been made publically available.32 The piece provides a useful 
overview of policy development during the years of the Attlee government, however, 
provides little by way of assessment post-1951.  
Beyond Schlaepfer and Maguire’s respective pieces, there has been extremely little 
written specifically on the subject of early Cold War counter-subversion policy. 
Discussion of the subject does appear in other secondary sources, however is typically 
addressed only either tangentially or as a chapter within a larger piece. Of such works, 
Professor Christopher Andrew’s official history of MI5, The Defence of the Realm, 
published in 2009, is arguably the most notable. The book represents the most 
comprehensive history of the Service yet published and has been of tremendous value 
during the course of research for this thesis. Discussion of counter-subversion practice 
does occur within Andrew’s work, however this is related primarily to Security Service 
operations, rather than to development of policy. Meanwhile, given that much of the 
material Defence of the Realm examined has still not yet been formally released into the 
public domain, the work is difficult to independently verify. This being said, those files 
which have been declassified since DOR’s publication have corresponded to Andrew’s 
conclusions – indicating that Defence of the Realm can be relied upon as an accurate 
source. Beyond Andrew, significant discussion of facets of counter-subversive policy 
appeared within Peter Hennessy’s revised 2010 edition of The Secret State. The Secret 
State provided a fairly comprehensive examination of vetting reform under the Attlee 
government, and the role of subversives in transition to war planning during the late 
1960s, however did not provide a study of how these subjects related to the development 
of counter-subversive policy over time.  
With regards to the contributions of the Information Research Department (IRD), again, 
relatively little has been written specifically on the organisation’s contributions to 
domestic policy formulation. Most prior work has been focused heavily on IRD’s 
                                                          
32 Files regarding the AC (H) were released in two batches over the course of 2014 
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overseas ouput. There are two notable exceptions to this, namely Hugh Wilford’s The 
CIA, The British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? and John Jenks 2006 
monograph, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War. Prior to the 
publication of Schlaepfer’s PhD, Wilford’s work represented the sole major analysis of 
British domestic counter-subversion practices, albeit via an American lens.  Wilford’s 
work is useful as a preliminary overview of IRD’s domestic activities, however the book 
was published in 2003 and thus is slightly out of date given the enormous amount of 
material on this subject which has been declassified since that point. Jenks’ work 
meanwhile examined the subject of British Cold War propaganda from the viewpoint of 
the journalistic profession. Whilst Jenks was unable to comment substantively on 
domestic propaganda from a policy perspective, due to the lack of source material 
available in 2006, his work is extremely valuable for the way in which it demonstrated 
how the professional relationships between IRD and the British Press developed and 
functioned on a day to day level. Beyond Wilford and Jenks, Andrew Defty’s 2013 book, 
Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53 arguably constitutes the most 
complete overview of IRD’s early work thus far, however it is overwhelmingly focused 
upon the Department’s foreign output and as such has been of limited immediate benefit 
to this thesis. Similarly, Linda Risso’s 2011 article for Intelligence and National Security 
entitled ‘A Difficult Compromise: British and American Plans for a Common Anti-
Communist Propaganda Response in Western Europe, 1948-58’ concerns itself with 
IRD’s contribution to counter-propaganda efforts on the continent and contains no 
mention of its domestic role. 
Discussion of counter-subversive policy is also notably lacking within the various Prime 
Ministerial biographies which have been consulted over the course of this thesis. Indeed, 
most biographies regarding Clement Attlee scarcely mention the intelligence aspect of his 
premiership at all. Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds 2012 book, Attlee: A Life in Politics made 
scarcely any mention of Attlee’s close relationship with the Security Service, whilst 
meanwhile Kenneth Harris’ classic biography, Attlee again passed little comment on the 
PM’s relationship with the secret state. Even John Bew’s 2016 biography of Attlee, 
Citizen Clem, includes no mention of the Prime Minister’s concerns regarding subversion. 
Michael Jago’s 2014 biography Clement Attlee: The Inevitable Prime Minister does 
somewhat better in this regard and does devote a chapter to the subject. However, many 
of his conclusions appear to have been predicated on the commentary of Chapman 
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Pincher, who can scarcely be described as a reliable narrator. Churchill fares slightly 
better, essentially due to his established reputation as a voracious consumer of secret 
intelligence.33 Again however, post-war domestic counter-subversion policy has received 
little explicit attention within the vast majority of Churchill-related literature. The topic 
appeared on the periphery of David Stafford’s 1997 book, Churchill and Secret Service, 
though Gill Bennet’s 2007 biography of Desmond Morton, Desmond Morton and the 
World of Intelligence is more useful in this regard due to Morton’s brief liaison with IRD 
in the early 1950s. Unsurprisingly most of the previous literature regarding Eden has been 
focused heavily on Suez, with an examination of the PM’s attitude to domestic security 
rather overshadowed by the 1956 debacle. Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac’s 2016 
book on the relationship between Prime Ministers and secret intelligence, The Black 
Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers, has corrected this oversight 
somewhat, even if its analysis of the topic was (understandably) brief due the work’s 
broader intention as a survey of multiple Prime Ministerial careers. Equally, whilst 
biographies of Harold Macmillan have typically featured considerable discussion of the 
intelligence aspect of his premiership, such analysis has tended to be limited to those 
espionage scandals which, in large part, helped to undermine his government - rather than 
dwelling on Macmillan’s attitude to domestic communism. D.R. Thorpe’s 2010 book 
Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan, falls into this category as does Alistair Horne’s 
official biography of the PM, published in two parts over 1988 and 1989. 
It can be seen therefore that there is a clear gap in the current historiography which this 
thesis is well placed to fill. Owing predominantly to a lack of available source material, 
the development of counter-subversive policy has received very little assessment in 
previous historical works. What little analysis has been attempted, has typically focused 
on specific events, facets, or concentrated periods, and there has been no attempt to assess 
these various elements as a whole in order to understand the underlying factors which 
shaped Whitehall’s response to domestic communism. This thesis seeks to make an 
original contribution to historical knowledge by assessing the development of British 
security policy in relation to domestic communism over the course of the nineteen year 
period which the matter was of greatest concern. The manner by which counter-
subversive policy was formulated and enacted has had tremendous implications for both 
                                                          
33 Richard J. Aldrich & Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime 
Ministers, (William Collins, London, 2016), p. 162 
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the British political system and social structure. Concerns regarding communism 
fundamentally altered the nature of the British State’s relationship to its citizenry, and it is 
of the utmost historical importance that the reasons why and how this shift occurred be 
explored.  
Methodology 
The vast majority of this thesis’ argument is predicated on original archival research. 
Unsurprisingly, given the fact that this work is primarily concerned with the development 
of British governmental policy, most archival material has been drawn from the National 
Archives at Kew. Though the files of various departments have been consulted, it is the 
Cabinet Office, Security Service and Prime Ministerial (CAB, KV and PREM) series 
which have been of most relevance. Of particular importance to this thesis is the CAB 
134 series, which contains the full files of the Cabinet Committee on Communism 
(Home). Founded in 1951 under then Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook, the AC (H) was 
the central governmental body for the deliberation of domestic counter-subversive policy 
between 1951 and 1962. It is only since mid-2013 however that the files of the 
Committee have been declassified and transferred to the National Archives at Kew.34 The 
files contain not only the Committee’s minutes, but also regular briefing reports from IRD 
and the Security Service regarding both overt and covert communist activity within the 
United Kingdom. Certain of the reports circulated to the AC (H) are still withheld from 
public view – most notably a 1952 IRD progress report, 1960 Security Service 
investigation into communism in the British Film Institute and briefings of the 1963 AC 
(H) Working Party – however these examples are very much the exception, the vast 
majority of AC (H) deliberations have now been released for public examination.  
Totalling some 300 individual papers in total,35 the files of the AC (H) provide a record of 
the key decisions and analyses which contributed to the development of domestic 
counter-subversion policy during the early Cold War. The lack of the CAB 134 series 
public availability until relatively recently has prevented any analysis of the development 
of British counter-subversive policy making in the post-war period. This thesis represents 
the first time that they have been assessed in their entirety, rectifying this previous 
                                                          
34 The first batch of AC (H) files were released in late 2012, however it was not until summer 2013 that the 
declassification process was completed. File CAB 21/5004 was available as early as 2005, though this is a 
rather slim volume comprised solely of the Committee’s terms of reference and a small amount of general 
correspondence. 
35 TNA estimate. See: http://origin.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news/775.htm 
18 
 
historiographical gap. The release of the Brook Report of Inquiry in 2014 has been 
equally vital to this work. The document represents a wholesale review of British 
intelligence as it existed in 1951, and challenges existing thinking by demonstrating the 
centrality of counter-subversion to MI5’s priorities. Beyond the files of the AC (H), this 
thesis makes extensive use of the personal diaries of Guy Liddell dating from the post-
war era. Liddell served as Deputy Director General of MI5 between the years of 1945-
1953, keeping a personal daily diary throughout the period which was later deposited with 
MI5 following his death in 1958.36 Given the level of detail and meticulousness with 
which Liddell recorded his thoughts, his diaries make for a unique and highly valuable 
record of the personal relationships and immediate concerns which served to inform high-
level security policy-making during the Attlee and Churchill governments. Whilst 
Liddell’s war-time diaries were publically released in 2002,37 his post-war records were 
only declassified in October 2012 meaning that they have received relatively little 
attention at the time of writing. Liddell’s testimony helps to illuminate the scale of 
Attlee’s personal involvement in intelligence-related decision making – challenging the 
writings of Bew, Harris and Thomas-Symonds, all of whom omit this crucial element in 
their various biographies.  
This thesis has also profited from the release of several Security Service ‘personal files’ 
over the past three years, most notably those of individuals associated with the 
Communist Party Historians Group. The files of the noted historians Christopher Hill and 
Eric Hobsbawm, declassified in late 2014, have helped greatly with the process of 
attempting to understand why the government was so concerned about communist 
influence within academia during the early 1950s. Other recently declassified MI5 
personal files of note include those of MP Cecil Bing, nuclear physicist Robert 
Oppenheimer, actor Charlie Chaplin and author JB Priestly (all released in 2014). It is 
worth noting here that the vast majority of MI5 files required for the study of this topic 
have now been released. The key exceptions to this are those documents related to the 
historians John Savile and EP Thompson – both of which were released only in late 
September 2016, after this work had been completed. However, much of the material 
                                                          
36 Codenamed ‘Wallflowers’, Liddell’s diaries were considered for a time so sensitive that MI5 kept them 
locked away in a safe. Aldrich & Cormac, The Black Door, p. 141 
37 Later edited for publication in two volumes by Nigel West in 2005, see Nigel West, (ed.), The Guy 
Liddell Diaries Volume I: 1939-1942: MI5's Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II, (Routledge, 
London, 2005) and Nigel West, (ed.), The Guy Liddell Diaries Vol.II: 1942-1945: MI5's Director of 
Counter-Espionage in World War II: 1942-1945, (Routledge, London, 2005) 
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those files contain is duplicated within the files of Hill & Hobsbawm, meaning that it is 
unlikely that these files challenge the argument made in this thesis. Those files examined 
have provided a useful cross section of MI5 analyses and help to provide verifiable 
evidence that the work undertaken by Christopher Andrew for his official history of the 
Service was broadly correct in its conclusions. Similarly, the declassification in 2015 of 
those remaining unreleased files related to the Philby, Burgess and Maclean cases has 
helped this thesis to build upon Peter Hennessy’s work regarding vetting in The Secret 
State – the reports contained within these files demonstrating that the Burgess and 
Maclean cases had a greater immediate impact on the enaction of positive vetting than 
previously believed. 
Though the National Archives at Kew has provided the vast majority of original source 
material for this thesis, it is not the only archive to have proven useful over the course of 
the past three years. The records of the Communist Party of Great Britain, held at the 
People’s History Museum in Manchester contain extensive records of the Party’s overt 
activities, details of which have been helpful from a contextual point of view. Equally, the 
Cambridge University Library itself has been a surprisingly useful source of original 
material. The Library has retained copies of several key examples of IRD’s public 
counter-propaganda offerings dating from early 1960s, as well as copies of the original 
three editions of The Reasoner from 1956. Being able to examine these documents first-
hand, rather than relying upon second-hand accounts and extracts has significantly 
assisted with the writing of both chapters three and four. Certain documents acquired 
from US-based institutions have proven informative, however the vast majority of 
material collected in the United States between January and March 2015 at the US 
National Archives facility in College Park Maryland, Truman Presidential Library and 
Kennedy Presidential Library has not been included in the final thesis. As the thesis has 
developed most of the archival documents retrieved from these institutions have proven to 
be ultimately tangential to the main argument and therefore, in the interests of brevity, 
deemed unsuitable for inclusion. The two notable exceptions to this are files from the US 
Embassy in London from 1951 which refer to the aftermath of ill-fated attempts by 
British students to travel to the 3rd World Youth Festival in East Berlin via US occupied 
Austria, as well as CIA policy documents concerning counter-subversion theory dating 
from the late 1950s, both of which were discovered at the NARA facility. 
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Structure 
There are, it would seem, four main questions to answer with regards to the conduct of 
counter-subversion policy over the period in question. Firstly, did the government’s 
efforts to combat domestic communism between 1945 and 1964 contribute meaningfully 
to the decline of British communism? As has been well recorded by Francis Beckett in his 
1995 work Enemy Within, and indeed communist activist Noreen Branson in her official 
histories of the Party, the British communist movement struggled to retain the support and 
influence it had enjoyed during the Second World War, and had been reduced to a 
shadow of its former self by the late 1960s. Did official counter-measures help to arrest 
communism’s influence within the United Kingdom in any notable way, or was the 
ideology’s eventual marginalisation within wider British society more the result of extra-
governmental factors – particularly poor leadership of the movement on the part of the 
CPGB? Secondly, to what extent did official understanding of domestic communism 
change over the course of the early Cold War? Were official perceptions of the threat 
posed by the communist movement static, or did they alter over time in accordance with 
changing international circumstances? Thirdly, why was domestic communism viewed as 
a threat by successive governments despite its limited ability to impact directly upon 
political stability? The CPGB only ever experienced extremely limited direct political 
success, before being wiped from the face of the electoral map at the 1950 election. 
Meanwhile, as has been demonstrated by Hennessy in The Secret State, counter-measures 
enacted under Attlee during the late 1940s meant that communists had been effectively 
barred from entering sensitive official employment as early as 1947.38 Equally, as shown 
by Andrew in Defence of the Realm, the Security Service succeeded in establishing a 
system of relatively comprehensive surveillance via which to monitor the CPGB’s 
activities by the early 1950s, which thereby removed the Communist Party as an 
immediate covert threat to the state.39 Despite all this, domestic communism remained a 
central priority until 1963, attracting the regular attention of security officials, senior civil 
servants and government ministers alike. Why did the threat of domestic communism 
trouble Whitehall for such a significant period of time, particularly given its early 
successes in marginalising the movement? Finally, were successive government’s actions 
to counter-act domestic communism over the early Cold War predicated ultimately on 
                                                          
38 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State, (Allen Lane, London, 2010), pp. 105-107 
39 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 402 
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political, rather than national security, concerns? As has been well established by 
Halberstam, Caute, Morgan and others, counter-subversive actions directed against the 
American left during the early 1950s soon spiralled into an anti-communist witch-hunt 
whereby notions of the ‘enemy within’ were exploited for political gain.40 Did a similar 
phenomenon occur within the United Kingdom over the same period, or were British 
motivations somehow different? 
To attempt to answer these questions, whilst presenting the material researched in as clear 
and logical a manner as possible, the main body of this thesis has been split into four 
chapters of roughly equivalent length. Each is concerned with a loose five year span, 
though there is occasional overlap in chapter periodisation when required. An argument 
could be made that this thesis would be better structured were its chapters arranged 
around each individual administration. However, given the significant changes in counter-
subversive thinking and policy focus which occurred following the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950, and re-election of Harold Macmillan in 1959, this argument is 
ultimately conceptually flawed – arranging this thesis by administration alone would 
obscure these two important junctures.  
The first chapter concerns itself with the origins of post-war domestic counter-subversion 
policy and examines the reasons why domestic communism became a central 
preoccupation of the Attlee government during the years following the end of the Second 
World War. The chapter, which spans the period from VE Day in May 1945 to the 
outbreak of the Korean War at the end of June 1950, examines the impact of early 
espionage scandals – most notably the Gouzenko affair - upon Whitehall security 
assessments, as well as the rationale behind the introduction of negative vetting in 1947. 
It also attempts to explain why early counter-subversion policy progressed so cautiously, 
before suddenly escalating over 1949 and 1950. Most importantly, the chapter also 
examines the impact of crypto-communist MPs upon the Attlee government and how the 
Prime Minister’s concerns regarding this subject were grounded in verifiable evidence. 
The chapter deliberately does not extend to encompass Attlee’s second term, as the 
changes in thinking which occurred as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War makes 
this period more suitable for separate examination. 
                                                          
40 See, David Halberstam, The Fifties, (Fawcett, New York, 1994), David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-
Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1979), Ted Morgan, 
Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America, (Random House, London, 2004) 
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The second chapter is concerned with the period spanning from July 1950 to Churchill’s 
retirement as Prime Minister in April 1955, and attempts to show firstly, how changing 
circumstances in the wider Cold War affected the Attlee government’s thinking in 1950 
and 1951, and secondly how and why this thinking was subsequently adopted without 
issue by the Churchill government following Conservative victory in the October 1951 
General Election. The impact of further espionage scandals – namely the confession of 
Klaus Fuchs in 1950 and defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951 - are 
assessed, using recently declassified material to show how formulation of counter-
subversive measures continued to be fundamentally tied to concerns regarding espionage. 
This chapter examines the origins of offensive counter-subversion policy following the 
foundation of the AC (H) in mid-1951 as well as the formal incorporation of a counter-
propaganda element via the creation of IRD’s English Desk later that same year. Chapter 
two attempts to show how the government moved from an essentially defensive footing to 
an offensive one, whilst also examining the efficacy of early measures and assessing 
whether they were correctly targeted. By utilising the MI5 personal files related to 
Christopher Hill and Eric Hobsbawm, as well as IRD’s progress reports from the period, 
the chapter attempts to show how the government began to attempt to undermine the 
ideological appeal of communism as well as ensure that its influence was marginalised 
within key areas of wider society. 
Chapter three meanwhile is focused upon the period from the accession of Anthony Eden 
as Prime Minister at the beginning of April 1955 to the Macmillan government’s victory 
at the general election of October 1959. A large proportion of the chapter concentrates on 
the collapse of CPGB support between 1956 and 1957. This section attempts to show how 
the Party’s haemorrhaging of intellectual support was more the result of inner leadership 
failings brought on by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in February 1956 coupled 
with the Hungarian Revolution over late October/November of that same year, than it was 
the product of counter-subversive policy success. The progress of counter-communist 
policy within the trade unions is also charted, as the chapter examines how private 
organisations began to be effectively exploited as outlets for IRD counter-propaganda. 
The origins of the Electrical Trades Union vote rigging scandal are analysed, and it is 
shown that much of the publicity which would later surround the case originated with 
efforts by IRD to raise the affair’s profile. The chapter also assesses the impact of the 
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fledgling CND and beginnings of the New Left movement on counter-subversive policy 
as large parts of the radical left became reshaped following the turmoil of 1956. 
Finally, chapter four is concerned with the decline of domestic communism as a central 
subversive concern over the period from November 1959 to the election of the Wilson 
government in October 1964. The chapter examines the reasons behind the brief 
escalation of official worry in 1961 – essentially as a direct result of Labour’s defeat at 
the 1959 general election - and assesses the impact of CPGB attempts to hijack the 1960 
Trades Union Congress and Parliamentary Labour Party conferences in favour of 
unilateralism. The chapter attempts to show the decline of domestic communism as a 
relevant factor in espionage concerns, whilst simultaneously showing that despite 
progression on certain fronts, government policy remained burdened with many of the 
same problems which had identified since the Attlee government. The chapter assesses 
the rise of wider subversive concerns and attempts to show that threat of domestic 
communism was not so much solved as reduced in severity, to the point whereby it 
became viewed as merely a single facet of a broader problem. Meanwhile, the chapter 
attempts to demonstrate that domestic communism’s loss of influence within the trade 
union movement was a direct result of counter-subversive policy efforts conducted via the 
ETU electoral scandal and that it was the loss of the CPGB’s industrial influence which 
finally consigned it to a position of secondary importance amongst official domestic 
security priorities. 
Post-1964, the threat of domestic communism had receded to the point that it was regard 
as merely one subversive threat amongst many. From this point onwards, counter-
subversive policy became occupied by a far more diffuse set of concerns than had been 
case during the years of the Attlee government and subsequent Conservative hegemony. 
Communism was perceived to be the central domestic subversive threat only up until the 
end of the Macmillan government. This thesis therefore, shall attempt to trace the 
development of counter-subversion policy only during those years whereby domestic 
communism was considered to be of central importance. An examination of domestic 
security policy between 1945 and 1964 encapsulates the entire period whereby 
communist subversion was considered to be a central concern by the British government. 
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Beginnings: July 1945 – June 1950 
 
The domestic communist movement as it existed at the end of the Second World War was 
judged initially by British intelligence to be something of a minimal threat to national 
interests. Indeed, communism was deemed to be essentially an in-house matter for the 
political left. Though attempted crypto-communist entryism to the Parliamentary Labour 
Party was of concern to Attlee and select members of PLP leadership (a fact which has 
been oft ignored by previous histories of the Attlee government),41 this was judged by 
MI5 to be a party-political problem with little bearing upon wider national security 
interests. Such a state of complacency did not last long. Labour’s shock electoral victory 
in August 1945 rendered the existence of crypto-communist MPs a matter of national 
security. Meanwhile, as a result of Igor Gouzenko’s defection in September 1945, British 
intelligence came to the realisation that it had woefully underestimated the scale and 
pervasiveness of Soviet intelligence operations in the West during the 1930s and early 
‘40s. As evidence gathered from the Gouzenko affair was assessed it became clear that 
Soviet espionage actively sought to cultivate and exploit pre-existing Western communist 
movements for the purposes of pro-Soviet indoctrination and recruitment. Subsequently 
meanwhile, as the Cold War became entrenched from 1947 onwards, repeat strategic 
assessments regarding Soviet capabilities and intentions concluded that international 
influence formed a crucial component of Soviet power. National-level communist 
movements were assessed as a fulcrum of Soviet foreign policy and it was judged that the 
USSR would seek to exploit its influence over international communism for the purposes 
of anti-Western subversion. As such, domestic communism became an increasingly 
significant, indeed central, preoccupation for Whitehall by the end of the 1940s. Where at 
the end of the war the British communist movement was something of a secondary 
concern for the government, by mid-1950 it was judged by ministers, senior civil servants 
and intelligence officers alike to be of tremendous importance to domestic security.  
The Attlee government’s response to the domestic communist threat was up until 1950 
essentially defensive in nature. Domestic communism in the late 1940s was understood 
primarily as a security problem, rather than ideological one. Official policy therefore 
sought to identify and exclude communists from sensitive areas of government, however 
                                                          
41 Even John Bew’s recent well received single-volume biography of Attlee fails to address this subject. 
John Bew, Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee, (Riverrun, London, 2016) 
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little attempt was made to undermine or marginalise communist influence more broadly. 
Attlee’s security reforms, typified by the introduction of centralised vetting procedure in 
1947, were intended to defend the state against communist predation, not to begin a 
political crusade. Counter-subversive measures escalated only slowly during the first five 
years of the Attlee government as ministers and civil servants sought to balance Britain’s 
tradition of political liberty against an ideologically motivated threat. The relationship 
between British security policy and domestic communism between 1945 and 1950 was 
thus characterised by three key factors. Firstly, the steady growth of concern regarding 
domestic communist influence from a party political matter to a problem of immediate 
importance to national security. Secondly, the establishment of consensus that hostile 
Soviet espionage and foreign policy efforts were implicitly linked to national level 
communist movements. Third and lastly, a tendency within Whitehall to view domestic 
communism as fundamentally a security problem which would be best resolved via 
defensive counter-measures. 
 
Immediate post-war assessments of subversion 
Within the Civil Service, as of the summer of 1945 genuine worry that domestic 
communists and fellow travellers could pose a significant threat to the stability of the 
United Kingdom was minimal. Indeed at the time, on the domestic front official concern 
was far more preoccupied by the surge of Zionist terrorism which occurred sporadically 
between 1945 and early 1947.42 The combination of the CPGB’s switch to strong support 
of the war effort following Germany’s invasion of Russia in 1941 along with the formal 
dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 meant that communist subversion was generally 
considered to be at a low ebb. It was thought unlikely that the Soviet Union would in 
future look to incite mass subversive activity as a tool of foreign policy.43 MI5’s F 
Division (then responsible for counter-subversion) stood at a mere 24 staff members and 
was somewhat tarred with the wider reputation as being a haven for anti-Soviet zealots 
and the unduly paranoid.44 As noted within John Curry’s secret official history,45 much of 
                                                          
42 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire, (Harper 
Press, London, 2013), pp. 76-81 
43 ‘U.S.S.R., The Comintern’, FO comments to the Northern Department, 30th April 1945, TNA, KV 3/303 
44 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State, revised edition, (Allen Lane, London, 2010), p. 84 
45 First made publically available 1999 
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F Division’s time was taken up with convincing others that its reporting was not merely 
kneejerk ideological reaction: 
‘It was clear from the evidence available to the section that there was still a long-term danger to be feared 
from the Communist Party in spite of their ultra-patriotic line, but it was not always easy to sell this idea to 
Government Departments, particularly those who were profiting from the cessation of Communist 
obstruction and offers of positive help. Much rested upon the power of individual members of the section to 
convince our opposite numbers in Government Departments that our views were soundly based on 
knowledge and experience and were not merely the reactionary outpourings of people who had stuck to one 
job for so long that their opinions had become ossified.’46 
Meanwhile, though F Division were at least attempting to monitor the domestic 
communist movement from a far earlier point than any other section of Whitehall 
machinery, their reporting on communist-related material was also often marred by a 
misplaced sense of complacency. This was recorded within the division’s internal war-
time history (completed in early 1945): 
‘New sources have provided a very considerable mass of information of a highly secret nature… It can be 
said that the detailed study of [redacted] on both the Communist and Fascist side has given to F. Division a 
knowledge of the organisational set-up and policy of the movements studied which would certainly be 
alarming, and probably instructive, to the leaders of these movements themselves.’47 
Given that F Division were so confident in their reporting, it is unsurprising that a 
relatively relaxed attitude prevailed more widely across the government, even within the 
Service’s higher echelons. Liddell, made a note in his diary entry for June 19th 1945 that: 
‘Roger [Hollis] came to tell me that he had a telephone check on a communist in the Admiralty called 
BARNETT. The check revealed that this man was a personal friend of Roland Bird (head of MI5’s war-
time censorship section). John Marriot [then head of counter-subversion] thought that Roland ought to be 
told. I am however inclined to agree with Hollis that there is not much point in saying anything for the 
following reasons: (a) Roland Bird may or may not know that the man is a communist but would not 
disclose anything of a really confidential kind; (b) he will in any case be leaving in a month or so; (c) he 
would feel embarrassed if he were at BARNETT’S flat and BARNETT started to call one of his communist 
friends; (d) Roland might feel, in view of his somewhat strong Left Wing tendencies, that the office was 
engaged in a heresy hunt and, worse, that he himself was not trusted; (e) Roland’s present work is not really 
of a confidential nature; (f) if he has the intention of disclosing secret information to BARNETT he could 
have already done so.'
48 
The entry is in many ways extraordinary, particularly when compared against later policy 
and attitudes. Liddell was entirely unfazed by the suggestion that a relatively senior 
member of the Security Service was personal friends with a communist, whilst the fact 
that he decided not to pursue the matter further would seem to be evidence that he 
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believed the risk of potential damage to the State to be negligible.49 However, there is 
perhaps something admirably civil in his well-meaning if naïve insistence that the 
political persuasions of an individual’s friends should not raise questions regarding that 
person’s own loyalties. In any event the entry aptly demonstrates the lack of concern over 
domestic communism at even the highest levels of the British security state at the end of 
the Second World War. 
This being said, there is evidence to suggest that although British intelligence and the 
wider Civil Service were unconcerned with subversion in 1945, the matter was a priority 
for Clement Attlee from the moment of his electoral victory. The newly elected Prime 
Minister, was initially most troubled by the presence of so called ‘crypto-communists’ 
(that is, communist adherents who were not formal members of the CPGB) within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party itself. Of the 393 Labour MPs elected to the House of 
Commons in 1945, both Attlee and Labour General Secretary Morgan Phillips suspected 
that a significant proportion retained allegiance to the Communist Party. Whilst the 
CPGB was at the height of its electoral popularity at the 1945 General Election, its 
general appeal was still highly limited.50 The fact remained that for ambitious politicians 
on the radical left the best chance of electoral success was through the Labour Party. That 
the PLP was being used as a vehicle for communist entryism was a view shared by the 
Security Service, although Attlee’s concern regarding the matter was not. This much is 
made clear via evidence of an exchange between Guy Liddell and a Permanent Under-
Secretary (most likely Geoffrey Munster, Home Office PUS from October 1944-July 
1945) in April 1945: 
‘It might, however, interest Attlee to know that, having failed to affiliate themselves with the Labour Party, 
certain Communists were now seeking Parliamentary representation in the guise of genuine Labour 
candidates. P.U.S. [Permanent Under-Secretary] asked if we would inform Attlee to that effect. I replied 
that I thought the protection of the Labour Party fortress from such infiltration was almost certainly no 
concern whatever of the Security Service.’51 
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MI5 regarded communist entryism to the Labour Party as initially nothing more than a 
matter of Party politics, and therefore an inappropriate subject for investigation. Pre-
election, this assessment was most likely accurate – it seems likely that the most damage 
communists within the PLP could have achieved prior to the 1945 General Election 
would have been to adversely affect Labour’s chances of electoral victory (in a similar 
manner to the damage wrought by the Trotskyite faction ‘Militant Tendency’ in the 
1980s). With Labour’s unexpected victory in 1945 however, the presence of crypto-
communists within the PLP would come to have genuine implications for national 
security – as shall be discussed shortly. 
British intelligence’s lack of concern regarding subversion is understandable within a 
post-war context. What little work that was being attempted on the question of domestic 
communism was significantly hampered by that same problem vexing all other areas of 
British intelligence work at the end of the war. Namely, a substantive lack of both 
intelligence and intelligence sources regarding Soviet and wider communist intentions 
and capabilities. Whilst the Soviet Union, as would only slowly become apparent to 
Whitehall, possessed staggering numbers of intelligence agents both within the British 
security establishment as well as wartime nuclear research elements,52 at the end of the 
war neither MI5 nor MI6 possessed a single Soviet agent of note and were equally 
hindered by a lack of even rudimentary understanding of their opposing Soviet 
intelligence agencies.53 Though the VENONA project had been started in 1943, it had by 
1945 achieved only limited results. Meanwhile, as discussed in the introduction, wartime 
concerns had lead MI5 to largely neglect comprehensive monitoring of the British 
communist movement. This lack of information made it extremely difficult for any 
British intelligence agency to present a compelling case in favour of domestic 
communism posing a credible threat to British interests and all too often reports were 
based upon comparisons of Marxist dialectic with overt Soviet actions rather than 
accurate and timely intelligence.54 Meanwhile, structural problems equally hampered 
Whitehall’s understanding of the issue. As recorded by John Curry, the process of 
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attempting to understand the capabilities and intent of the domestic communist movement 
had long been hindered as a result of inadequate resourcing and organisational machinery: 
‘Since the establishment of the Comintern or Third (Communist) International in March 1919 in Moscow 
and of the (British) Communist Party as a section of the Comintern in August 1920, the nature of this 
problem [communist subversion] has varied even more widely. It is safe to say that the machinery in MI5 – 
or the Security Service – has never been adequate to cope with this problem in the sense of formulating a 
comprehensive appreciation of developments as they occurred, and that during the greater part of the time 
the material for an adequate understanding of it has been lacking.’55 
This was a significant problem, and was compounded by the fact that since the formal 
dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, networks of domestic communist organisations had 
if anything become only harder to accurately monitor.56 A joint Security Service/SIS 
investigation entitled ‘International Organisation of the Communist Party’ dating from 
June 1946 provides ample evidence of this. The investigation – which was headed on the 
MI5 side by Roger Hollis, then working within F Division, and ironically by Kim Philby 
(with the benefit of hindsight one can presume he probably knew more about 
international Communist organisation than any of his colleagues) for MI6 - consisted of a 
series of reports into the historical background of the Comintern and focused upon the 
question of whether the organisation still continued to exist. The concluding comments of 
Hollis, and of the formidable Milicent Bagot, British intelligence’s doyenne of 
Sovietology and reputed inspiration for Connie Sachs – resident Soviet expert in John le 
Carre’s Karla trilogy57 - summed up the prevailing view nicely: 
‘Communists in the past were proud of their membership of the Comintern and its internationalism was part 
of their creed. It is obvious that an International which is so secret that the great mass of its members know 
nothing of its existence is in itself a conception very different from the old Comintern’58 
This then supplemented by Bagot: 
‘There is no doubt that the Soviet government continues to use the component parts of the old Comintern, 
but this report seems to provide no evidence that the Communist parties are being re-organised into a new 
Communist International’59 
F Division recognised to its credit that the dissolution of the Comintern had indeed 
occurred as stated by the Soviets and that its revival in similar form would appear to serve 
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little strategic purpose for Moscow. However, it could not even begin to theorise what 
model may have replaced the Comintern, only that if Soviet subversion efforts were 
taking place then they were extremely covert when compared against the previous model 
of the Third International. Indeed the amount of guesswork, supposition and dearth of 
accuracy which formed the basis of British estimates post-war is demonstrated with 
almost wearying irony under the ‘Counter-Intelligence Problems’ section of the file:  
‘It is not likely that in direct espionage the Russians will in the future present more of a problem than in the 
past – though the possibility cannot be excluded that… their appetite for information on British and US war 
potential may considerably increase in the future.’60 
British intelligence estimates immediately post-war woefully underestimated the threat 
posed by Soviet espionage. Moreover, the intelligence services themselves lacked not 
only the information, but also the means of obtaining information which would have been 
necessary to perform accurate analysis and indeed alert the services that greater analysis 
of Soviet means and intent was urgently required. This same point – applied across the 
British intelligence structure as a whole – became evident only in painful retrospect, as 
was made clear by Air Chief Marshall Sir Douglas Evill in his eponymous 1947 report 
regarding British intelligence organisation: 
‘The study of Russia was only started seriously within the last two years. The virtual absence of the most 
elementary and basic forms of intelligence on that country meant that there was, and still is, a very great 
leeway to be made up concerning Russia as compared with the rest of the world. Furthermore, we find the 
greatest difficulty in remedying this situation, largely owing to the rigorous security arrangements within 
the Soviet Union and the satellite countries.’61 
 Under the circumstances it is unsurprising that the threat posed by domestic communism 
drew little by way of ministerial attention at the end of the war and that scant preventative 
action was taken at that early stage. British intelligence at the war’s end lacked the means 
by which to execute comprehensive and timely analysis of both Soviet policy and more 
specifically, its ties to domestic communism. Furthermore, such was the scarcity of 
information and resources, neither ministers nor intelligence officers themselves could yet 
identify that this constituted a major flaw within national security policy. 
Subversion and Atomic Espionage 
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It would not be long, however, before British intelligence was roused from its blissful 
state of naiveté. On the evening of the 5th September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher 
clerk employed by the Soviet military’s Main Intelligence Directorate (henceforth GRU), 
walked out of his place of work at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with over 100 highly 
classified documents stuffed down the front of his shirt.62 He then attempted to approach 
the Ottawa Journal, from where he was rebuffed, before the next day contacting the 
Canadian Department of Justice only to be turned away again whilst being threatened 
with vague accusations of arrest for being in the possession of stolen documents.63 It is 
testament to the novelty of Gouzenko’s 1945 defection that initially no branch of the 
Canadian government nor press wanted to have any contact whatsoever – viewing his 
actions more as a source of potential diplomatic upset than an opportunity to acquire 
exceptionally informative intelligence.64 It was only once local police were called to 
Gouzenko’s flat, after a neighbour discovered four individuals from the Soviet embassy 
ransacking the premises – amongst them the head of the NKVD station in Canada & 
assistant military attaché – that action was taken. After the arrival of local police, 
Gouzenko was brought to the headquarters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 
order for his story and documents to be investigated.65 It was as well they were, for the 
documents revealed the existence not only of an extensive GRU spy-ring, which had 
penetrated the Canadian parliament, Department of External Affairs, Royal Canadian Air 
Force intelligence – but more shockingly that the Soviet Union had obtained 
‘documentary materials of the atomic bomb: the technological processes, drawings and 
calculations’66 as well as fissile material via agents of Soviet intelligence embedded in 
Western nuclear research efforts. Indeed, it transpired that acquisition of this data had 
been in large part facilitated due to the efforts of a British subject – the Cambridge 
physicist Alan Nunn-May – who most notably had passed samples of enriched uranium-
235 & uranium 233 to his Soviet handler a mere three days after the detonation of 'Little 
Boy' over Hiroshima.67 These materials’ usefulness in accelerating the Soviet nuclear 
weaponry program is demonstrated by the striking technical similarity of ‘Joe-1’, the first 
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model of Soviet atomic bomb, with the US ‘Fat-Man’ dropped on Nagasaki.68  In a 
stroke, British intelligence was made aware of just how painfully little was known about 
Soviet intentions and capabilities and indeed – thanks to the nuclear aspect of the case - 
that the threat facing Britain from the Soviet Union had the potential to be so great as to 
be existential. Meanwhile, the files recovered also indicated that much of Soviet 
Intelligence’s accomplishment had stemmed initially from their successful exploitation of 
subversive elements within the West. As stated within the Royal Commission report 
appointed by the Canadian government to review the matter in February 1946: 
‘The Royal Commission reported that perhaps the most startling aspect of the entire network was the 
uncanny success with which Russians were able to find Canadians who were willing to betray their country. 
In this connection they found that it had been “overwhelmingly established by the evidence throughout that 
the Communist movement was the principal base within which the espionage network was recruited; and 
that it not only supplied personnel with adequately developed motivation, but provided the organisational 
framework wherein recruiting could be and was carried out safely and efficiently.”… They find that the 
evidence shows that in the great majority of cases motivation was inextricably linked with courses of 
psychological development carried on under the guise of activities of a secret section of the Communist 
Party’69 
In the view of the Royal Commission, the success of Soviet espionage efforts in Canada 
could be directly traced back to the exploitation of domestic subversives, who provided 
an effective recruitment pool from which willing & motivated agents could be sourced, 
often in possession or having the potential to possess both professional influence and 
access to sensitive information. It follows then, that counter-subversion – specifically 
directed towards communists – was suddenly elevated from a peripheral position on the 
spectrum of British security concerns, to being one of central importance was in large part 
as a direct result of information acquired in the aftermath of Gouzenko’s defection. By 
the point of Norman Brook’s wholesale review of British intelligence, communist 
subversion was deemed a central responsibility of MI5: ‘It is the first duty of a Security 
Service to counter subversive activities by communists’.70 The outcome of Gouzenko’s 
defection was twofold – firstly, it demonstrated to Whitehall that the Soviet Union was 
actively engaged in an extensive espionage campaign designed to undermine the national 
security of multiple Western nations. Meanwhile secondly, it indicated that to Soviet 
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espionage efforts were designed around the exploitation of domestic subversive networks 
already present within Western countries. 
This being said, official belief in a link between atomic espionage and domestic 
subversion was not predicated solely on the evidence of the Gouzenko affair. 
Developments within the United Kingdom itself also helped to convince both ministers 
and security personnel of the heightened importance of counter-subversion to British 
national security. July 1946 saw the founding of the World Federation of Scientific 
Workers (henceforth WFSW), at the British Association of Scientific Workers’ annual 
London conference.71 The organisation, headed by a pair of noted scientists, French 
nuclear physicist Frédéric Joliot Curie & British crystallographer John Desmond Bernal,72 
purported to be a trade union and advocacy group for both scientists and lab workers, 
organised along professional rather than national lines. Problematically, however, both 
Joliot-Curie and Bernal were ardent and committed communists – a speech by Bernal at 
the group’s first conference, held in Moscow in 1949, gives an idea of their ideological 
leanings: 
‘For now in capitalist countries the direction of science is in the hands of those whose only aim is to destroy 
and torture people so that their own profits may be secured for some years longer. They show this by their 
choice of weapons, not those of combat against equally armed opponents but weapons of mass destruction, 
for destroying houses and fields, for poisoning and maiming women and children.... The fact is that science 
in the hand of a decayed capitalism can never be employed usefully; it can only lead to increased 
exploitation, unemployment, crises and war. Under capitalism war is poisoning science... Only under 
capitalism is it true that science can bring no happiness, but only destruction.’73 
More worrying for British intelligence, however, was the involvement in the group of the 
British physicist Norman Veall.74 Veall had already been placed under surveillance as a 
result of his suspected involvement in the Canadian espionage ring detailed within the 
Gouzenko files, with not enough evidence being present to secure a criminal conviction.75 
Furthermore, Veall was known to be a close associate of Alan Nunn-May, having been 
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supervised by him as an undergraduate at Cambridge as well as working with him at labs 
in Canada and had been assessed by MI5 as someone who would almost certainly seek to 
pass on classified material to the Soviet Union should he ever gain access to it.76 The 
formation of the WFSW would appear to be precisely what the Security Service were 
most wary of post-Gouzenko and provided further evidence of domestic communist 
movements being used as fronts for direct espionage. As stated within the initial Security 
Service assessment of the group: 
‘The W.F.S.W offers very clear chances to the Soviet Union and to her satellites for the collection and 
collation of scientific information, particularly on such matters as nuclear physics and armament 
production. Though it would be untrue to suggest that the W.F.S.W is at present being used as a Trade 
Union international for technical and scientific workers, attempts may well be made to bring this about, 
indeed for the purposes of interfering with the rearmament and recovery programs of the Western Powers, 
the W.F.S.W. can provide a useful instrument of Soviet policy. The future activities of the Federation can 
be expected to become increasingly covert, and to operate through the trusted Party members in each 
country who are represented in the W.F.S.W. affiliate concerned.’77 
In other words, become the sort of network which had led to the large-scale penetration of 
the Canadian government, only now with a direct and explicit interest in scientists and 
technicians who might have access to Western nuclear secrets. The report was correct in 
its assumption as the WFSW actively sought to recruit nuclear physicists as an overriding 
priority.78 Here then was clear and immediate evidence of a subversive front organisation 
being established on British soil, which had the potential to recruit individuals who might 
be in a position to disclose intensely sensitive information regarding British nuclear 
research efforts. Though the WFSW and its membership never ultimately threatened 
British interests in any particularly serious way – in part due to MI5’s extensive 
monitoring – the organisation would nevertheless remain a target of significant interest 
for MI5 for a considerable period of time, who maintained files on the group through the 
mid-1960s.79 
Concern regarding atomic research also served to convince British intelligence that 
crypto-communist MPs within the Labour Party were a threat to national security. 
Labour’s election victory, coupled with Attlee’s decision to begin exploring the 
possibility of an independent British nuclear device in August 1945, meant that crypto-
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communist MPs’ theoretical ability to damage British security increased dramatically. 
Concern was caused not so much by fears that crypto-communists could actively hinder 
the government’s agenda, as a voting bloc crypto-MPs were too small to actively disrupt 
parliamentary proceedings. Meanwhile, open rebellion gave PLP leadership an excuse to 
evict crypto-communists from the Party, as in the cases of the MPs Hutchinson, Platts-
Mills, Solley and Zillacus, who were all expelled from the Labour Party in 1949 
ostensibly on account of their opposition to the NATO vote.80 Rather, concern on the part 
of the PM and Security Service was heightened by the fact that crypto-communists were 
by no means socially or professionally isolated from the main PLP membership and 
indeed retained the potential for advancement within the Party – which therefore meant 
that they had the potential to influence party-politics in the long run and, more 
importantly, could potentially eventually access sensitive information regarding 
governmental intentions. The case of Geoffrey Bing provides a useful example. Elected 
as MP for Hornchurch in 1945, Bing’s early career was notable for a pattern of 
involvement with radical leftism dating back to the 1930s. The MP was active in a 
number of radical left-wing advocacy groups during the pre-war years and appeared on 
MI5’s early-war Officer Cadet Training Unit ‘Stop’ list (listing those to be prohibited 
from gaining a commission) due to suspected communist associations.81 Post-war proof 
of Bing’s (and others) continued association with the CPGB was provided via MI5’s 
routine monitoring of the telephone lines of known Communist Party members and 
CPGB headquarters: 
‘Victor GOLLANZ [noted communist publisher] [sic] rings Betty REID [CPGB organiser in charge of 
Party discipline] and they discuss the election results. B: Maurice WEBB [Labour MP] is in and so is 
Stephen SWINGLER [Labour MP]. Victor G. thought it a great joke that two communists had got in… He 
also asked whether Geoffrey BING and PLATTS-MILLS [John Platts-Mills, Labour MP] had been 
successful, but Betty didn’t know.’82 
Bing was not, however, professionally isolated from the mainstream Labour Party. As 
stated by the Security Service:  
‘The position of Geoffrey BING at the present time would seem to be of considerable interest. He remains a 
crypto-Communist and is in regular touch with the Party behind the scenes. At the same time he is being 
relied upon by Aneurin Bevan to an increasing extent and is regarded by Bevan as a key man in his 
organisation. It is stated that in the event of Bevan becoming Prime Minister of some future Labour 
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government BING has been earmarked for the post of Chief Whip… BING is regarded, both by Communist 
leaders and the Bevanites, as the best tactician in the House.’83 
The presence of crypto-communists within the Parliamentary Labour Party therefore had 
wider security implications regarding what subjects the Prime Minister could openly 
discuss and with whom. With this in mind, the PM’s decision to convene 1945’s GEN 75 
and 1947’s GEN 163 (the Cabinet committees responsible for nuclear development) 
essentially in secret is placed in new context, as is Attlee’s comment a decade later that he 
justified secrecy on these matters on the grounds that ‘I thought some of them (Cabinet 
members) were not fit to be trusted with secrets of this kind’.84 
This need for official secrecy helps to explain why the matter of crypto-communist MPs 
was elevated to a position of central importance by 1946. Within days of his appointment 
in spring 1946, the new Director General Sir Percy Sillitoe was summoned to the Prime 
Minister’s Office and instructed to inform Attlee – and him alone – about any MPs of 
whatever party who were ‘proven to be members of a subversive organisation’.85 Sillitoe 
was furnished with a list of fifteen ‘lost sheep’, who were believed by Labour General 
Secretary Morgan Phillips to be crypto-communist entryists and asked to investigate the 
truth of the matter.86 Such a request was indicative of MI5’s then place within Whitehall, 
whereby it was still directly answerable only to the PM, an arrangement which would 
only change in 1952 under the Churchill government following the Service’s delegation 
to the Home Secretary under the Maxwell Fyfe directive.87 This being said, certain 
elements within the wider Service remained leery of Attlee’s intentions. In the case of 
Liddell, it took a personal meeting with Attlee before he was convinced to acquiesce to 
the PM’s request that all information on subversive MPs should be passed to him directly: 
‘I told him about the summons I had had from Mr. Bellenger [Secretary of State for War] and that, in view 
of the letter from the P.M., I had thought fit to go ahead and give him the information that he required. I 
did, however, think that a matter of principle was involved. I handed to him a questionnaire asking him 
generally what action he requires to take in the case of MPs belonging to subversive movements, and in the 
case of MPs who had close contacts with subversive movements. Without answering each question in 
detail, he said that he thought that he alone should be informed in every case where we had positive 
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information that a Member of Parliament was a member of a subversive organisation, whether that member 
was also a member of the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, or any other Party represented in the House 
of Commons. I thought he was not very specific; I gathered that he felt that he had a responsibility to the 
House and country to see that such members did not get into positions where they might constitute a danger 
to the state.’88 
Worryingly for Attlee, the list the provided to the Security Service was neither wholly 
accurate, nor exhaustive. The identity of crypto-communists were not always obvious to 
the Prime Minister, which further heightened his concern. As recorded by Guy Liddell in 
1947: 
‘I thereupon gave him the names of PLATTS-MILLS, HUTCHINSON, Leah MANNING [educational 
reformer and Labour MP] and Mrs. BRADDOCK [Bessie Braddock, Labour MP]. He was not surprised to 
hear about HUTCHINSON, and had already taken it for granted the PLATTS-MILLS was a C.P. 
[Communist Party] member. He was however, considerably shaken to hear of Leah MANNING and Mrs. 
BRADDOCK. He then volunteered the information to me that he thought DODDS was a C.P. member; that 
SWINGLER probably was, and that D.N. PRITT almost certainly was. I said that only in the cases of 
BING, PLATTS-MILLS, HUTCHINSON, Leah MANNING and Mrs. BRADDOCK had we positive 
proof.’89 
Given Attlee’s usual reserve, the fact that he allowed himself to appear ‘visibly shaken’ to 
Liddell, would appear to demonstrate the gravity with which the PM regarded the matter. 
In this case, his dismay was most likely caused by the fact that Braddock had, as of 1947, 
had just been elevated to a seat on the Labour National Executive Committee and thus 
was already in a position of considerable intra-Party influence.90 The PM was aware of 
the problem of communist entryism to the Labour Party, however it was only once MI5 
undertook independent investigation of the matter that it scale became realised. 
From all this therefore, it follows that the catalyst for official concern regarding 
communist subversion was fear related to atomic espionage. As evidenced, these two 
subjects were understood as separate phenomena, however also to be intrinsically linked. 
The experience of the Gouzenko affair served to convince Whitehall that the success of 
Soviet espionage efforts ultimately hinged upon the exploitation of domestic subversive 
groups for the purposes of recruitment and transmission of information. That this model 
was not a purely Canadian phenomenon was indicated by the formation of the World 
Federation of Scientific Workers in London in late 1945 – a Soviet backed group which 
masqueraded as a union for lab workers and scientists whilst actively seeking to recruit 
nuclear physicists. Meanwhile, atomic espionage concerns also finally served to convince 
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the Security Service that the presence of crypto-communists within the Labour Party was 
no longer merely a matter of politics, but rather could have a grave and detrimental 
impact upon the security of nuclear policy deliberations. 
Early Official Response 
Despite evidence that communist subversion presented a very real - and possibly 
existential by proxy, due to nuclear research implications – threat to the security and 
stability of the United Kingdom; and also despite open acknowledgement that Britain 
knew far too little about communist intentions, capabilities and motivations – changes to 
counter-subversion policy and machinery were still ponderous. The explanation for this 
was comprised of several different factors, not least of which a tendency to view the 
escalation of anti-communist measures as unacceptable from a political standpoint. As 
late as 1949 the argument was still made that: 
 ‘So long as the British Communist Party still remains a legal political organisation the Government cannot 
undertake officially any action to discredit it’91 
Counter-subversion measures still seemed uncomfortably repressive, whilst the weight of 
evidence available seemed insufficient to favour increased security over political liberty. 
Beyond this, there was still a certain degree of mistrust between the Security Service and 
the presiding Labour government under Clement Attlee. Certain elements within the 
Labour backbenches still, erroneously, blamed MI5 for the publication in the Daily Mail 
of the ‘Zinoviev Letter’, days before the 1924 General Election.92 Feelings of suspicion 
were, it appears, mutual – with many of the senior leadership of MI5 blaming – again 
erroneously – for the appointment of Sir Percy Sillitoe, a former police officer, to the 
position of Director General in 1946 (Sillitoe had in fact been appointed unanimously by 
a Whitehall interviewing committee composed primarily of senior Civil Servants).93 
Sillitoe was disliked from the outset, as much due to the fact that his appointment was 
perceived as a snub to MI5 careerists as base snobbery.94 One particularly catty entry 
from the diaries of Guy Liddell sums up attitudes rather well: 
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‘1) It is a mistake to appoint a policeman since the work of this office is entirely different from police work.  
2) It puts the stamp of the Gestapo on this office. 
3) It creates a false impression in the minds of police forces general and of the Services that MI5 is a kind 
of police dept. 
4) It generally down-grades the office.95 
Equally, it is important not to discount Attlee’s personal outlook and style of leadership. 
He was not prone to alarmism,96 had a tendency to want to believe the best of people and 
preferred strongly in adhering to the use of the Whitehall system of cabinet and 
committees as a means for facilitating both decision making and gradual, measured 
change.97 As things were, it took until February 1947 and the publication of the Canadian 
Royal Commission’s report into the Gouzenko case before any substantive escalation of 
anti-communist measures was made. By chance, the publication of the Royal 
Commission’s report happened to coincide with the ministerial release of a pair of Joint 
Intelligence Committee reports, entitled the ‘Spread of Communism Throughout the 
World and the Extent of Its Direction From Moscow’ and ‘The Communist Party as a 
Fifth Column in the Event of War with Russia’.98 Both reports can be summarised nicely 
via the corresponding Prime Ministerial brief: 
‘The salient points from the conclusions of these two reports are that:- 
(a) Communism is the most important external political menace confronting the British Commonwealth. 
(b) Inside the United Kingdom it is sufficiently well organised to be in a position to cause considerable 
dislocation of our war effort. 
(c) Since the Communist Party is highly centralised, it is vulnerable to official counter-measures, the 
effectiveness of which would depend on the extent to which they could break up any war-time shadow 
organisation as well as the open party leadership. 
The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee consider that the situation that these two reports disclose constitutes 
a serious menace to the defence of the Commonwealth and one which will undoubtedly increase if counter-
measures are not adopted.’99 
As previously mentioned, the Canadian investigation into the Gouzenko affair had 
concluded that Soviet espionage efforts had been actively facilitated via the use of 
domestic subversive networks and moreover that such espionage efforts could feasibly be 
recreated in other major Western nations. As the preceding extract shows, this hypothesis 
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was directly supported by JIC analysis which indicated that subversives could also pose a 
real and credible threat to effective British action in the case of war with the Soviet 
Union. Both reports were considered at the meeting of GEN 164, the ad-hoc ministerial 
meeting which provided the basis for GEN 183 (see below), and thus seem to have 
substantially influenced both the PM and Home Secretary’s thinking regarding the nature 
of the communist subversive threat.100 
In perhaps typical Attleean fashion, the initial response to these heightened concerns was 
the formation of a committee – namely the appropriately titled Cabinet Committee on 
Subversive Activities, or GEN 183.101 Although MI5’s F Division was tasked specifically 
with researching and countering domestic subversion, no ministerial body existed within 
Whitehall machinery prior to 1947 specifically purposed with its deliberation. The 
membership of the newly formed committee was particularly senior, chaired as it was by 
the Prime Minister himself, with the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Minister of 
Defence and Minister for Labour comprising the permanent membership.102 The 
subordinate working party was similarly influential, including senior representation from 
the Home Office, all three branches of the armed services as well as the Ministry for 
Labour, Foreign Office and representatives from both MI5 and SIS, which again would 
seem to indicate the severity with which communism was regarded by 
Whitehall.103Meanwhile, such was the perceived sensitivity of the committee’s remit that 
great lengths were taken to ensure that its role was obfuscated as greatly as possible. The 
name of the committee was deliberately vague and intended to stave off accusations of 
political partiality.104 The publically avowed purpose of both committee and working 
group being to ‘Keep under consideration the activities of subversive movements, at 
home and abroad, and to make recommendations from time to time on any counter-
measures that appear to be desirable.’105 Meanwhile, it should be stressed that the ‘public’ 
element of the committee was very much limited, its minutes were classified as top secret, 
whilst it was deliberately omitted from the Cabinet committees record book and listed 
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only as ‘Committee 51’ in non-classified correspondence.106With regards to its remit, in 
actuality the committee was focused almost exclusively on matters pertaining to 
communism. The minutes of an early meeting of the working party make abundantly 
clear that from the outset domestic communism was the only subversive element 
considered to be of particular import by the group’s members: 
‘THE CHAIRMAN outlined the Working Party’s functions and pointed out that they included 
consideration of all subversive movements whether of the extreme right or of the extreme left. IT WAS 
AGREED, after discussion, that neither the Fascists nor the Trotskyists were of any present importance and 
that only the Communist Party constituted a serious problem… The CHAIRMAN enquired how far the day 
to day activities of the Communist Party were directed from Moscow. MR. HOLLIS said that there was no 
evidence of day to day guidance and a great deal of negative evidence that the party was left to itself… 
There was no doubt, however, that the Party would accept any detailed instructions which Moscow might 
wish to give. The Working Party then considered the influence of the Communist Party in industry, the 
Armed Forces, the police and the Civil Service.’107 
From this point onwards, any official mention of domestic subversion even without the 
adjectival prefix of ‘communist’ may be considered to be directed primarily at 
communism. Certainly fascism was an ideology of negligible influence in Britain by 
1947, as official disruption efforts during as well as overt public hostility served to 
marginalise any remaining fascists to the point of irrelevance.108 Meanwhile, Trotskyism 
was considered by officials to essentially be a mere fringe interpretation of communism – 
the distinction only really of minor technical importance and best left to political theorists 
to bicker over. Commenting on the distinction in 1942, Sir Desmond Morton then 
personal assistant to Churchill and heavily connected to British Intelligence as a result of 
his work with SIS during the 1920s,109 commented in a report on Communism to the 
Prime Minister: 
‘Books have been written upon the economic theory of Communism. They are intensely dull… Only 
arguments with instructed “Communists” require an understanding of all the “isms”, Communism, 
Marxism, Trotskyism, Fascism, Bukharinism and others. In reality they are all but detachable labels, affixed 
by emissaries of the IIIrd International or their dupes to whatever idea best suits their current plans.’110 
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To look forward slightly, that such a view remained relatively consistent and unchanged – 
if perhaps expressed with slightly greater nuance – is demonstrated by the content of Sir 
Norman Brook’s 1951 report: 
‘We cannot have multiple brands of Communism or multiple sets of ideas about it in the Security Service, 
and I do not think anyone would dispute this. The proper keeper of the Security Service conscience is thus 
the head of F-division, with those of his staff who maintain a proper watch on, and make a systemic study 
of Communism as a whole. But besides community of thought, there must be community of action.’111 
That is to say, communists were communists no matter the stripe, and were to be treated 
in a uniform manner. As to where best to focus counter-subversion efforts – attention was 
directed first towards the Civil Service. All three branches of the Armed Forces reported 
only limited communist activity within their ranks and all by personnel who would soon 
be demobilised in any event.112 Where previous contemporaneous counter-subversion 
efforts had been predominantly directed towards the Armed Forces and industry,113 the 
late 1940s was the first time Whitehall had paid any real attention in the modern era 
towards disloyalty amongst the civilian representatives of the British government. 
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the report on communist activity in industry – 
delivered by Sir Guildhaume Myrddin-Evans of the Ministry for Labour – was 
surprisingly conciliatory towards the subject of working class militancy. The point was 
made that although there was evidence of communist involvement in recent strike action, 
said strikes typically ‘had genuine grievances and while the Communists might have 
taken advantage of them, they were not primarily responsible’.114 This was a view echoed 
throughout all wings of the British State during the Attlee period. 1950 saw the Home 
Office commission a major survey (the entire document runs to some 450 pages) of 
Communist influence in Trade Unions. This was a direct result of the 1950 gas workers 
strike, which had led to a sentence of imprisonment for a month (later repealed) of 10 
workers under the provisions of order 1305 - a piece of wartime legislation first enacted 
in 1941 which effectively banned strike action in favour of a governmental arbitrations 
court. Again, the conclusions of the report were notable for the conciliatory manner with 
which they approach industrial grievance. As noted within the report: 
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‘Special Branch and the Security Service both say that the Communist Party is not moving officially in the 
matter of the gas strikers’ appeals, but that individual Party members are working actively to ferment 
opposition to Order 1305 and to organise a demand among trade unionists that the sentences on the gas 
strikers be quashed. There is no doubt that the Party is doing its best by such methods to exploit a heaven 
sent opportunity of gaining sympathy among the rank and file of trade unionists by supporting their 
opposition to the prosecution of strikers.’115 
In other words, outdated – and what in peacetime could be interpreted as openly 
combative – legislation served to provide a vehicle through which communists could 
attempt to gain influence. Similar problems were encountered as a result of 1948’s wage 
freeze. Though supported by the TUC (as was Order 1305), dissent and unofficial strike 
action broke out amongst dock-workers due to the policy. Again, there was attempted 
exploitation by communists, which came to nought.116 There existed a recognition on the 
part of many in Whitehall that where poor relations existed between the government and 
trade unionists, often as not the root cause lay in justifiable frustration with an outmoded 
legal framework than communist agitation. It is telling that the advice provided to the 
cabinet as a result of the report was not to legislate for further powers, but rather to 
abolish an unhelpful law which only served to stoke tension.117 Indeed, there seems little 
evidence that outright class-based suspicion fuelled any part of the drive towards more 
active counter-communist measures. The dock strikes of 1949 (during which Attlee 
declared a state of emergency and enlisted the help of the army to unload goods arriving 
into the country)118 perhaps strained these conclusions somewhat, and the White Paper on 
the matter made reference to the fact that ‘the campaign was founded on the support of 
the members of the Communist Party’.119 However, the majority of evidence available 
indicates that neither the elected government nor the intelligence services believed at this 
point that attempted communist infiltration of trade unions and industry presented the 
greatest subversive threat to British stability. By way of comparison, there was no 
rhetoric akin to the acrimonious relationship which would define later relations between 
officialdom and trade unionism, for instance the planned labelling of the National Union 
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of Mineworkers as the ‘enemy within’120 by Margaret Thatcher in 1984. Fears regarding 
the exploitation by communists of trade union militancy do not appear to have been the 
primary focus at this stage of counter-subversive policy reform. Certainly Whitehall was 
aware of communist interest in the unions: 
 ‘The Communist Party has long recognised the importance of capturing British Trade Unions with which 
the Labour Party provide the political basis of the current government. It exerts an influence on trade Union 
policy and on public affairs generally greater than its mere numerical strength secures for it at the polls.’121  
However, it still saw the main threat of communist subversion as ultimately emanating 
from the intellectual internationalist wing of British communism. As put by Peter 
Hennessey ‘it was the brains of the Communist Party carried in the heads of the 
professional classes against which the realm of George VI had to be defended’122. The 
conclusions drawn from the Gouzenko case give reason for this, the Canadian Royal 
Commission report shared with Whitehall attributed communist recruitment opportunities 
as deriving from intellectual groups and organisations rather than heavy industry:  
‘ZABOTIN [Soviet military attaché in Ottawa], found already in existence in Ottawa, Montreal and 
Toronto numerous study groups where Communist philosophy and techniques were studied and where 
writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and later authors were read and discussed. To outsiders these groups 
adopted various disguises, such as social gatherings, music-listening groups and groups for discussing 
international politics and economics. In some at least of these groups dues were collected and the money 
used for various purposes including assistance to Communist Party leaders and the purchase of Communist 
literature… These study groups were in fact “cells” and were the recruiting centres for agents, and the 
medium of developing the necessary frame of mind which was a preliminary condition to eventual service 
of the Soviet Union in a more practical way.’123 
The evidence Gouzenko provided indicated that Soviet espionage sought overwhelmingly 
to recruit from amongst intellectuals and that moreover implied that those employed in 
industry simply would not have access to the types of information sought by Soviet 
intelligence. Meanwhile, when analysing the British state those most likely to fit the 
intellectual template, as well as have access to the sorts of sensitive information which 
could prove of interest to a foreign government, were primarily employed within the 
various departments and ministries of the Civil Service. Claims that British security was 
fundamentally flawed by a slavish adherence to class-based snobbery until the shock of 
Burgess, Maclean & Philby’s defections forced reform should be treated with 
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considerable scepticism.124 From all this it is clearly evident that certainly during the mid-
1940s suspicion was directed predominantly at the upper-middle class – intellectuals and 
civil servants – not the working class. 
Negative Vetting 
Still, however, Whitehall found itself hampered by obsolete governmental machinery. 
The risk of subversives within the government itself may have worried the Cabinet, yet 
Attlee possessed inadequate tools to enact precautionary measures. The implementation 
of the most obvious counter-measure, security vetting, was hindered almost to the point 
of uselessness by an antiquated and haphazardly applied system.  With the benefit of 
historical perspective it is difficult not to agree that vetting procedures for the Civil 
Service were in dire need of reform. The report of the Cabinet Committee on Subversive 
Activities Working Party regarding communist influence within the civil service made it 
abundantly clear the amount of variation and partiality inherent to the pre-1947 system as 
well as its lack of central oversight: 
‘Normally, established staff are regarded as fit from the point of view of security for employment on secret 
work and in the ordinary way such staff are not vetted on appointment. Exceptionally, Departments may 
arrange for an established officer to be vetted, e.g., where the work is of a particularly secret nature or 
where the individual, by his association or record, has given rise to legitimate doubts about his discretion 
and reliability. The extent to which temporary staff are vetted must largely depend on the work of the 
Department and its arrangement.’125 
As a result of Gouzenko’s defection, the detection of atom spies such as Klaus Fuchs via 
the VENONA program and the public exposure of the ‘Cambridge Five’ it is easy to – 
rightly – criticise the government’s, chaotic at best & non-existent at worst, approach to 
security vetting pre-1947. However, is important to note that clamour for centralisation 
and standardisation of governmental vetting procedure had occurred internally for some 
time. Concerns regarding vetting had certainly surfaced during the course of the War, as 
evidenced by the Royal Air Force’s formal complaint to MI5 dating from 1942: 
‘Director General – It is submitted that the methods, by which the Security Service investigate subversive 
activities in the forces, need revising. There are two reasons why this has become urgent. The first is the 
necessity for the Security Service to treat members of subversive political organisations with a uniform 
policy, whether such members happen to be in the Armed Forces or in the factories or in Government 
Departments… The existing organisation of the Security Service provides that when the investigating 
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sections of F. Division find a communist or fascist in, or about to join, the Armed Forces that the case is 
passed to F.1, who apply to it their own rules and standards, which are to some extent different from those 
of F.2 and F.3… To sum up: the changing policy of the Government towards subversive political parties, 
coupled with the steps which the communists have taken to wriggle out of observation in the Armed Forces, 
obliges the Security Service to alter its arrangements and to investigate all subversive activities with 
uniform machinery and by uniform standards.’126  
Moreover, the Security Service had already been caught out through the failure to enforce 
vetting standards during the War. Information gathered as a result of the arrests for 
espionage of Douglas ‘David’ Springhall, the national organiser for the CPGB, in June 
1943 as well as the of David Uren, a captain in the Special Operations Executive, that 
same year had led to F division circulating a list of some 57 members of the CPGB 
employed in sensitive work in both Government Departments and critical war 
industries.127 MI5 was forced to confess that these individuals had slipped through the 
system predominantly as a result of loopholes in the vetting system and an uneven 
application of protocols across government departments.128 The ensuing investigation into 
communists employed on secret work, which was led by F Division, urged in autumn 
1943 that standardised vetting procedure be adopted and communists transferred from 
sensitive positions. In a statement which was in hindsight highly prescient David Clarke, 
the officer in charge of the investigation concluded that: 
‘The whole experience of the Security Service shows that members of the Communist Party place their 
loyalty to the Party above their loyalty to their Service and that their signature of the Official Secrets Act 
always carries a mental reservation in favour of the Party.’129  
Despite such exhortations, little action was taken beyond the appointment of a token 
communist employment review board, before which only a single case was brought 
before its dissolution in 1945.130 
It follows that the introduction of a standardised vetting procedure was not a radically 
new proposal, merely one which had previously lacked the necessary political will to be 
enacted – prior to the exposure of the Canadian spy ring it had been felt that ‘the 
governing factor was the need to reduce the burden of this type of work on the Security 
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Service to a minimum’.131 It took the revelations provided by Gouzenko’s defection, 
coupled with increasing concern over Soviet intentions before finally the impetus needed 
to begin to implement reform was provided. It is worth stressing here that, perhaps 
counterintuitively, the bulk of resistance to proposed vetting reform came from the 
Security Service itself. On a practical level the Service was deeply sceptical as to how 
effectively it could successfully prosecute mass vetting to the standard required with its 
current staffing and funding levels.132 Government departments lobbying for more 
funding has been a constant since time immemorial – so this is hardly surprising in of 
itself. What is more notable however is to find that MI5 had severe reservations about 
vetting on the grounds of civil liberties and personal privacy. Perhaps as a result of 
lingering memories of Nazi Germany, MI5’s staff and officers were extremely eager to 
avoid any sort of situation which may have found the Service drifting into the role of 
quasi-authoritarian secret police. The matter was not settled quickly and would drag on 
for some time. Guy Liddell’s diary provides an excellent summary of the concerns, as he 
recorded his opportunity to voice them in person when meeting with Herbert Morrison 
(Deputy Prime Minister) in 1948. 
‘I said that I should like him to know that all these cases are handled with scrupulous care and impartiality, 
and that so far from being a set of irresponsible autocrats in these matters, it was our Department which was 
exercising a restraining hand not only on the Working Party set up by the Cabinet, but also on all 
Government Departments. It seemed to me that in the Press, Parliament and in the public mind generally a 
totally false impression was being allowed to grow up about the work of our Department. This could not be 
otherwise than extremely damaging to our work in the future, particularly to the cooperation we get from 
the Police, Government Departments and various administrations overseas. It seemed to me that there was a 
serious risk of our being used as a whipping boy...’133 
Liddell was possessed of the understandable fear that MI5 would be forced into taking up 
a, undoubtedly highly unpopular, role of government inquisition only to find itself later 
accused as having acted in an unethical, indeed perhaps unconstitutional, manner should 
the political winds change. The episode gives testament to the novelty of the challenge 
faced in the late 1940s. Britain had not had to confront an ideologically based threat of 
this magnitude certainly within living memory, and the tools required to combat it often 
appeared strange and potentially suspect. 
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Further evidence that vetting reform was motivated by a genuine concern for security, 
rather than a desire to enforce political orthodoxy, can be gained by examining the 
discussions which lead to its introduction. The government’s argument was that the state 
had a right to protect itself and that adherence to communist ideology ultimately led to a 
divided loyalty.134 Negative vetting seemed to fulfil the dual requirements of filtering out 
potential security risks before they could come into contact with sensitive information 
whilst simultaneously being in keeping with the requirements of British law and sense of 
liberty. The biblical metaphor ‘sheep from goats’ seems to have persisted as the 
illustration of Cabinet thinking at the time. The full quotation, derived from the 1947 
Working Party on Subversive Activities report on Civil Servant employment as follows: 
‘This is not to say that all Communists would be prepared, even after long exposure to Communist 
indoctrination, to betray their country by consenting to work for Russian espionage agent; but there is no 
way of separating the sheep from the goats, at least until the damage has been done or suspicion is aroused, 
and even if a Communist Party member conceives himself to be entirely loyal to this country, he may not be 
averse from furthering what he regards as the constitutional aims of the Party by supplying information 
which may be of use to their political manoeuvres. Such an individual may easily become an unconscious 
espionage agent by supplying information which he thinks will be used for political purposes only, but is 
being passed to Russian agents by intermediaries.’135 
With regards to the specifics, by modern standards the initial introduction of negative 
vetting, or ‘purge procedure’ seems remarkably gentle.136 Communists were prohibited 
only from employment in areas where they may be have been reasonably expected to 
come into contact with sensitive material, though this standard was applied in the loosest 
possible way. Even within the various governmental branches of the Armed Forces – 
namely the newly formed Ministry of Defence, Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry – 
it was felt that work could still be found for communist employees.137 The aim was not to 
enact some sort of political witch-hunt within the Civil Service, though the terminology 
of ‘purge procedure’ sounds perhaps uncomfortably reactionary, but rather to enact basic 
safeguards within the Civil Service so as to hopefully prevent the sort of mass espionage 
network that had plagued the Canadian government. Moreover, security checks were 
initially made against an individual’s personal file and did not entail a wholesale 
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investigation into their background and personal life. Such an approach was deemed 
distasteful and dismissed as being fundamentally unsuitable to British sensibilities: 
‘We understand that the FBI system is extremely elaborate. Before any person is appointed to any 
Government post in which he would have access to classified information, his name is checked over FBI 
records and he has to fill in a detailed and lengthy form listing his ancestry and the whole of his career, 
education etc. He is then subject to intensive overt police enquiries based on this form. We consider that 
any such procedure would be repugnant to British thinking.’138 
There is a certain amount of irony to be had in the fact that modern ‘developed vetting’ 
for individuals with access to highly sensitive material follows these almost exact same 
protocols.139 The expulsion of communists from sensitive Civil Service positions was 
designed to be a justifiable security measure in the face of available evidence and was not 
intended as a witch hunt to expunge political ‘heresy’.  
Measures beyond Negative Vetting 
Beyond the introduction of vetting reform in 1947 however, senior Ministers – up to and 
including Attlee himself – continued to exhibit extreme reluctance to consider the 
introduction of anything but a relatively basic and defensively oriented domestic counter-
subversion policy up until early 1950. In part, this can be attributed to the fact that it 
seemed for a time that it no further action might be required. As early as the April 1948, 
Guy Liddell reported to Attlee that vetting reform had sparked panic within the CPGB. 
As Liddell recorded: 
‘I told Attlee there was a general atmosphere of depression in the Communist Party in light of recent 
happenings. They felt that they had lost the initiative. They feared that the party might be supressed; they 
were destroying indexes, issuing warnings about talking on the telephone and taking other precautions… 
[Attlee] did not think that the British Communists would take this very easily and that it may well lead to 
divisions in the Party.’140  
Despite this, there existed a growing appetite amongst certain quarters in Whitehall, most 
prominently within the Cabinet Committee on Communism (Overseas)141 headed by the 
veteran diplomat Sir Gladwyn Jebb, for a more proactive and aggressive approach to 
counter-subversion policy. Informal experimentation with proactive counter-subversion 
efforts began essentially in 1948 with the formation of the innocuously named 
Information Research Department (henceforth IRD), a government body intended to 
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circulate ‘grey’ or plausibly deniable anti-communist propaganda.142 Placed under the 
authority of the Foreign Office and ostensibly created with a purely foreign remit, IRD’s 
operational responsibilities quickly became blurred enough to include a substantial 
domestic presence, despite the fact that no official domestic counter-propaganda 
campaign was authorised by the PM until 1950. By mid-1949 it had issued some 60 
articles for publication within the United Kingdom as well as a weekly digest of shorter 
items and an average of 193 pages of information monthly via the Central Office of 
Information managed London Press Service.143  However, attempts to formalise anti-
communist efforts continued to be resisted. Attlee continued to be extremely wary of 
taking any action which may have been construed as antithetical to traditional British 
notions of domestic political liberties, and as such what followed was a period of 
protracted bureaucratic feuding between the PM and AC (O). Initial proposals in 1949 on 
the part of the Committee on Communism (Overseas) to begin to prosecute a domestic 
counter-propaganda campaign met with a particularly frosty response: 
‘In discussion of the proposals for action at home, it was generally agreed by Ministers that, from a 
constitutional point of view, it would be very difficult for a Government to take official action of the kind 
proposed against a political party which had not been declared to be an illegal organisation and was in fact 
represented in the House of Commons. So long as the Communist Party remained a legal political 
organisation, it was considered that it would hardly be proper for the Government in power to use 
Government funds and Government agencies for the purpose of discrediting it. It was thought that the 
policy suggested might cause particular embarrassment to the Home Office, since it would remain the duty 
of that Department and the Police to preserve the peace at Communist Party meetings, and to enable 
Communist speakers to secure fair hearing of views which other agencies of the Government were engaged 
in discrediting.’144 
The exchange is evidence of the degree of caution with which Attlee approached the 
question of domestic counter-subversion policy prior to 1950. The implementation of 
domestic anti-communist measures was undertaken only with the utmost reluctance at 
each step, with the Prime Minister himself acting as a final check on undue escalation. At 
every stage in the development of Britain’s approach to domestic counter-subversion over 
the early years of Attlee’s premiership, the proportionality of any proposed measure was 
fully scrutinised and it would seem that neither the Prime Minister, nor many other senior 
ministers and intelligence officials (Liddell an obvious example), were ever able to fully 
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shake the feeling that by hardening the state’s attitude to communists the government was 
in some way unwittingly undermining the principles of political liberty and freedom of 
association which were felt to underpin British parliamentary democracy. For these 
reasons, further escalation of British domestic counter-subversion was limited following 
the implementation of 1947’s vetting reform and would remain so until 1950. There was 
however, one notable exception to this in the form of 1948’s operation HILLARY. Drawn 
up by the Defence Transition Committee, HILLLARY consisted of emergency 
internment plans should war with Russia have occurred. In case of World War III, it was 
intended that some 3000 possible subversives and saboteurs – 1000 of whom British, 
2000 foreign – were to be rounded up and detained at a variety of sites around the United 
Kingdom, including Ascot race-course in Berkshire, a Welsh holiday camp in Rhyl and 
Holloway Gaol in North London.145 Though clearly notable, there is a point of distinction 
to be made in so far as HILLARY constituted planning in case of war – escalation of 
counter-subversion planning for peacetime remained static. 
Practical Considerations 
Irrespective of the political questions posed by the implementation of harsher anti-
communist measures, the immediate practical challenges of enacting change proved 
formidable. Even the relatively modest reforms of 1947 demonstrated that the intentions 
of policy had already outstripped the capabilities of the State. For starters, Britain was 
still struggling under the weight of its wartime burdens - the cost of victory had been the 
loss of some 28% of pre-war national wealth, whilst loans taken from the United States to 
fund war-efforts totalled by 1945 some $20 billion USD, meaning that the increase of 
additional official expenditure in any area was a matter fraught with difficulties.146 The 
brunt of practical challenges was felt arguably most keenly by MI5, as the introduction of 
standardised vetting procedures increased the Security Service’s workload exponentially. 
For the Service, which was still struggling as a result of post-War budget and personnel 
cuts, the additional strain was difficult to bear. Personnel numbers had been reduced to 
897 in July 1945, from a war-time high of 1271 in 1943, and this figure had fallen still 
further to a mere 570 staff members by 1947.147  Within F. Division and B. Division 
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(counter-espionage) the burden of additional work fell particularly hard. An indication of 
this strain is offered by the following circular, which was distributed throughout B 
Division in the July of 1950: 
‘For the last three years we have been going through a period of constantly expanding commitments and 
corresponding expansions of staff. The total strength of B Division today is 60, a figure large enough to 
make us stop and think about where we are going... However the constantly increasing mass of business to 
transact here has led to a crisis in management and a crisis in manpower... There has equally been an unfair 
burden of sectional work placed on all B.1 staff and the way which this has been shouldered has been much 
appreciated.’148 
Counter-subversion responsibilities were, out of all the various disciplines the British 
intelligence services were called upon to perform in the post-war period, possibly one of 
the most difficult in terms of personnel requirements and amount of information required 
to be collected in order to make a reasoned and useful judgement. A contemporaneous 
CIA manual on counter-subversion tactics and techniques, dating from the mid-1950s, 
gives a good idea of the number of factors which had to be considered: 
‘1) The Underground level of the party must be penetrated on a high level and in many places 
2) Key Communist Personnel must be identified and their movements and activities brought under 
surveillance or at least intermittently checked 
3) All organisations, groups, business and fronts suspected as being communist fronts must be checked 
4) Persons in sensitive positions in government, the armed forces and strategic industries must be screened 
and periodically checked 
5) Overt propaganda issuances of Communist missions must be monitored as leads to clandestine activities 
6) Listening to foreign Communist broadcasts must be prevented by jamming, confiscation of radio sets and 
police action 
7) Foreign mail must be censored to prevent an influx of Communist propaganda 
8) Travel abroad must be controlled to prevent persons from participating in Communist managed 
congresses and training schools’149 
Leaving aside the moral contradictions the document posed – particularly the fact that it 
advocated that the only way to prevent the rise of totalitarian communism was to utilise 
techniques so repressive that they would achieve essentially the same outcome – it is 
indicative of the amount of work necessary in order to run an effective counter-
subversion operation. One only has to perform a cursory examination of a Security 
Service personal file to appreciate the sheer toil which was necessary to accumulate the 
amount of information contained within – the acquisition of travel records, telegram 
communication, telephone conversations, not to mention details of an individual’s social 
habits and connections was a labour-intensive process as was the job of analysing and 
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sorting the material so as to be able to make a reasoned judgement regarding the person’s 
relative threat to the state. Mass monitoring of communists as well as increased vetting 
responsibilities presented a difficult logistical problem for the Service. 
Nevertheless, despite the additional burdens the Service coped admirably with its 
enlarged workload. Partial coverage of the CPGB had already been in place since 1941, 
when the Service had seen fit to install eavesdropping devices within the CPGB’s King 
Street headquarters whilst simultaneously tapping all telecommunications equipment 
connecting to the building.150 As such, by the time negative vetting was introduced the 
Service already possessed the means to covertly monitor CPGB activities. For negative 
vetting to function as intended however, comprehensive information regarding Party 
membership was still required. Without accurate records to compare against, the negative 
vetting checks would be essentially useless (negative relied upon a passive check against 
pre-existing records, there was no active investigatory component to the procedure). The 
Service experienced considerable success in its efforts to obtain these. As a result of the 
series of operations codenamed STILL LIFE (covert raids against properties owned by 
known CPGB members) MI5 succeeded in acquiring comprehensive information 
regarding the Party’s membership fairly quickly. The first major operation alone – RED 
KNIGHT – succeeded in 1949 in acquiring all Party registration forms for the Greater 
London area.151 Equally, the Service experienced notable success in its endeavours to 
infiltrate penetration agents into the Party. In 1949 Sillitoe reported to Attlee that ‘we 
now had quite a number of agents in the Communist Party who were well placed and 
gave us good coverage’ causing Liddell to remark that ‘the PM seemed particularly 
pleased by this’.152 Again, the level of Attlee’s personal interest in the problem of 
domestic communism is made clear here. For the PM, who was renowned for his 
taciturnity, should have openly expressed pleasure at the news of successful penetration 
of the Communist Party shows how important the PM felt the matter of communist 
subversion was. 153 
As such, by early 1950 the Service was relatively confident that it had the Party ‘sewn up’ 
– Sir Percy Sillitoe delivered a full statement to Attlee to this effect in April 1950: 
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‘SILLITOE said that the Security Service now had an almost complete list of the membership (numbering 
some 40’000) of the Communist Party of Great Britain with particulars of age, sex and employment; and 
despite a turnover of about 10’000 members per year, were keeping the list up to date. In addition they had 
a virtually complete list of the membership (about 3’500) of the Communist Youth League.’154  
The Service was therefore able to comment accurately and authoritatively on CPGB 
activities within a relatively short space of time. Though it taxed MI5’s capabilities 
severely to do so, nonetheless the Service succeeded in establishing comprehensive and 
pervasive coverage of the CPGB from essentially 1950 onwards. It should be stressed that 
MI5’s monitoring of the Communist Party was still at the stage intended as a defensive 
measure. Though information acquired from the Security Service’s monitoring of the 
Party would later be used to target propaganda and other offensive anti-communist 
efforts, at this stage surveillance was intended purely to facilitate negative vetting efforts. 
However, whilst intelligence gathering efforts experienced particular success, direct legal 
reprisal against communists remained difficult. Even where subversives could be 
identified, the judicial options available for dealing with them were limited to such an 
extent that by 1950 Attlee’s Cabinet was deeply concerned that successful prosecution 
would be nigh on impossible. The Home Secretary stated plainly to the AC (M) in 1950 
that ‘the task of his Department would of course be much more straightforward if the 
British Communist Party were to be declared illegal’ even if ‘the results of proscribing 
the Communist Party in other countries were not encouraging’.155 Meanwhile a July 1950 
Cabinet Meeting saw Sir Hartley Shawcross, then Attorney General, declare that ‘existing 
powers are inadequate. We aren’t at war. Acts which would be treason in war can’t be 
punished.’156 It is not hard to understand why such sentiments were expressed – as things 
stood existing legal framework was wholly unsuitable for securing the successful 
prosecution of subversives. The Treachery Act of 1940 had been designed predominantly 
to facilitate the trial and execution of German spies during the war and in any case had 
been suspended in 1946.157 Meanwhile, the law governing the offence of Treason – in 
place since 1351 and amended several times since, at this point most recently in 1945 to 
assist with the trial of William Joyce of ‘Lord Haw Haw’ infamy – was far too harsh to be 
politically practicable or indeed in any way in keeping with Britain’s sense of civil 
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liberties.158 So began a long-running effort to invent new legislation which could be used 
for the successful prosecution of domestic communists in both a proportional and 
politically acceptable manner. The Working Party on Subversive Activities – still in 
existence though with responsibilities considerably reduced as a result of the formation of 
ministerial committees on communism – found itself tasked with the responsibility of 
formulating such legislation. The first draft of which was produced in late September of 
1951, with its express purpose being to: 
‘One making any act done with intent to assist the enemy a criminal offence without attracting the full 
penalties of treason, and the other… conferring powers to restrict visits abroad by persons possessing vital 
information’159 
The bill was met with considerable criticism for the proposed scope its powers. Sir Frank 
Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary of State to the Home Office was particularly 
critical, drawing particular attention to the proposed restrictions on travel for persons 
having knowledge of the aforementioned but ill-defined ‘vital information’: 
‘I said that we had a general objection to the Act in that its scope was far too wide. In particular it purported 
to give the Secretary of State power to make orders against any persons possessing vital information but, in 
fact, the intention was not to make an order against a man simply because he had vital information, but 
because he was treacherous enough to want to sell his information to the enemy… It seemed to me that 
either when the Bill was before Parliament or, if Parliament passed it, when the Home Secretary began to 
use his powers under it, the fact that the intention and the wording of certain Clauses were at variance 
would come to light, and the Home Secretary would be unable to stand up to the criticism which would 
arise.’160 
Reservations were echoed by the other members of the cabinet panel overseeing its 
review, not least of which was due to the fact that: 
‘If the clauses follow the wording of the minutes of the meeting it will be illegal for members of an 
expeditionary force to land in such territory, for agents to go into enemy territory, or for war correspondents 
to ply their trade.’161 
Again, the problem of how to define ‘subversive activity’ emerged. As demonstrated by 
Whitehall’s inability to draft acceptable legislation defining exact parameters for 
‘subversion’ and ‘subversives’, the government was able to identify the problem, though 
wholly unable to articulate its exact legal categorisation. As a result of the Working Party 
on Subversive Activities failure to draft acceptable legislation, ‘subversion’ would 
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continue to be understood as a loose and nebulous term, applied to those activities which 
the government found to be threatening, and yet were unable to categorise more formally.  
Changes in Strategy 
As it was, with the notable exception of Operation HILLARY, further substantive 
changes to domestic counter-subversion policy did not occur in earnest until 1950, at 
which point Attlee and the AC (M)’s earlier reservations were revised in favour of a more 
proactive strategy. Though Attlee and the Committee had justified their earlier caution on 
essentially ethical grounds, the reasons behind the timing of the changes in strategy were 
in large part purely political. As is made clear via an examination of instructions received 
by the Committee on Communism Overseas in June 1950, the AC (M) were worried 
about the impact of harsher anti-communist measures upon Labour’s electoral popularity: 
‘That decision by Ministers was taken shortly before the General Election, and it is understood that the 
Committee may wish to consider the advisability of now raising again the question of anti-Communist 
action at home. It is of course a fact that the terms of reference of the Committee confine it to stimulating 
and co-ordinating anti-Communist activities overseas. On the other hand, it may be argued that the 
activities of the Communists themselves know no distinction between home and overseas and that it is 
therefore impossible to draw any rigid line of demarcation between the spheres of the necessary counter-
action… It seems therefore that the Committee would not be out of order in bringing again to the attention 
of Ministers the question of possible anti-Communist action in this country.’162 
With Labour facing what was understood to be a heavily polarised electorate in February 
1950, Attlee had not wanted to embark upon measures which may have adversely 
affected the already delicate balance of public opinion.163 The PM was correct to be 
concerned about his Party’s popular appeal, as evidenced by the fact that Labour 
proceeded to lose 78 seats in the February 1950 general election, leaving Attlee with a 
majority in the House of Commons of only five MPs.164 However, whilst the timing of 
further counter-subversive reform was almost certainly political in nature the underlying 
reasons underpinning Attlee and wider senior ministers’ change in opinion were 
fundamentally tied to national security developments which had occurred since 1947. 
Since the introduction of negative vetting in spring 1947, relations with the Soviet Union 
had deteriorated still further. In February 1948 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
seized power via a Soviet-backed coup d’état. Meanwhile, at the end of June 1948, the 
USSR moved to block all transport links between the western areas of Berlin and western 
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Germany, resulting in a blockade which lasted eleven months and was only lifted 
following prolonged airlift efforts by the Western powers. Both actions were unpredicted 
by British intelligence estimates.165 More alarmingly, on the 3rd September 1949 the West 
became aware of the first successful Soviet atomic weapons test. Again the event caught 
Whitehall wholly off-guard, JIC estimations had predicted that the Soviets would obtain 
nuclear weapons no earlier than 1954.166 Liddell recorded in his diary that:  
‘The story was given out at the JIC last Friday week under a melodramatic bond of secrecy. Hayter [then 
chair of the JIC and later ambassador to Moscow] cleared the room of secretaries and then said if there was 
anybody present who could not keep what was going to be said to himself, would he kindly leave the 
room… It was then announced by Perrin of Atomic Energy that the explosion of an atomic bomb had 
occurred in Russia.’167 
The news prompted such consternation within Whitehall that had Harry Truman not 
publically announced the news a week later, it seems likely that the British government 
would have attempted to keep the event a secret indefinitely.168 If war with the Soviet 
Union were to occur, it would now be nuclear – and therefore existential - in nature. 
It was this concern regarding the ideological component of Soviet power which lead to 
changes regarding domestic counter-subversive measures. The first sign of an intensified 
anti-communist policy was the convention, under the direct chairmanship of Clement 
Attlee, of the Cabinet Committee on Communism (AC (M)) on Dec 31st 1949.169 This 
committee, which ultimately superseded the responsibilities of the Cabinet Committee for 
Subversive Activities, was notable for its seniority (its permanent membership was 
comprised of Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Ernest Bevin, Hugh Gaitskell and 
Minister of Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell) as well as the degree to which it dispensed 
with many of the niceties of its predecessor. Gone were many of the foibles over 
appearing politically impartial. Indeed, the committee was explicitly tasked with the 
responsibility of keeping a ‘continuing watch on the Communist threat to national 
security, to make recommendations to ministers and, under their supervision, to co-
ordinate such activities as might be approved’.170 It is clear from the committee’s minutes 
that domestic communism and communists were now firmly linked in the minds of 
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ministers with the increasingly grave threat posed by the USSR. Whereas the reforms of 
1947 had prompted discussion regarding the exact extent of communism’s threat to the 
British state and there had been a temptation to perhaps regard communists as political 
eccentrics – possessed of questionable beliefs and of unknown loyalty but not by 
definition ‘dangerous’ unless recruited by Soviet intelligence – communists were now 
firmly regarded as a direct threat to British security regardless of any specific foreign 
connections.  
Whilst in early 1947 the government could still plausibly convince itself that Soviet 
Russia presented only a limited challenge to British interests, by 1950 it had become 
unmistakeably clear that the USSR posed a central threat – both ideologically and 
existentially – to the security of the United Kingdom. The comments of Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
to the Imperial Defence College in early 1950 illustrate the new mind-set well: 
‘The phrase “cold war” may be defined as “a worldwide struggle against Stalinist Communism, not 
involving world war”. This involves primarily a struggle for the minds of men and women – for spiritual 
allegiance… This definition would not exclude actual warlike acts (e.g. as in Malaya or Greece) and might 
even involve a localised war (e.g. a war between the Soviet Union and Tito or between Albania and 
Greece). It would range, in fact, from a sermon from the Archbishop of Canterbury on the necessity for the 
adoption of Christian principles, to efforts by General Mao’s Government to suborn the native population of 
Hong Kong.’171 
‘Warlike acts’ which directly involved the United Kingdom were to come more quickly 
than anticipated, as communist North Korea invaded its Southern democratic counterpart 
on the 25th June 1950. The action caught Whitehall entirely off guard, as the JIC had 
predicted over preceding months that North Korean activities would most likely be 
restricted to small-scale guerrilla incursions rather than a full military offensive.172 Events 
moved quickly. That same day, the United States secured a resolution of the United 
Nations Security Council condemning North Korea’s actions.173 On the 27th June, a 
resolution was passed recommending UN members supply military assistance to the 
Republic of Korea.174 On the 28th, the British Chiefs of Staff recommended to Attlee ‘that 
we demonstrate to the world, and to the Russians and Eastern peoples in particular, our 
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solidarity of purpose’.175 Britain was now involved in a ‘hot’ war with a communist 
power. Importantly meanwhile, Britain’s entry into the Korean War was directly opposed 
by the CPGB who chose instead to back the North Korean communists, denouncing 
American and British actions as ‘imperialist aggression’.176 Indeed, in time, the Party 
would go so far as to attempt to exploit British prisoners of war as vehicles for anti-
capitalist propaganda.177 As a result of its support for North Korea, the communist 
movement could be now interpreted as an openly hostile political movement. Therefore, 
as a result of increased tension with the Soviet Union and outbreak of hostilities with 
North Korea, the stage was set for an escalation of anti-communist policy. Domestic 
security policy had typically attempted to avoid offensive counter-subversion measures 
during the later 1940s. The early 1950s by contrast, would be defined by a far more 
aggressive stance. 
 
 
Summary 
Where domestic communist subversion was a peripheral concern for the British 
government in 1945, it can be definitively said that by 1950 it was a central one. The 
material gained as a result of the Gouzenko defection made clear not only the scale of the 
threat posed by Soviet espionage but also indicated that its success was directly linked to 
the effective exploitation of subversive elements within Western nations. Analysis by the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police after the event directly linked Soviet agent recruitment 
to subversive groups pre-existing within Canada. Soviet friendship groups, peace 
movements and communist study groups all offered Soviet intelligence ideologically 
sympathetic individuals to co-opt and utilise in gaining sensitive Western governmental 
information. To effectively counter Soviet espionage it seemed implicit that Britain would 
have to take steps to monitor or repress communist groups within the United Kingdom. 
Discovery of Soviet espionage activity meant that increasingly domestic communism 
became viewed as an implicit security threat. Whereas in 1945 communists could be 
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dismissed for the most part as at best political eccentrics and worst minor nuisances, by 
1950 communism and communists presented an existential threat British parliamentary 
democracy. The steady partition of Europe, combined with further revelations as to the 
extent of Soviet espionage success and the detonation of the first Soviet atomic weapon 
meant that by 1950, communism now clearly posed an immediate ideological and kinetic 
threat to British stability and security. Moreover, as a result of the outbreak of hostilities 
in Korea, the Cold War now possessed a ‘hot’ component. With British and Soviet 
interests now so obviously oppositional, the continued presence of a significant group of 
individuals within Britain possessed of pro-Soviet sympathies became a cause for 
credible concern. 
However, whilst the conception of domestic communist subversion as a threat can be 
viewed as a fairly linear progression – from ignorance, to mild, to severe concern – the 
enaction of counter-subversion policy was a slightly more convoluted affair. Though 
acknowledgement of the threat developed steadily, there remained throughout the period 
an uncertainty amongst both ministers and civil servants alike as to what constituted 
proportional response. The ideological nature of the problem presented uncomfortable 
ramifications for political liberty within the United Kingdom, whilst constitutional, legal 
and indeed historical precedent meant that there was justifiable reluctance to enact overt 
political repression. To this end, the majority of counter-subversion practice under Attlee 
between 1945 and 1950 was reactive rather than proactive. The political willpower to 
enact vetting could only be mustered as a combination of the Gouzenko incident and JIC 
analysis of the USSR as a growing threat. Meanwhile it was not until successful Soviet 
atomic weapons testing took place that explicit and focused examination of domestic 
communism at a Cabinet committee level took place. The result was that by 1950 
growing frustration existed within Whitehall that government measures to combat 
communism were ultimately proving ineffective. The lasting impact of the late 1940s 
therefore was to force communist subversion to the fore of security concerns as well as to 
provide many of the basic governmental mechanisms which would be used to defend the 
state against the problem. Long term meanwhile, frustrations over the failings and 
perhaps excessively cautious nature of the Government’s initial approach laid the 
groundwork for a more aggressive and combative approach to counter-subversion to 
begin to implemented beginning in 1950. The problem was recognised at least partially as 
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early as 1945, however it was not until the 50s that a proactive strategy would begin to be 
utilised in earnest.    
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Escalation: July 1950 - April 1955 
By July 1950 countering domestic communism had become a central priority for the 
British government. The experiences of the late 1940s served to convince both ministers 
and civil servants alike that the domestic communist movement presented a credible and 
pressing threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. However, the development 
of counter-subversion strategy during the first five years of the Attlee government had, 
for the most part, been ultimately cautious and defensive in nature. The early ‘50s, by 
contrast, saw Whitehall embrace a far more aggressive and pro-active model of counter-
subversion which would set the template for the remainder of the early Cold War. The 
discovery of further Soviet espionage (under wartime conditions) in 1950 and early 1951 
provided the catalyst for the escalation of counter-subversive measures. In particular, 
worries regarding communism’s ideological reach lead to an increased focus on the 
communist movement in academia beginning in late 1951. Concerns regarding 
communist influence in the trade unions also became heightened, as the ongoing Korean 
War brought the matter of rearmament to the fore. Vetting procedure was significantly 
strengthened, whilst the government exhibited an increased willingness to utilise so-
called ‘grey’ propaganda in a redoubled effort to undermine communism’s ideological 
appeal. Meanwhile, though a change of government occurred in October 1951 as the 
Conservative Party returned to power under Winston Churchill, the escalation of counter-
subversive policy during the early 1950s was not the product of changed political 
leadership. Rather, the evidence available suggests that the Churchill administration was 
largely in consensus with the Attlee government on domestic security matters, and 
continued the development of counter-subversive measures on the grounds of conclusions 
drawn by its Labour predecessor. 
Prosecuting an offensive campaign of counter-subversion proved more difficult than the 
introduction of defensive measures however. Whilst it was clear that communism held no 
great political sway over British public sympathy as a whole, as the CPGB’s electoral 
collapse in both the 1950 and 1951 general elections proved,178 Whitehall continued to be 
vexed by the question of how best to account for the raw ideological appeal of 
communism to certain individuals. It was this confusion which lead to the surveillance of 
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known communist figures within the universities in an attempt as much to understand the 
problem as well as to disrupt what were viewed as potential channels for communist 
recruitment. Unfortunately these efforts were too often defined by amateurism and ill-
defined purpose, thus meaning that the state wasted considerable time and resources 
investigating individuals who presented little threat to British interests. Early efforts to 
reduce communist influence within industry also experienced limited success. IRD’s 
domestic propaganda network was still not fully formed as of the early 1950s, and as such 
official attempts to marginalise communists in heavy industry did little to undermine 
communist influence in those unions where the CPGB was most heavily entrenched. As 
such, the progress of domestic counter-subversion policy in the early 1950s can be 
understood as characterised by two main trends. The first, an altered focus towards an 
offensive counter-subversion model which sought to undermine communism’s 
ideological appeal rather than merely guard against communist access to the state. The 
second, a tendency for this new focus to experience only limited success, particularly 
when compared against the efficacy of defensive measures. The early 1950s were very 
much a period of experimentation and refinement with regards to counter-subversion 
policy, perfection was still yet to be achieved. 
 
Impact of the Wider Cold War 
The shock of the Soviet Union’s early acquisition of nuclear weaponry in 1949, coupled 
with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 demonstrated to Whitehall that there 
was a clear need for reassessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Crucially, by late 
1950 the Soviet threat was assessed as being as much a product of ideological appeal as it 
was raw military power. As the JIC put it: 
‘The Soviet Union can only be understood if it is realised that it is not merely, like Nazi Germany, a 
totalitarian dictatorship engaged in power politics, but a unique and abnormal member of international 
society, inspired by a dynamic ideology with strong international appeal.’179 
The view that the USSR possessed ‘a dynamic ideology with strong international appeal’ 
had immediate and serious ramifications for the conduct of counter-subversion policy. 
Due to the fact that the domestic communist movement was now regarded as an integral 
component of the overall Soviet threat, fears regarding ‘fifth column’ type activities 
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became heightened, particularly due to the CPGB’s open support for North Korea. The 
comments of the AC (O) to the AC (M) from December 1950 illustrate this point well: 
‘In part, Communist activities in the United Kingdom are those of a legitimate political movement… But 
Communism is a world-wide force directed from the centre in the interests of Russian imperialism and we 
cannot treat Communism in the United Kingdom as a democratic political issue detached from the main 
Soviet threat to our existence. It is part and parcel of that threat, and there are a number of manifestations of 
Communist activity in the United Kingdom which are in the nature of a conspiracy organised against our 
national survival. They include attempts which have been made to ruin our economic recovery, to obstruct 
the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty and, by exploiting the forces of pacifism and defeatism, to 
damage our rearmament programme.’180 
Such a view was accepted by the AC (M), as indicated by the comments of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, in February 1951: ‘The British Communist Party… 
were undoubtedly making themselves felt by disseminating false ideas and untrue 
pictures of national policy. They were having an effect on the minds of people which was 
none the less real for being sub-conscious’.181 Importantly, it can be seen that discussion 
of communist subversion increasingly focused upon its influence within wider society, 
rather than its direct impact upon the government itself. It was increasingly understood 
that counter-subversion policy could no longer be restricted solely to defensive efforts 
designed only to protect the immediate state. Communist subversion was increasingly 
judged to be an ideological threat which affected the whole of British society – not 
merely a facilitator of espionage - and therefore required proactive efforts to directly 
counter the spread of its influence.  
Role of MI5 
Despite changing appreciations of the nature of the communist threat, the Security 
Service continued to remain central to Whitehall’s counter-subversion efforts. Countering 
domestic communism had become a central priority for the Service by the early 1950s, as 
is made abundantly clear by the extent of institutional review and restructuring efforts 
which occurred during the early portion of the decade. The conclusions of the Brook 
Report of Enquiry into the Secret Intelligence and Security Services illustrate the extent 
to which counter-subversive responsibilities preoccupied the Service by 1951: 
‘A high proportion of the total resources of the Security Service are at present devoted to the countering of 
subversive activities, mainly the study of Communism and Communists. Since the end of the war the 
Security Service has set itself the aim of building up, and keeping up to date, a complete list of all the 
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members of the British Communist Party and its affiliated bodies, such as the Young Communist League. 
In this work it has achieved a remarkable degree of success: it has built up an almost complete list of 
Communist Party members, and its technique should ensure that this list is kept fully up to date. In addition 
to a fairly complete knowledge of the Communist Party Headquarters, it is also building up a detailed 
picture of the personnel and organisation of each branch office. This has been a heavy task; and it has meant 
that more than half of the headquarters staff and resources of the Service have been concentrated on this 
intensive study of the Communist Party.’182 
Counter-subversion was now at the core of MI5’s preoccupations and indeed was 
understood to directly facilitate the prosecution of their other duties in the fields of 
counter-espionage and provision of preventative security measures. Proof of this is 
provided via examination of MI5’s restructuring efforts in both 1951 and ’53. 1951 saw B 
Division – formerly counter-espionage – reorganised to focus on communist subversion 
almost exclusively. B1 group was re-designated ‘Subversive Organisations’ before being 
subdivided further across its 60 members of staff into:  
‘British Communist Party: Organisation, Policy & Membership, Investigation of Communist Party 
Underground Activities, Prophylactic measures: Industry, Civil Service & Professions, Vetting, 
International Communism, Subversive and suspect movements other than the Communist Party, Foreign 
Communists in the UK as well as British Communist Party Foreign Activities’183 
Such restructuring of B division was necessary in order to manage the ‘constantly 
increasing mass of business (which had to lead to) a crisis in management and a crisis in 
manpower’, which section head John Marriot had bemoaned in 1950. The 1951 
reorganisation was therefore an attempt to reallocate the division’s resources whilst 
ensuring that communism remained enshrined at the heart of its priorities. As Marriot laid 
out, the division’s responsibilities were defined as: 
‘Counter espionage, counter-sabotage and counter-subversion. In practice, these mean defending the realm 
in peace and war against Russian and satellite activities, in time of peace defending our constitution (which 
in its widest sense includes our industrial stability) against attempts to overthrow it by subversive means, 
and in time of war preventing Fifth Column actions of all kinds.’184 
The reforms of Sir Dick White – successor to Sir Percy Sillitoe as Director General of the 
Service in 1953 – make the increased centrality of anti-communist counter-subversion 
even more obvious as counter-communist responsibilities were spun out across four entire 
divisions. C Division: Protective Security, D Division: Counter- Espionage, E-Division: 
Counter-Subversion home and overseas and F-Division: Communism – home.185 In a 
period of particular financial difficulty – government spending on rearmament was 
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curtailed significantly at the beginning of 1952 as import prices rose sharply, far 
outstripping the Treasury’s predictions – that so many of MI5’s resources were allocated 
to the problem of communism demonstrates the perceived gravity of the threat.186 In 
addition to these reforms, it is interesting to note the promotion of Roger Hollis – later to 
become DG himself – to the role of Deputy Director General at the same time as White’s 
elevation to DG.187 As previously discussed, Hollis was a veteran of the old F Division 
(counter-subversion) and his promotion would seem to clearly indicate that the discipline 
was now held in high esteem within both the Service and wider government. 
Impact of further Espionage Scandal 
Whilst much of the theory behind the government’s switch to a more proactive model of 
counter-subversion policy can be traced back to the escalation of the Cold War from 1947 
onwards, many of the initial practical arrangements were shaped by discovery of further 
Soviet espionage. Two cases in particular served to influence the shape of counter-
subversive policy in the early 1950s. The first was that of scientist Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs 
was a British nuclear physicist of German origin, who had been an avowed member of the 
German Communist Party during the 1920s, before immigrating to Britain in 1933 as a 
result of the Nazi party’s increasingly tight hold over the country.188 He proceeded to take 
a PhD at Bristol University and dabbled in communist politics within Britain, before 
spending a brief period of internment in Canada as a result of his Germanic heritage at the 
outbreak of the Second World War.189 1941 saw Fuchs returned to Britain by the 
government, on account of his scientific expertise, where he joined the research staff of 
Rudolph Peierls, then engaged on work related to the TUBE ALLOYS British nuclear 
research project.190 In 1943, Fuchs was part of the research team from the UK which 
moved to join US nuclear research efforts, with Fuchs himself assigned to the main 
atomic research facility at Los Alamos. Following the war’s end, Fuchs returned to the 
UK, whereupon he became head of the theoretical physics division at Britain’s nuclear 
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research unit at Harwell in Oxfordshire.191 In 1949, on the basis on information decrypted 
via the VENONA program, GCHQ began to suspect that Fuchs had been passing 
information to Soviet intelligence throughout all his periods of employment on these 
various Western nuclear programs. Following an investigation and subsequent 
interrogation by MI5, Fuchs confessed his involvement in Soviet-sponsored espionage 
and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison under the Official Secrets Act, his British 
citizenship stripped from him in the process.192 Worryingly for British intelligence 
however, Fuchs’ actions were inspired not by material interests, but rather a deep and 
unwavering commitment to communist ideals. The Security Service report in the wake of 
the investigation’s conclusion noted that: 
‘The history of Emil Julius Klaus FUCHS is a curious mixture of brilliant scholarship and achievement in 
the field of scientific research, blind devotion to the doctrines of Communism and cold-blooded treachery to 
the country which has done most to welcome and reward him… Fuchs was an ideological Communist and 
became a spy for that reason. He appears to be convinced that he was not recruited but that his actions were 
the result of his honest belief that by passing information on atomic energy to the Russians he was acting in 
the highest interests of humanity.’193 
In many ways the Fuchs case appeared to confirm conclusions drawn from the aftermath 
of Gouzenko’s defection, intellectuals with a predilection for communism presented an 
excellent opportunity for recruitment by Soviet Intelligence. Such individuals often had a 
strong chance of exposure to sensitive information due to their wider professional and 
social connections. Despite MI5’s highly successful efforts in documenting CPGB 
membership since 1948, remarkably little was still known about this class of person. As 
recorded within the pages of Norman Brook’s enquiry: 
‘[Communist] ideas evidently have a strong appeal to a certain type of intellectual; and scientists and artists, 
in particular, seem to be especially susceptible to them. It is significant that it was in this class that Fuchs 
and Pontecorvo were found. There is here an undoubted gap in our knowledge of potential agents for the 
Russian intelligence service or of people who might be willing, and able, to convey useful information to 
the Russians.’194 
The Fuchs case gave further justification for the surveillance and monitoring of 
academics and scientists with potential communist sympathies across all elements of 
British society, as the case seemed to indicate that members of the academy were more 
susceptible to communist sympathies than other members of society. In the eyes of the 
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government there was a pressing need for the Security Service to accurately identify those 
who not only maintained a formal association to communism, but also those who 
subscribed to its ideological tenants without maintain any overt links to the main 
communist organisations active within Britain. As put by John Marriot:  
 
‘Since Communists present us with the most serious problem in dealing with the R.I.S. our first 
responsibility must be to identify as many of them as possible. Positive steps must therefore be taken to 
collect and record information about all of them, for it should be regarded as just as important to identify 
convinced Marxists, particularly among educated people, as it is to identify card-holding members of the 
Communist Party.’195 
 
As evidence was provided time and again that adherents to communism placed 
ideological commitment above either national loyalties or material interest, Whitehall was 
forced to re-evaluate its counter-subversive approach. Meanwhile, the case of Fuchs 
clearly demonstrated that the threat posed by Soviet espionage remained, particularly, 
within the intellectual and educated classes. 
Following on from Fuchs, the consequences of failure to disrupt communism’s 
ideological appeal and recognise its adherents were made clear once again – to 
humiliating extent - in the wake of the defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. 
The spring of 1951 saw a breakthrough by British and American cryptanalysts working 
on the VENONA decryption program. Namely, it was realised that Soviet cypher clerks 
had reused a number of encryption pads intended for one-time use only – thus allowing 
for the decryption of a series of NKGB telegrams which provided clear proof that the 
identity of the Soviet agent Гомер (Gomer, or Homer when anglicised) – an agent known 
to British intelligence in at least vague terms since 1941 – was the Foreign Office 
diplomat Donald Maclean.196 With concerns raised that VENONA material would not be 
permissible in court, Maclean was placed under MI5 surveillance until sufficient and 
legally admissible proof could be acquired in order to obtain a successful prosecution.197 
Unfortunately, news of Maclean’s positive identification also reached fellow Soviet agent 
Kim Philby – then stationed as the liaison officer for MI6 in Washington – who quickly 
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informed KGB centre in Moscow of the development.198 With MI5’s net closing in and 
Maclean’s behaviour growing steadily more erratic, the decision was reached to exfiltrate 
him from Britain along with fellow Soviet agent Guy Burgess - whose increasingly self-
destructive behaviour had rendered him of little further use to Soviet intelligence.199 On 
the 25th May 1951, after MI5’s surveillance team had finished their shift (as a result of 
budgetary restraints – the Security Service had a mere 20 full-time surveillance officers in 
1951)200 the pair boarded a ferry at Southampton bound for the French coast, before 
making their way across the continent to eventually reach sanctuary in Moscow.201 
Although it was not immediately clear to British intelligence that the pair had definitely 
defected – Burgess & Maclean would not make a public appearance in Moscow until 
1956 – by March 1952 the Security Service strongly suspected that the pair had been 
aided in their escape ‘by the Russian Intelligence Service and that they are now under the 
control of the Soviet Authorities.’202  
The incident provoked crisis across the British government –it now appeared that at least 
two Soviet agents had been active within some of the most sensitive areas of the British 
State and moreover had been directly involved with intelligence liaison between Britain 
and the United States. Moreover, as the facts regarding the pair’s political development 
and subsequent recruitment by Soviet intelligence slowly became known, the case seemed 
to provide historical justification for an increased focus on countering communism’s 
ideological appeal. The scale of the pair’s betrayal seemed scarcely comprehensible in the 
immediate aftermath of their flight. The extent of Liddell’s confusion in particular – who 
had been friends with Burgess - was clearly evident within his diary entry for the 27th 
June 1951: 
‘I find it difficult to imagine BURGESS as a Comintern agent or an espionage agent in the ordinary 
accepted interpretation of these terms. He certainly had been Marxian and, up to a point, an apologist for 
the Russian regime, and would have been capable of discussing in a highly indiscreet manner with anybody 
almost anything that he got from official sources. He would have done this out of sheer political enthusiasm 
without any regard for security.’203 
It seemed scarcely believable that individuals such as Burgess and Maclean would betray 
all they had worked for to a foreign power in the name of ideology. Both products of what 
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Spectator journalist Henry Fairlie would in 1955 term ‘The Establishment’, Burgess and 
Maclean seemed to typify a certain fundamental ‘Englishness’ which had been thought to 
be unshakeable.204 Certainly it had not been thought that exposure to communism at a 
previous point in one’s life could cause an individual to become so intoxicated by the idea 
that they would rather act out of an abstract loyalty to ideology rather than national 
sentiment. As the 1955 FO report on the issue noted: 
‘If the statements about his [Maclean’s] Communist sympathies were made after his disappearance in 1951 
had been made at the time, it is unlikely that very much attention would have been paid to them. The stories 
would undoubtedly have been dismissed as indicating youthful indiscretions of the kind which were 
common enough among undergraduates of that period.’205 
Arguably, the problem of Soviet espionage had been somewhat distant for British 
intelligence until 1951. Although there had been previous instances of communist 
governmental infiltration detected, these were always at an arm’s length from the Security 
Service and SIS. For example, Nunn-May had been an academic, whilst Fuchs, as a 
naturalised British citizen, could not be expected to show the same loyalty to King and 
Country as expected of a native-born subject. By contrast, both Burgess and Maclean had 
been directly employed in various roles in the business of national security and had struck 
up friendships and acquaintances throughout the British secret state. With their defection 
it became chillingly apparent that communism really could trump national loyalty, even 
of those directly involved in the running of the state. As a result, the necessity of positive 
vetting (conducting background checks against a set of criteria) became very much 
apparent. The caveat given by Attlee in 1948 on the enaction of negative vetting 
(checking an individual’s history back against pre-existing Security Service records) now 
seemed hopelessly naïve, if well intentioned: 
‘I should emphasise that this action is being taken solely on security grounds. The State is not concerned 
with the political views, as such, of its servants, and as far as possible alternative employment on the wider 
range of non-secret Government work be found for those who are deemed for the reason indicated to be 
unsuited for secret work.’206 
The actions of Burgess and Maclean meant that the State was now very definitely 
interested in the political views of its servants. The pair’s defection seemed to 
demonstrate that the loyalty of the communist was not a conflicted one – communism 
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would eventually win out. Though positive vetting had been introduced in early 1951, 
mainly as a result of the Fuchs case, it was initially extremely limited in its application – 
the procedure’s very existence was classified until 1952, whilst it was only applied to 
some 1000 staff in its first year.207 It took the shock of the Burgess and Maclean 
defections to significantly increase the number of public servants covered by positive 
vetting. 1952 saw the FO convene the Cadogan board of enquiry, to contemplate what 
alterations to security would be required to prevent a repeat incident. As pointed out by 
the committee, negative vetting standards would have done little to guard against 
individuals such as Burgess and Maclean. The behaviour of neither had warranted 
investigation by the police or Security Service prior to their defection, (Maclean’s erratic 
behaviour in Cairo in 1950 during which he had broken a fellow civil servant’s leg in a 
bout of drunken rage, whilst Burgess’ fits of intoxication had been explained away as the 
result of stress and overwork)208 and as such there were no files to refer back against. 
Attlee’s reforms had clearly not gone far enough and it was recommended that positive 
vetting be extended across the diplomatic service as well as into senior management. By 
1954 positive vetting had been extended to all those engaged in consistent ‘exceptionally 
secret work’, with the number of individuals covered by such a provision rising to an 
estimated 10’000 people, not including those employed in atomic research.209 This is not 
to say the procedure was any less controversial than its predecessor had been. Criticism 
was again prevalent in the Security Service, typified by Director General Roger Hollis’ 
comment that: 
‘The secrecy of one’s employment influences one’s private life, I doubt if any of us who have spent a 
number of years in the Security Service could produce referees whose testimonial would be really valuable. 
I am sure I could not and I should not like to ask my friends to act as referees in a matter of this importance 
because I do not think it would be fair to them...’210 
Nevertheless, despite such reservations, the positive vetting system was adopted and 
standardised across government in a remarkably short space of time.211 The speed and 
scope of the transition was significant. It was only six years since the government had 
very tentatively adopted the minor (by modern standards) provisions of negative vetting. 
These alone had provoked considerable criticism within Whitehall as being overly 
draconian and had threatened to overwhelm the Security Service with additional work. 
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Moreover, by committing to expanding positive vetting wholesale across the Civil 
Service (curiously the Armed Forces would only be subjected to the same procedure 
beginning in Dec 1953)212, the government also by proxy committed to a significant 
increase in security spending and the size of MI5. No small thing when Britain’s 
precarious economic circumstances in the early ‘50s are considered. Churchill’s newly 
elected government entered power in October 1951 with the express intent of slashing 
public spending. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, RAB Butler, cut £160 million 
from food subsidies alone in his first budget,213 whilst such was the anxiety over the UK’s 
worsening balance of payments that the winter of 1951 had nearly seen the floatation of 
the pound under the Treasury’s infamous operation ROBOT plan.214 Burgess and 
Maclean’s defections provided the catalyst for the escalation of defensive security 
procedures. Without the grave shock caused as a result of the incident, it seems unlikely 
that the Churchill government would have countenanced the expansion of vetting 
measures to such a significant extent. 
Further espionage scandal, in the form of the Fuchs, Burgess and Maclean affairs 
therefore had two immediate practical implications for counter-subversion policy. As a 
result of the Fuchs case, official attention was turned more heavily towards the question 
of communism within the sciences and academia. Meanwhile, as a result of Burgess and 
Maclean further vetting reform was accelerated – leading to the enaction of positive 
vetting far more quickly than would otherwise have been the case. 
Restructuring of Cabinet Office Machinery 
The aftermath of Burgess and Maclean’s defection had immediate implications for the 
Cabinet Office machinery which oversaw Whitehall’s domestic counter-subversive 
campaign. The affair provided the catalyst for finally moving beyond the strictly 
defensive approach which had been the model for the vast majority of the Attlee 
government. October 1951 saw Norman Brook write to Air Chief Marshal Sir William 
Elliot – at the time stationed in Washington as the UK’s chief representative to NATO – 
who had been under significant pressure from Walter Bedell-Smith, then Director of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency: 
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‘Within the last few months the Government have agreed in principle that some positive steps should be 
taken to counter the activities of Communism in this country and that, within limits, Government agencies 
may be used for this purpose as well as the political instruments of the Labour Party and the trade unions… 
We contemplate that this policy will take shape mainly in information activities of various forms, mainly 
covert. The Committee is not precluded from considering suggestions for other types of action; but it is 
likely to concentrate, in the first instance at any rate, on measures for indoctrinating various sections of the 
community (e.g. industrial workers, members of the Armed Forces, students) against Soviet or Soviet 
inspired propaganda.’215 
The repercussions of the Burgess and Maclean defections, in conjunction with 
conclusions drawn following the discovery of Fuch’s treachery finally convinced the 
Attlee government in its final months that a more proactive policy was required. Where 
previously more active measures had been resisted, in May 1951 a domestic counterpart 
to the Cabinet Committee on Communism (Overseas) was approved ‘to keep a continuing 
watch on the Communist threat to national security’ in the United Kingdom.216 Headed by 
Norman Brook continuously from its founding,217 the Committee on Communism 
(Home) (hereafter also referred to by its official acronym of AC (H)) formed the central 
body for the formulation of counter-communist policy within the United Kingdom. 
Though similar in name to the Ministerial Committee on Communism, formed and 
headed by Attlee in 1949, the AC (H) was distinct in so far as its terms of reference were 
explicitly designed to denote a wholly domestic remit: 
‘To focus all available intelligence about Communist activities in the United Kingdom… To give any 
necessary guidance on administrative and policy questions to the briefing group of Information Officers 
handling anti-Communist information material in the United Kingdom… To co-ordinate any anti-
Communist activities in this country which may be approved by Ministers.’218 
The AC (M) by contrast functioned more as a Prime Ministerial oversight body and was 
convened with the purpose of exercising ‘general supervision over matters of major 
policy which arise in connection with the conduct of anti-Communist activity’.219 The 
aims of the new committee, meanwhile, were very similar to those proposed by the AC 
(O) in mid-1950: 
‘‘(i) To ensure that, following on their defeat at the recent election, the Communists should never be 
allowed to increase their political strength as to be able to claim the right to form a Government. (ii) To 
counter Communist influence in such bodies as the Trade Unions, Youth Organisations, the teaching 
professions etc. (iii) To detach from the Communist Party its intellectual-emotional type of adherent. (iv) 
                                                          
215 Sir Norman Brook to Sir William Elliot, 11th October 1951, TNA, CAB 301/120 
216 Comments regarding the memorandum ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’ (produced by the AC 
(O)), as discussed at meeting of the AC (M), 6th February 1951, TNA, CAB 134/2 
217 Permanent representation on the Committee was provided by the Foreign Office, Home Office, Ministry 
of Labour, Treasury, Ministry of Defence and Security Service. Other governmental bodies, most notably 
the JIC, were also represented intermittently. 
218 ‘Composition and Terms of Reference of the Committee’, AC (H), 7th June 1951, CAB, TNA 134/737 
219 ‘Composition and Terms of Reference’, AC (M), 31st December 1949, TNA, CAB 134/2 
74 
 
To expose various “rackets” promoted by the Communists which are not necessarily themselves connected 
the Communist ideology.’220 
It was these same subjects which formed the basis for the AC (H)’s initial discussions.221 
It follows, therefore, that the establishment of the AC (H) represented the successful 
culmination of lobbying by the AC (O) which had begun in 1949. Finally, twenty four 
months later, machinery had been created which would allow, in theory, Ministers to 
direct and monitor a cohesive and multi-faceted campaign against British communism. As 
an aside, unfortunately, certain proposals of the AC (M) and AC (O) were not carried 
forward by the new committee. At a meeting of the AC (M) in February 1951 it was 
speculated by the committee that ‘ridicule might well prove a most potent weapon’ 
against communism.222 This seemingly sensible idea was not considered further by the 
AC (H): 
‘MR. NICHOLLS said that he had been considering the possibility of approaching Mr. Edwards 
[presumably Jimmy Edwards – a favourite of the 1950s variety act scene] or some other comedian with a 
view to their introducing anti-communist themes into their programmes on the B.B.C. He recognised that in 
doing so there might be some danger that the atmosphere of good humour engendered by these comedians 
would attach to their victims as well and make people think that the communists were ludicrous rather than 
vicious… There was a danger that the use of the B.B.C. for this purpose might eventually be traced back to 
the Committee and that the Russians themselves, by employing the technique of humour to make palatable 
certain unpalatable measures, had regarded humour as reacting in their favour.’223 
Sadly the dealings of the AC (H) remained relatively dry affairs as Ministers reached 
exactly the wrong conclusions about the utility of humour in the fight against communism 
– as proven some 25 years later by the likes of Citizen Smith.  
The actual running of the committee was delegated to Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman 
Brook (initially, Herbert Morrison had hoped to eventually preside over the AC (H), 
however this was obviously precluded by Labour’s electoral defeat later in 1951).224 This 
was a marked change from the previous system under which Attlee had very clearly taken 
a highly active role in directing anti-communist activities. Interestingly, this arrangement 
remained unchanged following Churchill’s re-election in October 1951. In spite of his 
reputation as an avid consumer of secret intelligence, Churchill exhibited little of Attlee’s 
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desire to personally oversee domestic counter-subversion measures. Indeed, he was 
notable only by his absence when it came to the activities of the AC (H).225 Whilst he 
became occasionally exercised by some of the CPGB’s more aggressive 
pronouncements,226 Churchill left the actual running of domestic anti-communist 
activities to his deputies, a system which would persist throughout the years of 
Conservative hegemony. Though he remained an enthusiastic proponent of secret 
operations overseas - most notably personally overseeing 1953’s Operation BOOT, which 
secured the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq as Prime Minister of Iran – he displayed 
little interest in domestic affairs.227 Meanwhile, that Brook remained in the role of Chair 
of the AC (H) demonstrates the level of consensus that existed between the two 
governments regarding national security matters. Whilst considerable differences of 
opinion - particularly on economic matters - existed elsewhere between the Attlee and 
Churchill administrations, with regards to domestic security policy the governments 
remained largely in agreement. As such, the trajectory of domestic anti-communist 
measures continued in large part to be defined by the legacy of the Attlee government. 
Both the theory and bureaucratic machinery of domestic counter-subversive policy had 
been conceptualised by the time Churchill returned to office. The new Conservative 
government chose to build upon Attlee’s domestic security reforms, rather than discard 
them out of hand.  
The Burgess and Maclean cases finally forced the Attlee government to alter Cabinet 
Office machinery so as to facilitate a more proactive counter-subversive strategy. This 
altered strategy was then accepted without question by the incoming Churchill 
government – indicating consensus between the conclusions of the two administrations 
regarding domestic subversion. 
Initial Counter-Propaganda Efforts 
The effective countering of communism on ideological grounds presented difficulties 
however. Similar to initial counter-subversion efforts there was an immediate mismatch 
between intent and capability. It was the question of how to overcome this problem which 
directly accounted for IRD’s growth in responsibility and influence over the early ‘50s. 
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The parameters of what was required to fill the gap in capability were set out at the AC 
(H)’s second meeting: 
‘It was generally agreed that there exists a case for establishing machinery which would serve as a focus for 
all intelligence about the activities of the Communists in this country, not only among the workers but 
among the other groups of the population as well. The organisation set up for this purpose should be 
designed to extract all the relevant intelligence from the Departments concerned and to arrange for its issue 
in the form and through the channels most appropriate to each of the population groups.’228  
Such a role had already been performed on an ad-hoc basis by the IRD since 1948. 
Certainly the preceding years had proven IRD’s worth as a propaganda outfit - the 
Department counted the Parliamentary Labour Party, Conservative Central Office, TUC, 
Church of England Council on Foreign Relations and United Nations Association 
(amongst others) amongst its clientele by 1951.229 Meanwhile, crucially, IRD’s activities 
had remained covert throughout that time. There existed little appetite within government 
for an overt campaign of counter-propaganda, particularly as open efforts were felt to 
possess the potential to achieve more harm than good. As had been pointed out by Percy 
Sillitoe in June 1950: 
‘Sir Percy Sillitoe thought that more harm than good would be done by an “exposure” of the Communist 
Peace Propaganda Campaign. This campaign had had very little success in this country… To launch a big 
attack on this campaign would therefore give it just that publicity which was its main need.’230 
IRD’s clandestine nature was thus seen by officials as a highly desirable trait. 
Furthermore, as the members of the AC (H) went on to note, it was a far more 
straightforward matter for the government to simply create a formal ‘Home Desk’ within 
the Department than go to the trouble and expense of founding an entirely new 
organisation. As discussed at the second meeting of the AC (H): 
‘It was noted that the Foreign Office already had, in its Information Research Department, an organisation 
which was serving the same ends for overseas information and which had, in the course of its work, 
accumulated a large fund of material and expertise on the general pattern and methods of Communist 
penetration. It was generally felt, therefore, that the best use could be made of this experience if, instead of 
setting up a separate organisation to deal with indoctrination against Communism at home, a “Home Desk” 
was added to the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office to act as the focus for the 
collation and dissemination of intelligence about Communist activities on the home front. In the first place 
this “Home Desk” could be manned by the addition of two men to the IRD…’231 
The granting of a formal domestic remit to the Information Research Department was a 
highly significant moment in the development of British counter-subversion policy. 
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Although as previously noted, IRD had operated within Britain on an ad-hoc basis since 
1949, the report by the AC (H)’on ‘Countering Communism’ in 1951 marked the first 
instance of the government incorporating a formalised domestic counter-propaganda 
campaign as part of its approach to domestic communism.232 Initial success was limited. 
Whilst the IRD was proficient at generating substantial amounts of anti-communist grey 
propaganda, effective dissemination proved a consistent problem. Although the IRD had 
long possessed the means to collaborate with highly centralised bodies such as the 
TUC,233 it struggled to obtain notice amongst more localised groups. Information 
intended for local trade union branches and other groups of regional influence – including 
parish clergy – was often lost amongst the more mundane paperwork that such groups 
received on a regular basis, to the deep frustration of the government.234 The original goal 
behind IRD’s incorporation into Whitehall’s domestic counter-subversion strategy – 
namely securing a means through which to covertly disseminate anti-communist literature 
on a wide scale – continued to elude Ministers. The AC (H) reported in 1953 that: 
 ‘There was evidence that there were a considerable number of people in the provinces with a strong 
potential influence on public opinion, who were anxious to help in countering Communist propaganda, but 
who at present lacked the necessary ammunition in the form of facts and figures.’235 
When quantified, the circulation rates for IRD’s self-published domestic output was 
relatively small. For 1953 The Interpreter, IRD’s most widely read publication, reached 
only 204 individuals per month – whilst the ‘British Answers to Communism’ pamphlet 
had a grand total of 9 readers and ‘The Monthly Summary of Communist Activities in the 
United Kingdom’ achieved a circulation of only 10.236 Whilst IRD’s readership were 
undoubtedly influential - ‘The Monthly Summary’ was circulated to Clement Attlee & 
Herbert Morrison as well as Arthur Deakin, General Secretary of the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union – they were typically already predisposed to the IRD’s line of 
argument, whilst publications were not achieving anywhere near high enough circulation 
rates to effect general opinion in any meaningful way.237 Greater success was experienced 
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when the Home Desk collaborated with those domestic journalistic contacts which the 
wider IRD had cultivated over the preceding three years. W.N. Ewer of the Daily Herald 
proved an enthusiastic ally as did the Daily Telegraph’s industrial correspondent Hugh 
Chevins.238 The Labour Party’s central office was also extremely co-operative, extensive 
links between IRD and the Party had been forged during Labour’s time in power thanks 
to the efforts of Denis Healey and these continued even after electoral defeat in 1951.239  
Nonetheless, whilst individual articles could be disseminated through IRD’s stable of 
journalistic and political contacts, the means to improve circulation rates of longer 
publications continued to elude the Department. Somewhat ironically, the solution 
initially offered was essentially the founding of a government front organisation – 
composed of a small executive committee, which would have knowledge of IRD’s 
influence on the organisation, and a larger general staff responsible for the dissemination 
of material, though crucially with no knowledge of their publications’ exact 
provenance.240 It is interesting to note that as counter-subversion policy turned 
increasingly to active measures, many proposed counter-measures effectively mirrored 
communist practices and techniques. The solution in the end was something of a (perhaps 
typical) governmental fudge. Both the Home Office and Sir Norman Brook raised 
concerns that control over such an organisation would be fraught at best – Cabinet 
oversight would be difficult to maintain – whilst the political damage if such a group’s 
origins were to be discovered was deemed too great to be acceptable.241 However, were a 
suitable individual found who would be willing to set up such an organisation without the 
assistance of official subsidy there was no particular reason why IRD could not assist the 
new group by providing material and contact to subscribers.242 The formal proposal 
which followed the discussion recorded that ‘Tentative soundings, made without 
committing I.R.D. to an interest in the project’ were made under the ‘pledge of strictest 
secrecy’ to Sir Desmond Morton - Churchill’s former personal assistant, recently retired, 
and as such, without official connection to government – who provisionally consented to 
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act as the organiser for such a group.243 Unfortunately after the proposal was submitted 
Sir Norman Brook, acting in his capacity of Chair of the AC (H), ruled that future 
discussion should ‘not be formally considered by any Cabinet Committee, nor should 
they be linked to the recent discussion of the Committee’s work by the Defence 
Committee’244 making it difficult to ascertain what happened in the aftermath. Gill 
Bennett in her 2007 biography of Morton argues that the AC (H) simply considered the 
plan too risky, which seems highly plausible, however this is never stated outright in the 
files available.245 Regardless of the reasons for its abandonment, the fact that discussion 
of the ‘International Information and Research Centre’ appears to cease post-July 1953 
would seem to indicate that the idea was not pursued to fruition.  
Nevertheless, despite the initial proposal’s failure, it is possible to infer from the progress 
report furnished to the AC (H) regarding IRD’s English section in March 1954 that the 
problem of distribution was still solved rapidly by other means. The report makes note 
that: 
‘The salient features of the activities of English Section in disseminating knowledge of the aims and 
methods of Communism at home are: i) a good range of contacts with the national daily press and some of 
the provincial newspapers; ii) increased contacts with the national weekly press; iii) increasing interest in 
IRD material on the part of Labour and trade union leaders.’246 
The implication was that by 1954 problems with distribution had been resolved to a 
satisfactory extent. Circulation of The Interpreter in particular had risen to over 300 
copies domestically per month, which were circulated throughout the major unions, 
political organisations and socially influential groups (for example the Church of 
England).247 Beyond distribution, it was assessed that future trends more widely also 
appeared stable, with no major changes to policy recommended. The only drawback that 
was highlighted by the report was a lack of progress within certain trade unions.248 
Namely: communist influence within engineering, shipbuilding, vehicle production and 
construction unions remained significant, with no apparent solution offered by the IRD.249 
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Herein lay the fundamental weakness of what has been termed the ‘state-private’ network 
(covert government liaison with private entities) approach to counter-subversion typified 
by the IRD’s anti-communist propaganda campaign.250 Countering communist influence 
within the trade unions was often reliant upon continued co-operation with individual 
union leadership. However propaganda, even that as artfully designed as the material 
produced by the IRD, could only influence opinion so far. When confronted by unions 
temperamentally predisposed to militant action, the British government had little by way 
of effective counter-subversion options to manage the situation. 
Counter-Subversion in Industry 
IRD was not the only government department to encounter difficulties in dealing with 
communism within Britain’s trade unions. Communist influence over the unions proved a 
constant worry for Whitehall more widely, both during the latter months of the Attlee 
government and throughout the second Churchill administration. Contrary to 
understandings formed in the late 1940s (which concluded that the educated bourgeoisie 
was the group from which the principle communist threat emanated), communism within 
industry was increasingly viewed as an equal, if not greater threat as the ‘50s wore on. 
Evidence of the change in attitude first began to appear in earnest from 1951. Sir Robert 
Gould, then Minister for Labour, stated plainly at the first meeting of the AC (H) in the 
June of that year that ‘Of all the classes… the workers were the most important. They 
were the object of special attack by the Communists, and our counter-attack must be 
based on showing them how they have been misled by the Communists for their own 
ends.’251 Of course the government had long understood that links existed between 
domestic communism and organised labour. The CPGB had long sought to exploit 
working class grievance for political gain, as it regularly and openly affirmed. The 
CPGB’s political programme The British Road to Socialism, first published in February 
1951 proclaiming that: 
‘The essential condition for establishing such a People’s power [a communist Britain] is the building up of 
a broad coalition or popular alliance of all sections of the working people: of the organised working class, 
or all workers by hand and brain… Because of this, working class unity, the united action of all sections of 
the working class movement – Labour, Trade Union, Co-operative and Communist – is the vital need… A 
People’s Parliament and Government which draws its strength and purpose from a united movement of the 
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people with the working class at its core, will be able to mobilise the overwhelming majority of the people 
for its decisive measures to break the economic and political power of the big exploiters.’252 
Where previously, in the immediate post-war period these links had not been seen as 
cause for immediate concern, the situation had changed. In part the shift in attitude can be 
attributed to heavy industry’s renewed central importance to national security, as the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and early 1951’s commitment to an ambitious 
rearmament program following American pressure pushed industrial production back 
towards the top of the governmental priorities.253 Meanwhile, though industrial concern 
was in part brought about by the outbreak of the Korean War, official worry persisted 
long past the conflict’s conclusion in July 1953. Partially, the government worried that 
the increased economic burden rearmament brought may present opportunities for the 
growth of communist influence:  
‘If public opinion in this country does not fully understand the reasons for our defence programme, and the 
sacrifices it entrails, it may find it difficult to maintain the firm and enlightened attitude and the stout-
heartedness which will be needed in the dangerous years ahead.’254 
Certainly following the decision to re-arm, CPGB attempts to forment industrial unrest in 
war-critical industries increased markedly, much to the discomfort of Whitehall 
officials.255 The larger reason for increased concern however can be traced to the CPGB’s 
failure as a political party. By the election of the Churchill government, the British 
Communist Party had ceased to offer any sort of viable political alternative within 
Westminster.256 The 1950 general election saw both of the Party’s sitting MPs unseated, 
whilst 1951 brought electoral disaster as the CPGB’s share of the vote plummeted from 
roughly 92,000 in 1950 (this total in of itself a not insignificant decrease from the 98,000 
votes carried in 1945) to a meagre total of only 22,000.257 Matters for the Party were 
meanwhile made worse as it duly lost some 98% of its electoral deposit on account of 
failing to garner enough votes even to meet the minimum mandated threshold.258 Due to 
electoral collapse, the CPGB seemed unlikely to be able to affect change unilaterally. 
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This conclusion was strengthened via an examination of the Party’s finances. Whilst the 
Party presented a public image of success and prosperity, following closer inspection the 
rapidly worsening state of its financial situation was laid bare. Signs that the Party were 
struggling financially were evident from 1951, as noted by Guy Liddell: 
‘The weekend circulation of the ‘Daily Worker’, which some years back had been as high as 120’000, was 
now 52’000, and there were likewise falls in the circulation of ‘World News and Views’, ‘Communist 
Review’, ‘Woman Today’ and ‘Challenge’. This was possibly due to the increased cost. Constant appeals 
were being made by the Communist Press for financial support, but, in spite of an apparent deficit, its 
organs continued to appear. It was difficult to say how far the deficit was made good by certain wealthy 
supporters of Communist Party activity or from outside sources.’259 
By May 1953 an agreement had been reached between the Foreign Office and Board of 
Trade that a member of the Board of Trade would act as a liaison officer between the 
Board, FO and Information Research Department – passing on relevant trade information 
related to the CPGB’s commercial activities.260 At the same point, a major study was 
commissioned by the AC (H) into the state of British communist finances. The working 
party - which was comprised of representatives from the Foreign Office, Home Office, 
Ministry of Labour, Board of Trade, Treasury and Security Service – proceeded to 
compile over the next two years the most detailed investigation into communist finances 
undertaken up to that point. The report, presented to the AC (H) in June 1955, shortly 
after the 1955 general election,261 showed that the CPGB had essentially been living on 
borrowed time since the end of the Second World War – whilst it had maintained 
solvency through the use of savings acquired during the War (the high point of its 
popularity) as well as the pruning of its administrative staff – by 1955 only a quarter of its 
typical expenditure was met by routine income, meaning that the Party was almost wholly 
reliant on donations and bequests from its more affluent members.262 Interestingly, there 
was little evidence to suggest foreign funding – unlike the continental communist parties 
by the 1950s the CPGB did not draw directly upon international organisations or mutual 
aid funds run by the international peace movement.263 Whilst this meant that little 
punitive action could be taken against the Party – its various investments and savings 
were all entirely legitimate and its tax record immaculate - there was at least comfort to 
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be had in that the CPGB was steadily running itself into the ground. By 1955, circulation 
of the Daily Worker had dropped from three to two editions a week, whilst most 
expenditure increasingly only just met the running costs for each district, thereby 
meaning that there were little spare funds for propaganda efforts.264 
With advancement through politics now effectively denied Whitehall assessed, 
reasonably, that the most viable path left for the CPGB would be to turn to increased 
agitation within industry in an attempt to build an alternative base of support. As assessed 
by the Ministry of Labour: 
‘Communist participation in political life in Britain has never had much success and the Party is now a 
negligible political force… Having failed to make much progress in politics the Communists now look to 
the field of labour and industry as the best place for making their greatest efforts’.265  
Chief amongst governmental concerns was not that any great pro-communist sentiment 
existed amongst the working classes. Rather, the evidence available suggested that 
communist success tended to be engendered via the exploitation of pre-existing union 
grievance, rather than any particular affection for communism amongst the working class. 
The MI5 report on the 1954 dock strikes (which had paralysed traffic at the Port of 
London, before spreading to Liverpool and Birkenhead)266 illustrates this point well: 
‘It is always difficult to disentangle the causes of a strike and more so to apportion accurately between them 
the burden of responsibility… Neither on the national level nor through any of its subsidiary formations, 
including the Port of London branch to which most Communist dockers belong, did the Communist Party 
plan or inspire the strike… The Party did not make a single recruit amongst London dock workers either 
during or after the strike… (The Party again has shown) its tendency to delay too long before intervening in 
a dispute already started; and then to rush in, badly-informed and ill-prepared.’267 
Rather, official fears were concentrated around the possibility that general apathy 
amongst the rank and file of Britain’s trade unions could allow committed communists to 
covertly ascend to positions of influence within union leadership. This theory chimed 
with Foreign Office analyses of communist tactics performed in 1951. As argued by the 
FO, the communist threat to national stability ultimately stemmed from communist 
exploitation of vulnerable groups, without whom the domestic communist movement 
would be defanged and reduced to a mere nuisance: 
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‘Communist parties are not designed to create revolutionary situations directly. They are to work upon the 
masses through what Stalin calls “transmission belts” or “levers”; that is to say, through any ostensibly or 
actually non-Communist mass movements whose aims can be exploited to create in the popular mind 
misgivings about policy contrary to that of the Soviet Union… The Communist parties cannot directly 
achieve very much, and they were in fact explicitly designed by Lenin and Stalin to operate indirectly; their 
function is to lead public opinion via any local mass movement or agitation that they can exploit, to an 
acceptance of the Soviet thesis.’268 
The Labour movement seemed to offer a ready-made group for the Communist Party to 
exploit. Certainly quantitative analysis supported the plausibility of this hypothesis – by 
1954 Foreign Office estimates placed the total proportion of communists within the trade 
unions at only 0.3%. Within the Executive Council of the Electrical Trades Union (one of 
the most heavily communist influenced unions, as will be discussed in the following 
chapters) however the proportion of communists stood at 57% and communist 
sympathisers at 21%.269 For the government the problems presented by this were twofold. 
First and perhaps most obviously, it was felt that the presence of communists within 
union leadership would necessarily lead to increased militancy and greater tension in 
union relations overall.270 More importantly however, communist influence over trade 
union leadership had the potential to severely weaken official capacity for counter-
subversion efforts within industry - as it was this same leadership which was viewed as 
vital for broader governmental influence over the political trajectory of the working 
classes. As put by the Ministry of Labour: 
‘Trade Union opinion is extremely sensitive towards any semblance of a threat to its complete freedom and 
independence. Intervention by the Government, however mild in form or benevolent in intention, would set 
up violent reactions in the Trade Unions, even in those which have pursued the most strongly anti-
Communist policy. It is easy to guess at the political capital which could be made if it became known that 
the Government was passing information or advice to one section of the Trade Union movement to use 
against another section of the movement… This is the kind of situation which the Communists like to 
create, by identifying an attack on Communism as an attack on Trade Unionism, and great care must always 
be used to avoid playing into their hands.’271 
A long tradition of fiercely defended union independence meant that Whitehall’s ability 
to interfere directly in matters of industry was severely curtailed. Such was the degree of 
sensitivity that even extending vetting measures into the more sensitive areas of industry 
was deemed an impossibility. Even in those areas where private contractors were 
employed by the government on matters directly related to national security – most 
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notably the construction of Britain’s nuclear infrastructure - it was still felt that it would 
be morally dubious and legally difficult for the State to implement positive vetting 
procedures. Although negative vetting had been extended to industry since 1949,272 the 
government was so acutely sensitive to union pride that this was only announced, 
reluctantly, in late 1951 following the adoption of further safeguards to Atomic security 
post-Fuchs.273 In any event, though eventually adopted, the introduction of positive 
vetting would most likely have proven ineffectual – due to the volume of work it was 
already burdened with, MI5 was unable to provide accurate lists even of trade union 
executives, particularly at the local level.274 All of which meant that to large extent the 
countering of communism and indeed militancy more generally was ultimately reliant 
upon the continued co-operation of union leadership. It should be stressed however that 
this was not an equal partnership – the passing of classified information to union 
executives was particularly frowned upon by the Security Service and had been for some 
time. Even during negotiations regarding industrial vetting procedure MI5 had attempted 
to argue that all cases should be dealt with by a committee of ‘retired and serving Public 
Servants’ with no information regarding procedures to be shared with representatives 
from private industry.275 There existed here a considerable split in official opinion 
however – where MI5 deeply opposed the idea of sharing information outside of 
government, the idea became increasingly attractive at a Ministerial level. Encouraged in 
large part by the Foreign Office, from 1951 Cabinet-level efforts to co-opt trade union 
leadership into acting as surrogates for counter-subversion policy became steadily more 
common.276 As put within the AC (H)’s initial assessment of communist penetration of 
the unions: 
‘The question was raised how far trade union leaders were aware of the power of the Communists in the 
shop-steward movement, and how far they knew which of their officials Communists or crypto-
Communists. It was believed that the knowledge of trade union leaders on this point was often very 
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incomplete, and it was agreed that it would be desirable that they should be enlightened wherever 
possible.’277 
Indeed the importance of doing this was such that the occasional dissemination of 
classified materials to union leaders was openly countenanced, in direct contrast to MI5’s 
position.278 Whilst the Security Service was reluctant to formally incorporate non-official 
channels as a means of countering domestic communism – due mainly to concerns over 
security – the AC (H) saw an opportunity to sidestep official limitations. With 
government machinery unable to act directly against communism in industry - owing to 
the risk of severe political and legal repercussion were it to be caught interfering in trade 
union politics – Whitehall began to explore the use of ‘state-private’ networks in an 
attempt to circumvent the perceived limitations of official action, a trend which would 
continue into the early 1960s as shall be discussed. 
 
Counter-Subversion in Academia 
Industry was not the only area in which communist influence aroused official concern. 
Academia also was singled out for special consideration and the deliberation of 
communist academics was the subject of many early AC (H) discussions. The first 
mention of communist influence in academia arose at the second meeting of the AC (H), 
held in July 1951. The recorded minutes for that meeting made note that ‘It was generally 
agreed that the question of Communism among the student classes and the scientists was 
of special importance and that the method of dealing with it would require very careful 
consideration.’279 In response, the AC (H) advocated for the creation of networks of 
informants within the academic community who could be relied upon to relate 
information about suspect colleagues to the government as well as work within their 
respective universities to marginalise the views of communist academics. As put by John 
Winnifrith (later Sir) – then under-secretary at the Treasury – the basic idea was to 
decide: 
 ‘The names of a number of gentlemen in the different Universities who… might be approached on this 
subject. It was agreed that no attempt should be made in the first place to make contact with all 
Universities… The object should be to find out whether a substantial Communist problem existed in the 
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University and, if so, how serious it was, with a special reference to the prevalence of Communism amongst 
scientists and economists.’280 
Unsurprisingly Oxford and Cambridge were both selected amongst the initial institutions 
to be targeted, as were Manchester, Glasgow, the London School of Economics and 
University College London.281 Reflecting perhaps the individual biases of the members of 
the Committee, Oxford and Cambridge received far greater scrutiny than any of the other 
institutions – despite the fact that the government believed the Birmingham, Manchester, 
Nottingham, Hull and Glasgow all to be harbouring ‘Communist cells’ within their 
various departments (mainly Russian, also History in the case of Manchester, and 
Education in the case of Hull).282 Of the universities selected Oxford presented the least 
worry, with the feedback of FW Deakin (Warden of St Anthony’s College, formerly 
literary agent to Churchill and member of SOE during the war) recorded as: 
‘Deakin’s view was that Communism was not a serious problem at that University, nor that it was 
particularly prevalent among scientists and economists; rather it was to be found in certain maladjusted 
types who could easily be recognised.’283 
Cambridge meanwhile received far greater attention – predominantly due to worries that 
the economics faculty had become irreparably tainted through the influence of a number 
of Marxist economists.284 Again, an informal approach was adopted as spring 1952 saw 
Norman Brook contact Professor Stanley Dennison over the matter of Communism in 
Cambridge. Dennison, a Fellow of Gonville and Caius College passed on that although:  
 
‘Known communists in the faculty had little or no influence on the political views of undergraduates… The 
most immediate danger was that the Governing Board or Executive of the Faculty might be captured by 
persons of communist views or sympathies, in accordance with characteristic communist tactics, in which 
event there was every likelihood that more University teaching appointments would go to communist 
fellow-travellers. The University and college authorities in Cambridge, however were now fully alive to the 
dangers.’285 
It seems likely Dennison used the AC (H)’s enquiries as a pretext for his own 
professional gain and exaggerated the influence of communists in the faculty in order to 
advance his own position. Certainly Dennison had been involved in a long running 
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dispute within the Economics Faculty for several years, as he favoured a more liberal 
economic model as opposed to that of Dobb’s Marxist interpretation.286 Equally it is 
notable, though perhaps coincidental, that Dobb did not achieve a University readership at 
Cambridge until 1959 (he had first taken up a lecturing post in the late ‘20s, before 
gaining a full Fellowship at Trinity in 1948) – a year after Dennison had left to accept a 
post a Queens’ College Belfast.287 It is also telling that in his reply to Brook, Dennison 
had stated that ‘he would think it quite appropriate to be influenced in making an 
appointment to a teaching post by a consideration that the applicant was known or 
believed to be a communist’.288 Certainly MI5’s assessment of the situation was not 
nearly so dire and advocated that the matter was dropped entirely: 
‘A good deal of special attention has been paid to the problem of Communism in Cambridge, past and 
present, and the results of these researches do not so far indicate that DOBB and SRAFFA [Piero Sraffa – 
Italian economist, also employed at Cambridge] have played a particularly sinister role such as would 
qualify them for priority investigation in a current context. It is true that these two Communist lecturers in 
economics have both been at Cambridge continuously since about 1926, (most of the time, significantly 
enough at Trinity, the key college), and that throughout the thirties DOBB’s influence was a powerful factor 
in stimulating communism at the University; however, DOBB’s Communist interests have generally been 
public in character and have extended far beyond the confines of Cambridge, and neither DOBB nor 
SRAFFA appears to have dabbled in under-cover practices… In the circumstances, we can probably afford 
to let these two cases rest where they are.
289
 
 
In this instance the Security Service acted as something of a brake on Whitehall’s more 
reactionary tendencies with regards to communism within academia. MI5, though quite 
capable of questionable judgement in their own right as will be discussed shortly, did still 
continue to act as the voice of restraint within government. Indeed it is telling that 
communism in the universities seems only to have been a real point of concern for the AC 
(H) in the earliest portion of the 1950s. By 1953, the topic appeared far less frequently 
within the Committee’s minutes and by 1954 had been dropped almost entirely.290 The 
episode is indicative of a continued ministerial failing to fully understand domestic 
communism, despite the great strides made since 1945. By 1951 ministers still had a 
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tendency to view the ideology as a single homogenous block, with a successful counter-
subversion strategy requiring that all parts be tackled equally.291 Meanwhile, though 
initial efforts were well intentioned there was also a considerable degree of unhelpful 
amateurism still present. The wisdom of delegating what was essentially professional 
intelligence work to friends and associates within academia was, regardless of prior 
wartime experience, dubious at best and there seems to have been little gained as a result 
of the exercise other than a realisation that prior concerns had been misplaced. There are 
perhaps uncomfortable parallels with McCarthyism here, as officialdom acted to limit 
individuals’ influence based more on ideological grounds than strict assessment of their 
danger to national security. Whilst the Committee’s actions are understandable when the 
extent of Whitehall’s institutional knowledge about communism is taken into account, 
they still act as proof that Ministers were fully capable of foolhardy decision-making in 
the pursuit of a more aggressive strategy. 
 
The Security Service misjudged their surveillance targeting, as they themselves embarked 
upon a campaign of anti-communist surveillance concurrent with the AC (H)’s separate 
efforts. From MI5’s perspective, increased oversight of private individuals employed by 
the universities was warranted as a necessary measure in the fight to curtail communism’s 
appeal. It was felt that such an approach would tackle two issues concurrently, granting 
insight into the ideological appeal of communists by solving the long-standing problem of 
why intelligent, successful British citizens would feel an affinity to communism whilst 
meanwhile hopefully mitigating future security risks by providing the Security Service 
with a more detailed picture of domestic communism beyond the confines of CPGB’s 
hierarchy. To take the introductory remarks of the file regarding Christopher Hill – the 
pre-eminent historian of early-modern England – as an example, the aim was to first 
increase official understanding of the problem, so that effective policy could later be 
implemented to guard against it. The B division officer assigned to his case made his 
initial application to begin pervasive monitoring of Hill’s activities as follows: 
‘HILL is one of the leading Communists at Oxford University and plays a prominent part in all the Party’s 
cultural work. He is one of the persons whom I have selected (in consultation with Thistlethwaite)292 as 
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deserving further investigation, in order to increase our knowledge of Communism at the Universities. An 
application for a Home Office Warrant is submitted herewith for signature is approved.’293 
Although Hill had been a member of the Communist Party since 1935 and thus had 
already cropped up occasionally on the periphery of Security Service investigations, it 
was the combination of his political views with his profession that singled him out for 
significant individual attention from 1951.294 This distinguished him from fellow member 
of the Communist Party Historians Group and subject of Security Service attention Eric 
Hobsbawm. Unlike Hill, Hobsbawm had come to the attention of MI5 as early as 1942, 
when whilst a sergeant in the Army Education Corps, he had attempted to arrange for a 
German communist to present a lecture for the benefit of enlisted personnel.295 At the 
outset, Hill himself was of little interest individually to the government – the eventual aim 
was to monitor him in the hope of building a more complete understanding of potential 
communist networks within the academic profession. The briefing for B divisions 
‘watchers’ (officers within MI5 immediately responsible for conducting surveillance) 
informed personnel assigned to the case that: 
‘This investigation is being carried out with a view to establishing the identity of his [Hill’s] contacts at the 
University and in the cultural field generally, and to obtain the names of intellectuals sympathetic to the 
Party who may not already be known to us. We are therefore interested in all persons who telephone to 
HILL or to his wife.’296 
From the Security Service’s perspective, it seemed as if the best way to address the 
‘Achilles heel’ identified by Brook - namely lack of detailed information about 
communist intellectuals outside the CPGB - was to attempt to use established knowledge 
regarding CPGB membership to map professional and social connections outside of it. 
Sadly, in the case of Christopher Hill, such high-minded intentions soon devolved into 
little more than the reporting of gossip and spurious rumour. An excellent example of this 
being the initial report on his personal life and relationship with his then wife Inez Hill:297 
‘Inez HILL is described as a somewhat neurotic, rather emotional and unstable person… She has 
announced recently that she is sick to death of the Party and of Communism and no longer wishes to 
belong. It is difficult to say whether this resolution represents her fixed political determination, boredom 
with her husband’s political activities or may merely be the result of a gush of emotionalism. Since he is 
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reputed to give his wife a very small sum as a dress allowance or pin-money Inez HILL may well resent the 
Communist Party absorbing what would otherwise go towards a new summer dress for herself… 
Christopher HILL himself, has been described in the past as somewhat mean-minded, pompous and 
tiresome.’298 
The report would seem to serve little purpose other than as an example of how dated 50’s 
attitudes towards women have now become. Certainly there is nothing contained within 
of any particular relevance to national security. Meanwhile, attitudes within the wider 
government were more of slight embarrassment than support for the investigation – Sir 
Reader Bullard’s 1953 ‘Report on Soviet Studies in the Universities of the UK’ included 
the rather pointed remark that:  
‘Hill is admittedly a Marxist historian and, according to Deakin, he is a member of the Communist Party. 
He does not, however, engage in Soviet studies. His period is the seventeenth century. Recently he gave an 
interesting BBC talk on the Barebones Parliament, representing it as innocent of the opinions attributed to it 
by the people who destroyed it and as advancing views now accepted as laudable.’299 
 
The whole episode was demonstration that the Security Service, despite on the whole 
being fairly pragmatic in its approach, still possessed the capacity for mistakes. Such 
errors did impact upon individual reputations and careers in a manner which in hindsight 
is difficult to justify. Prior to the aforementioned BBC talk for example, MI5 felt 
compelled to write directly to the Corporation and inform ominously that they ‘may care 
to know that this man has a Communist history in this office dating from 1935, and is 
known to us as a current member.’300 What precise relevance this information may have 
had to the broadcasting of a documentary about a short-lived mid-17th Century parliament 
is unclear. Though the Security Service’s aims were arguably well-intentioned, and the 
process by which they reached the decision to investigate Hill plausibly justifiable, it 
nevertheless struggled at times to accurately identify genuine subversive threats. Every 
communist was not a security risk, despite the closeness of their links to the CPGB. That 
Hill’s file, complete with warrants permitting wire taps and postal checks, continued to be 
regularly updated until at least the early 1960s is testament to this much at least.301  
Co-operation between the US and UK 
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In spite of missteps such as Hill and the wider investigation into communist academics, 
anti-communist measures were still slight by international standards. It is important to 
stress that although the early 1950s saw Britain strengthen anti-communist legislation and 
enact a considerably more aggressive policy than previously, British actions were 
consistently milder than those undertaken in the United States over the same period. 
There were no political figures who sought to capture the same sort of populist 
demagoguery as typified by Senator Joseph McCarthy – who delivered his infamous 
Lincoln Day speech in February 1950 claiming to possess ‘A list of 205 – a list of names 
that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist 
Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State 
Department.’302 It would equally have been unthinkable for a Director General of MI5 to 
appear on public radio (or indeed to make public announcements at all for that matter)303 
and warn that ‘Communists have been and are today at work within the very gates of 
America. There are few walks in American life which they do not traverse… Wherever 
they may be, they have in common on diabolic ambition: to weaken and to eventually 
destroy American democracy by stealth and cunning’304 as Director of the FBI J. Edgar 
Hoover did in May 1950. Though the official language of Whitehall could occasionally 
stray into similar dehumanising terms – communists as an ‘infection’ began to occur as a 
common trope across government departments from the early ‘50s onwards – the idea of 
members of Britain’s Secret State issuing public warnings about the communist menace 
would have been deemed wholly inappropriate. Meanwhile it is telling that both Attlee 
and Churchill shared the opinion that the American response was both distasteful and 
wholly disproportionate.305 The work done for Christopher Andrew’s official history of 
MI5 was finally able to quantify the differences in approach on publication in 2009. 
Between 1947 and 1956, US purges of its civil service – beginning under Truman with 
the ‘Loyalty Program’ – led to the sacking of 2700 federal employees and the resignation 
of an additional 12000. By contrast, dismissals in the British civil service over the period 
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1948-1954 amounted to a mere 124.306 Even accounting for the disparity in time-span and 
size of the United States compared to Britain, the difference is still striking.  
Nonetheless, despite official distaste for American anti-communist zealotry and markedly 
more restrained application of counter-subversion legislation Britain did, grudgingly, find 
itself a surrogate player to McCarthyite hysteria. As a result of the continued importance 
of the Special Relationship to British policy – both foreign and domestic - as well as 
assessment that membership of NATO incurred certain responsibilities to counter 
communist activities in a robust fashion, considerable co-operation with the United States 
on anti-communist measures occurred. This is perhaps most in evidence in the direction 
of MI5’s activities over the period, with the Security Service accepting American 
instruction to investigate certain suspected communists, even if not always accepting the 
premise behind the investigation. The Service’s investigation into Robert Oppenheimer a 
case in point. Although Oppenheimer had once occupied some of the most sensitive 
positions in the American defence establishment – heading the wartime nuclear research 
efforts at Los Alamos and acting as chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the 
US Atomic Energy Commission in the late 1940s – he was called to testify before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee in 1949 where he admitted association (albeit 
minor) with the US Communist Party in the 1930s.307 Matters were compounded in 1953, 
when Oppenheimer’s security clearance was suspended as a result of his past communist 
associations – leading to the nuclear scientist to insist on a hearing, which was scheduled 
for spring 1954.308 In December 1953, Oppenheimer travelled to London on a long 
planned trip. Initially informed of Oppenheimer’s travel plans in the October of that year, 
the Security Service were formally asked by the FBI to monitor the scientist’s movements 
and report any information which might be deemed of interest.309 As recorded by the E 
Division (the division responsible for ‘Counter-Subversion: Home & Overseas, as a result 
of White’s reforms earlier in ’53) officer in charge of the case: 
‘On 11.12.53 Mr. O’Brien [FBI legal attaché to the US Embassy in London] came to see me regarding this 
case. He said he was under pressure from Washington to report on OPPENHEIMER’s activities, 
particularly as Washington had heard that OPPENHEIMER had visited this country and had then gone on 
to France. O’Brien asked if we had any adverse information regarding OPPENHEIMER’s visit here. He 
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also asked what degree of coverage we were giving this visit. I told him that action had been taken to alert 
the security authorities concerned with AERE [the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell] and 
that we had taken the routine step of asking for a Police report in the event that OPPENHEIMER had come 
to their adverse notice. Beyond that we had, on present information, no justification for taking any special 
action. If however he had additional information which would warrant such action I should be glad to have 
it…. O’Brien said in fact he had no such information.’310 
The Security Service would monitor individuals on behalf of the American Government, 
however it was not willing to stray from its constitutional role, or contravene established 
procedure in order to satisfy the whims of American politics. Such an attitude was typical 
of Service behaviour over the period. When sent a missive by the FBI warning that Julian 
Huxley (noted British evolutionary Biologist, director of UNESCO and founding member 
of the World Wildlife Fund) had been invited to a joint West/East scientific conference to 
be held in India in late 1952 the Service’s response was merely: 
‘Several of these scientists are known to us, but have nothing adverse recorded against them. The following 
notes may be passed to the Director of the Bureau… Although politically HUXLEY is believed to be “very 
left-wing” there seems to be no reason to regard him now as being in sympathy either with the Soviet Union 
or with Communism.’311 
It is testament to the strength of the transatlantic alliance that at least spirited 
disagreement could occur. A similar approach was in evidence during the Service’s 
investigation into Charlie Chaplin. Chaplin had attracted the ire of Hoover’s FBI as a 
result of support for pro Soviet groups during the War, coupled with an affair with the 
actress Joan Barry – which resulted in public scandal in the United States and Chaplin’s 
popularity plummeting accordingly.312 After leaving the US for the premiere of his latest 
film Limelight in London in 1951, Chaplin had his re-entry permit revoked on the order of 
then attorney general James McGranery.313 Eager to ensure that Chaplin could not re-
enter the country should a legal challenge be issued, the FBI contacted MI5 to see 
whether further proof of communist association could be acquired. Whilst the Security 
Service co-operated with the investigation, opinion of the case within the Service was 
withering. Initial instruction from John Marriot regarding how to proceed with the 
investigation was particularly sharp: 
‘I think it better not to volunteer the information [requested by the US legal attaché], but to confine 
ourselves to answering the specific questions put by the FBI. If they really want to whip up a case against 
CHAPLIN, they can read Pravda for themselves. It is curious that we can find no record of CHAPLIN’s 
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birth, but I scarcely think that this is of any security significance.’314 
 
Though the file on Chaplin remained open until 1960, it is clear that few Service 
resources were expended on the investigation. The last report of note in Chaplin’s file 
summed up the whole affair nicely: 
‘CHAPLIN, when resident in America, was the subject of several reports associating him with 
Communism. These reports, the veracity of which we are unable to check, and which do not impress us by 
their prima facie quality, induced the American authorities to rule in 1952 and 1953 that he would not be 
permitted to re-enter the USA… We have no substantial information of our own against CHAPLIN, and we 
are not satisfied that there are reliable grounds for regarding him as a security risk… It may be that 
CHAPLIN is a Communist sympathiser but on the information before us he would appear to be no more 
than a “progressive” or radical.’315 
British co-operation with the US on investigations related to individuals accused of 
communism for political rather than security reasons was not necessarily indicative of 
approval. As the aforementioned MI5 cases show, more often than not co-operation with 
the FBI was a matter of courtesy rather than belief that an individual constituted a 
genuine security threat.  
As an aside however – US paranoia did occasionally prove useful to British intelligence, 
such as in the case of Cedric Belfrage. Belfrage, a British journalist resident in  the United 
States since the 1930s, had whilst employed by the British Security Coordination (MI6’s 
black propaganda outfit, whose purpose was to help sway US opinion towards 
intervention in Europe prior to December 1941) passed classified material concerning 
BSC to the Soviet Union over the course of the war.316 Whilst MI5 initially dismissed 
American interest in Belfrage ‘These communist connections do not amount to anything 
beyond a mild interest in left-wing affairs’317, the FBI was more tenacious and obtained a 
confession from Belfrage in 1947.318 Meanwhile, though MI5 believed by this point that 
he had been an important Soviet agent during the war, sufficient evidence could not be 
obtained to ensure a successful prosecution.319 Though the episode is perhaps of 
secondary importance in an assessment of British anti-communist policy, it is worth 
noting that the American approach did on occasion produce greater success than that of 
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Whitehall’s. On the whole however, whilst the British government could be accused of a 
degree of hypocrisy – American practices were readily criticised whilst a number of 
solely UK-based investigations were also predicated on similarly flimsy grounds as 
discussed – nevertheless it is comforting to note that ideological purges on an American 
scale were never contemplated in any meaningful sense by Whitehall policy makers and 
moreover that the prevailing governmental culture was almost entirely hostile to such 
measures ever being realistically considered. 
Explaining the Lack of Overt Suppression 
Beyond distaste for the overt suppression of communists as practised by the FBI during 
the early 1950s, Whitehall increasingly believed that harsher measures – for example 
proscription of the Communist Party - would ultimately accomplish little by way of 
management of the communist subversive threat and indeed would most likely prove 
counter-productive in the long run. Experiences during the early 50s of attempting to 
manage the communist ‘Peace Movement’ – that varied network of groups run from 1948 
by the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council, which all ostensibly advocated for world 
peace whilst quietly ignoring Soviet transgression in favour of ever more shrill 
condemnation of Western actions – taught the British government that a light touch could 
often produce the best results.320 The question of freedom of movement was particularly 
instructive in this regard. The travel of British nationals and UK based organisations to 
the Soviet Bloc were all too often exploited for the purposes of Soviet propaganda and 
could be seen to legitimise the communist position.321 However, attempting to prevent 
travel, particularly en-masse was equally problematic. The futility of attempting to 
prevent travel to communist countries and events was proved by a number of ill-fated 
attempts to restrict movement in the early ‘50s – most notably during the 3rd World 
Festival of Youth and Students held in East Berlin in August 1951. Though subject to 
negative reaction in the majority of British press outlets as well as the Labour Party 
enacting a standing ban on any of its membership travelling to participate – the 
conference still attracted circa 300 British students.322 Meanwhile, the United States 
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government had reached the decision to prohibit all travel to the Festival – a salient point, 
given that the majority of British students planned on reaching East Berlin via travel 
through Austria, then still under occupation by US forces. Trains carrying large quantities 
of British and French nationals were stopped by American military personnel at the 
Austrian border town of Saalfelden, whereupon the students were told to turn back and 
prevented from further travel – in some cases physically as groups attempted to push 
through American troops.323 The incident proved a godsend for communist propagandists 
as condemnatory articles appeared throughout the British press: 
‘A Durham University student who has arrived back in London after attempting to reach East Berlin for the 
Festival last night described his reaction to what he had seen in the Occupied Zone of Austria as “one of 
shock of the American treatment of British citizens and the contempt for the British passport”… Some of 
the things he did see, he alleged, were: armed guards of American occupation troops with fixed bayonets 
lining his party of 300 against a wall and telling them they would be shot if they moved; a British girl who 
had been “punched and kicked” by American troops; and two youths who had been bayoneted by them. He 
alleged, too, that the party he was in had been kept in barbed wire compounds covered by machine guns and 
mortars without food, water, or sanitation for 24 hours.’324 
The furore did not harm official US/UK relations overly much. Herbert Morrison’s letter 
to the US embassy (though slightly obsequious in tone) expressed regret over the 
incident, yet concluded that reports of inhumane treatment had been much exaggerated 
whilst any ‘unpleasant experience’ experienced by the students was a ‘natural 
consequence of the line of conduct which they themselves chose to follow’325. However, 
a salutary lesson to both governments was identified in that the political cost of restricting 
travel on ideological grounds was usually not worth the reward. The US State Department 
report on the incident commented in the aftermath that: 
‘It is obvious… that the policy of restricting and hindering travel to the Youth Festival has caused a 
substantial amount of adverse reaction in Britain. In the light of this, we question whether the decision was 
a wise one, and seriously doubt that the possible advantages of restricting travel outweigh the obvious 
disadvantages... It is possible to attribute a certain amount of British “touchiness” to the general feeling… 
Nevertheless, it should not be minimised that there is a deep-rooted attachment to liberal ideas in Britain, 
freedoms of speech, travel, and opinion which the average Briton believes are the inalienable rights of 
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British subjects… It may be presumed that the present furore will die down, but not without having 
provided propaganda to our enemies and embarrassment to our friends.’326 
The incident was taken as proof by the Foreign Office that outright repression tended only 
to fuel communist propaganda rather than providing any tangible benefit to British 
interests. By the time of the next major communist rally – the World Peace Council’s 
1952 Vienna Congress – the FO had reached the decision to not refuse passports to those 
wishing to travel, not only to avoid further embarrassment as had been suffered over the 
Youth Festival incident, but also due to reasoning that those travelling to attend were 
most likely ‘converted’ communists anyway.327 Where official attitudes to communist 
activity had hardened – there was a recognition that the appeal of domestic communism 
could often be mitigated more effectively through nuance than repression. By 1955, the 
government had begun to exhibit considerably more pragmatism in its approach to 
domestic communism as it learned to turn undesirable situations to British advantage 
without playing into the hands of the communist narrative. As was realised, the travel of 
British nationals and delegations provided opportunities for the acquisition of information 
about countries behind the Iron Curtain which otherwise may have been unattainable. 
Certainly this was the prevailing Foreign Office theory – policy guidelines provided by 
the FO in 1953 stated: 
‘In principle, our policy at present is as follows: (a) to secure the earliest possible information of a 
delegation’s departure and then to arrange for suitable representatives (if any) to be interviewed and if 
possible briefed. (b) To suggest to these delegates that they might visit H.M. Mission, pointing out that our 
staff at these posts are always glad to speak to people with the latest news of home. (c) To arrange for 
reliable newspaper correspondents to put a few carefully chosen questions to friendly delegates on their 
return to this country, and to encourage suitable individuals to publicise their views – by means of 
newspaper articles or BBC talks.’328 
Rather than attempts at outright suppression, such as the Treachery Act considered by the 
Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities in the late 1940s, government policy was 
progressively more defined by attempts to work around, increasingly covertly, the 
problem of communism rather than overtly repress it. 
Summary 
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The early 1950s were a period of major change and consolidation for British counter-
subversion policy. Where the majority of the Attlee government had been spent 
attempting to understand communism as fundamentally a problem of security, the final 
months of Attlee’s premiership saw a move towards approaching communism as an 
ideological threat to British stability as much as a direct security problem. It was this 
conceptualisation of the matter which would also serve to inform the Churchill and later 
governments’ attempts to manage the problem. Though the security element remained 
and was indeed strengthened – the move from a relatively limited program of negative 
vetting to a steadily more comprehensively applied positive vetting system a logical 
progression of the model currently practised – British domestic anti-communism efforts 
increasingly attempted to discredit the idea’s wider ideological appeal and reduce the 
ability of communists to influence individuals in wider civil society. Again, it was Soviet 
espionage which provided the final catalyst for change. The discovery of Klaus Fuch’s 
passing of atomic data convinced the government that greater effort needed to be made to 
understand the ideological draw of communism, a question which still puzzled ministers 
and civil servants alike. Meanwhile, the defections of Burgess and Maclean hammered 
home in the most dramatic way possible the fact that communism had the ability to 
penetrate the very heart of government. The modest defensive measures which had been 
agonised over by the Attlee government were proven in a single incident to still be 
ultimately inadequate for their intended purpose. Such events forced the government to 
accept that still stricter, more pervasive and more universal vetting legislation was 
required. Where negative vetting had been introduced only reluctantly and in limited 
fashion, evidence of Soviet espionage by those who had been trusted servants of the 
British State finally bolstered resolve sufficiently to generate the political will necessary 
to introduce pervasive and steadily comprehensively applied vetting procedure, even 
despite the significant additional financial burden this entailed.  
Meanwhile, it was realised that officialdom possessed little substantive understanding of 
the underlying attraction of communism as an ideology. That communism inspired 
security breaches continued to occur despite the decline of the CPGB as a political force 
(such as it ever was) demonstrated that the defensively orientated model for preventing 
communist subversion was predicated on a false set of assumptions. British counter-
subversion policy from the early ‘50s onwards attempted to tackle communism as 
fundamentally an ideological problem and not merely security based. Such a change in 
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understanding was, naturally, accompanied by a change in approach defined by far 
greater focus on the role of communism in civil society. The aim now was to undermine 
the communist political narrative and so prevent the further spread of communism as a 
political philosophy, particularly in those groups deemed to be both influential and 
particularly ‘at-risk’ to communist sympathies, notably academia and the trade unions. As 
such, the ‘50s witnessed the growth of counter-propaganda as an integral part of Britain’s 
anti-communism tactics on the home front, a role spearheaded by the Information 
Research Department and thus bringing the Foreign Office into the historically novel 
position as having a significant domestic remit along with its historical overseas role. The 
focus on ideology was not without risks however as demonstrated by the government’s 
activities within academia. The more nebulous nature of the ideological problem lead the 
government to engage in investigations and actions which in hindsight are difficult to 
justify, as resources were wasted on investigating those who realistically did little to 
further the cause of communism in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Britain never fell prey to the same paranoia which defined the US response over the same 
period – moreover it is evident that at most levels of government there was little appetite 
for anti-communist reprisal of the sort typified by Joseph McCarthy. At the very least, the 
period from July 1950 to April 1955 provided a series of valuable lessons for the British 
government as it attempted to fumble its way towards a cohesive and increasingly 
complex domestic anti-communism strategy which sought to protect the State via more 
pervasive positive vetting methods, whilst undermining the ideological appeal and 
influence of communism via an aggressively targeted counter-propaganda campaign. 
1950-1955 was therefore characterised by a more confident and proactive, if inexpertly 
applied strategy. By the time Churchill left office in early April 1955 to be succeeded by 
his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, a great deal of experience had been gained, yet 
counter-subversion policy remained at a deadlock.  
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Breakthrough: May 1955- October 1959 
 
British domestic counter-subversion efforts stood at something of a stalemate as of May 
1955. Whilst vetting reforms and MI5 surveillance had been effective in guarding the 
state against domestic communist predation, the considerable efforts made during the 
Churchill government to undermine communism’s influence and appeal within academia 
and industry had experienced only limited success. Members of the Communist Party 
remained entrenched in certain key unions (particularly those related to engineering, 
shipbuilding and mining) and government propaganda showed little sign of undermining 
the Marxist intelligentsia’s faith in pro-Soviet communism. Breakthrough was provided 
however, as the periods of the Eden government and early years of the Macmillan 
administration brought unexpected change and upheaval to the foundations of Britain’s 
radical left. The events of the period dealt what would prove to be irreparable damage to 
the credibility of the domestic communist movement, as developments behind the Iron 
Curtain demonstrated in the starkest terms the extent of the hypocrisy at the very heart of 
the Soviet system. The collapse of Soviet communism’s intellectual appeal within Britain 
following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in early 1956 and the heavy-handed 
Soviet subjugation of the Hungarian revolution in the late October/early November of that 
same year proved to be a crisis from which the CPGB would be unable to recover. The 
late ‘50s saw an exodus from the British Communist Party as almost a third of party 
membership left within a year of 1956.329 This mass-desertion made all the more 
damaging due to the fact that a substantial proportion of those who abandoned the Party 
post-’56 belonged to the influential intellectual core of the Party – individuals such as 
Christopher Hill, E.P Thomson and John Saville – who had provided a degree of 
credibility through their membership and by leaving rendered the Party bereft of both 
intellectual authority and political imagination.  
With the collapse of communist appeal within the more high-brow elements of the radical 
left, official attention became focused almost overwhelmingly on the question of 
communist activity within the trade unions. Specifically, the issue of communist 
influence over trade union leadership increasingly produced the greatest official concern. 
Spurred on by a series of historical reports which traced union unrest in the early ‘50s 
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back to communist interference, as well as concerns that communist-controlled union 
leadership could forcibly drag the Labour Party to the radical left, anti-communist efforts 
directed at industry increased exponentially during the late 1950s. Again, 1956 brought 
what in hindsight would prove to be a major breakthrough in industrially focused anti-
communist efforts, as MI5 monitoring learned of communist cheating in the elections of 
the Electrical Trades Union – a revelation which in time would prove key to the demise of 
communism’s industrial credibility. However, although the tumult caused by 1956 also 
proved to be problematic for the British government. With the gradual rise of the ‘New 
Left’, Whitehall found itself confounded by a new sort of political movement. Though 
undeniably viewed as more benign than pro-Soviet communism,330 in many ways certain 
aspects of the New Left movement proved just as troubling for British officialdom as 
communism had been. The rise of anti-nuclear sentiment in particular – formalised by the 
founding of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1957 – worried Whitehall 
considerably, as the goal of maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent continued to 
remain central to British defence policy.331 However, the security threat posed by the 
New Left as a whole was not as clear cut as communism had been – the Macmillan 
government struggled throughout the late ‘50s to accurately identify and counter the 
threat posed by the New Left without straying into the realms of disproportionate 
response. Meanwhile, beyond the changing priorities brought on by shifting political 
circumstance, the period also witnessed a marked increase in cultural counter-subversion 
efforts, directed principally at the burgeoning visual media sectors of film and television. 
As the cost of television ownership gradually became more affordable for the general 
population, the government showed a steady interest in monitoring the output of the BBC 
and private film-makers, in an attempt to mitigate the risk of communist propaganda 
reaching wide swathes of the British public. As such, British counter-subversion policy 
over the course of the late 1950s was characterised by four key themes: a diminishment of 
concern regarding communism within the intellectual and professional classes, steadily 
increasing anti-communist successes within the unions, the beginnings of the 
diversification of counter-subversion efforts as a result of changing circumstances and 
affiliations within the British left and finally greater worry over the potential cultural 
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impact of more widely diffused Soviet propaganda brought on by wider public access to 
visual media. 
 
Dissent within the CPGB 
Over the course of the late 1950s, Whitehall received a welcome, though wholly 
unexpected, boost to its counter-subversion efforts thanks to the development of a 
significant crisis of leadership and credibility suffered by the CPGB as a result of events 
behind the Iron Curtain during the same period. Namely, from early 1956 onwards the 
Communist Party of Great Britain experienced major internal dissent – particularly 
amongst its academic membership – which ultimately culminated in a collapse in 
membership by 1958. Such a crisis, in hindsight, was perhaps inevitable – though the 
scale still surprising. Certainly by 1955 there is evidence to suggest that a significant 
proportion of the CPGB’s intellectual membership found the Executive Committee’s 
(EC) insistence on ideological purity – as defined by the EC - and unilateral decision-
making increasingly frustrating, particularly in light of the Party’s failure to recover from 
its electoral collapse in 1950 over successive General Elections.332 As news of 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956 
reached Britain – tellingly via a full report of the speech published in the Observer in 
June 1956,333 rather than through official Communist channels – the level of hypocrisy 
inherent in the Executive Committee’s slavish adherence to Stalinist policy over the 
previous thirty years became wholly apparent.334 Already frustrated by the total lack of 
political advancement since the Party’s electoral catastrophe in 1950,335 news of 
Khrushchev’s denouncement served only to fuel the slow-brewing discontent growing 
within the CPGB. 
Within Britain, the first signs of serious dissent emerged in July 1956, with the 
publication of The Reasoner by John Saville and E.P. Thompson, both members of the 
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influential Communist Party Historians Group.336 The journal’s publication provoked 
outrage amongst the CPGB’s Executive Committee, given its openly avowed purpose as a 
vehicle for examining and questioning the principles and strategy of the Communist Party 
leadership. Thompson’s views on Party leadership were encapsulated via an open letter to 
George Matthews (then Deputy General Secretary, later editor of the Daily Worker from 
1958): ‘I am not proud of our confusion of the true principles of internationalism with a 
servile attitude to the leadership of the Soviet Union… I am not proud of the vacillation 
which our present leadership has shown over the last three months’.337 A resolution by the 
Yorkshire district committee of the Communist Party (due to Saville’s residence and 
employment in Hull) calling on the pair to immediately cease publication of The 
Reasoner swiftly followed. When this was ignored, both were then summoned to appear 
before the CPGB’s central Political Committee based in London where they were 
informed that: 
‘If they claimed the right to publish their own political journal, they could not deny that right to others. Any 
individuals or group of individuals disagreeing with any aspect of the democratically decided policy of the 
Party at any time, would be entitled to produce their own political journals and circulate them. Far from 
being democratic, this situation would be the negation of democracy. For such journals would be 
completely beyond the control of the Party membership, and would be produced by individuals not elected 
by or responsible to the membership.’338 
Beyond the dubious logic and somewhat creative interpretation of ‘democracy’ the 
Political Committee’s point was clear – the Party would tolerate no internal dissent. 
Saville and Thompson were once again ordered to cease publication of the Reasoner, a 
request which was duly ignored as a second issue was brought to print in September. 
Whilst the episode highlighted the highly centralised and authoritarian character of CPGB 
leadership, and attracted reasonable support for Saville and Thompson’s position (the first 
issue attracted around 300 letters of support)339, it seems plausible that the dispute would 
have remained controllable for Party higher-ups (the period from July to October 1956 
saw only 12 resignations from the Party – all of whom were relatively minor figures)340 
were it not for the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in late October 1956. The 
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timeline of events is worth explaining in detail, for it was the somewhat chaotic manner in 
which the events of the uprising occurred which ultimately explains why confidence in 
the CPGB collapsed rather than the occurrence of a revolution in of itself.  
The 23rd October saw some 20,000 protestors gathered beneath a statue of Józef Bem – 
hero of the Hungarian revolution of 1848 – in central Budapest to demonstrate against the 
Soviet Union’s subjugation of Hungarian national sovereignty.341 By that evening, the 
crowd had swelled to 200,000, moving across the Danube to outside the Hungarian 
Parliament building whereupon a list of demands was presented to the government of 
Ernő Gerő – which included but were not limited to, an affirmation of Hungarian 
neutrality & removal of Soviet troops still stationed in the country, the implementation of 
an economic system based upon the principles of democratic socialism, that Hungary 
should apply for membership of the United Nations, all citizens should be granted the 
rights of free men and that criminal trials should be brought before open courts.342 Gerő 
responded with a speech condemning the demands and rejecting the protestors’ 
grievances. Tension grew as protestors tore down a 30ft high statue of Stalin on the edge 
of Budapest’s central park and a group gathered outside the Radio Budapest building – an 
installation heavily guarded by the Hungarian secret police (Államvédelmi Hatóság, 
henceforth AVH).343 As protestors attempted to enter the radio station, AVH men opened 
fire – sparking revolution in Budapest as civil disobedience escalated into open revolt and 
spread throughout the city.344 Meanwhile, members of the military sent to relieve the 
AVH chose instead to side with the protestors – a clear sign that Gerő’s government was 
now bereft of any real authority. By midnight the Hungarian government had lost any 
semblance of control – leading Gerő to formally request Soviet military intervention. By 
2am, Soviet tanks had entered Budapest. A series of piecemeal skirmishes between Soviet 
forces and Hungarian revolutionaries ensued – leading to a ceasefire on the 28th October 
and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest by the 30th. On the 1st November the 
Hungarian government – now under the leadership of the reform-minded Imre Nagy 
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formally announced that the uprising was now officially viewed as a legitimate 
expression of political will and that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact with 
immediate effect – implementing instead a position of neutrality in all international 
affairs.345  
The revolution’s success would prove short lived. In the early hours of the 4th November 
Soviet tanks once again entered Budapest, supported by infantry, air strikes and artillery 
fire.346 Meanwhile, a substantial proportion of the new Hungarian government – led by 
new Defence Secretary Pál Maléter, the Hungarian Army officer who had proved 
instrumental in securing and coordinating military support for the initial uprising,347 were 
invited to Soviet Military command at the town of Tököl (just outside Budapest) under 
the pretence of peace negotiations - only to be arrested by the KGB.348 With Soviet forces 
bolstered to 17 full divisions, compared to the five stationed in Hungary pre-23rd 
October,349 and Hungarian leadership in disarray, only token resistance was possible. By 
8am any attempt at organised defence in Budapest had collapsed, by the 11th November 
all resistance across the country had been wholly repressed.350 In the immediate 
aftermath, 22’000 Hungarians were sentenced with crimes against the State, whilst an 
additional 200’000 fled as refugees.351 The implications of the conflict are perhaps best 
summated by Allen Dulles’ remarks to the US National Security Council in the days 
following the second Soviet invasion: 
‘The Hungarian revolt may demonstrate the inability of a moderate national Communist regime to survive 
in any of the satellites... The revolt confronts Moscow with a very harsh dilemma: either to revert to a harsh 
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Stalinist policy or to permit democratisation to develop... to a point which risks the complete loss of Soviet 
control of the satellites.’352 
The incident proved to most Western observers that the Soviet government would not 
countenance the existence of independent communist states in Eastern Europe and indeed 
would rather resort to violence and heavy handed repression than see a loss of influence 
in its satellite states. As a result of Hungary, the Kremlin’s claim to any particular moral 
high ground in international affairs was sharply revealed as wholly false.  
Such realisations proved to be particularly damaging to the British communist movement. 
Preconceptions concerning Soviet morality had been shattered, whilst the CPGB’s 
fluctuating line on events demonstrated the Party’s irredeemable sycophancy towards the 
USSR.  Beyond this, the Hungarian revolution was defined by an inherent chaos, both the 
revolutionaries and Soviet government reacted to events rather than shaped them. As 
concluded by JIC analysis of the uprising, ‘the Hungarian uprising is a spontaneous 
nation-wide revolt against Soviet domination and the Police State, with no unifying 
political principle and no integrating leadership’.353 Nevertheless, reporting of the 
revolution within the pages of the Daily Worker consistently parroted the Soviet narrative 
of events and attempted create a linear account of the crisis. A decision which lead to 
increasingly absurd switches in editorial position. Indeed, so inflexible was the Worker’s 
desire to cleave to Moscow’s narrative that it actively censored or otherwise ignored 
reports received from its reporter in Hungary - Peter Fryer - which called attention to 
Soviet military brutality.354 The initial line was one of wholesale condemnation: 
‘What has happened in Hungary during these past days has not been a popular uprising against a dictatorial 
Government. It has been an organised and planned effort to overthrow by undemocratic and violent means a 
Government which was in the process of carrying through important constructive measures to put right past 
mistakes and wrongs, and which has stated that it was unprepared for illegal armed attacks.’355  
However, by October 30th, as Soviet forces began their initial withdrawal and it seemed 
plausible that Nagy’s government may be recognised by Moscow as legitimate, there was 
a rapid switch in the Worker’s position as the paper attempted to maintain credibility: 
‘It is now clear, despite the confused and incomplete picture, that counter-revolutionary actions and just 
demands of the people were both factors in the situation. The people had justified grievances which had 
been boiling up for a long time… The government did not take simultaneous measures to right the wrongs, 
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including those concerned with the living standards of the people… It is tragic that Soviet forces had to be 
called to upon to help the Government. Certainly no Russian soldier wants to be fighting anywhere. Soviet 
soldiers would sooner be in their own country enjoying the fruits of Socialism.’356  
It was this brief window – between the 30th October and resumption of hostilities on the 
4th November which undermined the CPGB’s authority through its insistence on cleaving 
to the Soviet narrative. The central problem was that the Moscow narrative was openly 
inconsistent and clearly reflective of indecision within the Kremlin. Indeed the Soviet 
response towards Hungary was openly contradictory. Notably, late on the 30th October 
the Soviet Union proclaimed the adoption of the ‘Declaration of the Government of the 
USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and 
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States’. The cumbersomely 
titled document stated clearly that ‘The Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the 
appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and 
other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of Soviet troops on the territory of 
Hungary’.357 In other words indications on the evening of the 30th were that the Soviet 
government intended to negotiate with the Hungarian revolutionaries and potentially 
recognise their legitimacy – forcing a hasty retraction from the Daily Worker which had 
previously maintained the line that Hungary was under assault by fascist counter-
revolutionaries. However, with the redeployment of Soviet troops to crush the revolt on 
November 4th, the paper’s position was forced to switch yet again. November 5th saw the 
Worker run the headline ‘New Hungarian Anti-Fascist Government in Action: Soviet 
Troops called in to stop White Terror’358 followed by a printing of the Executive Council 
of the CPGB’s official statement: 
‘Coming after the murder and lynching of Communists, the open hostility of the Nagy Government to the 
Soviet Union and the repeated concessions which it made to reactionary violence, Cardinal Mindzenty’s 
(anti-communist leader of the Catholic church in Hungary – who had been imprisoned and tortured by the 
Gerő government in 1948 and only released on 30th October 1956 following its capitulation) broadcast was 
the warning to all Hungarian patriots that the danger of fascism and Western intervention was acute… The 
choice for the Soviet forces was clear; whether to help the Hungarian Communists and Socialists fighting to 
prevent a return to fascism, or to stand by and watch Hungarian and Western reaction crush the Hungarian 
people… The Soviet Union in responding to the appeal made to them to help defend Socialism in Hungary, 
is also helping to defend peace and the interests of the world working class… The Executive Committee of 
the Communist Party considers that the new Hungarian Government and the action of the Soviet forces in 
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Hungary should be supported by Communists and Socialists everywhere, and expresses to the Hungarian 
working people its solidarity with them in their fight against counter-revolution and reaction.’359 
Such a wilful misrepresentation of the situation in Hungary by the Executive Committee 
proved a step too far for the consciences of many of its leading intellectuals. By issuing 
the statement the Executive Committee irrefutably proved that its first loyalty lay not to 
socialism and the interests of the international working class, but rather to Soviet policy 
and the Kremlin alone. It was plain to Western observers that the Hungarian 
revolutionaries were not fascists, reactionaries or counter-revolutionaries. They were 
typically dedicated communists who believed in a socialist state free from the control of 
Moscow. One only had to read the signatories to the list of revolutionary demands to 
realise this: the Hungarian Writers’ Union, Hungarian Academy of Letters and Science, 
Hungarian Artists’ Union etc.360 All organisations of immense respectability for British 
communists and all, chillingly, groups and unions which members of the British 
communist intelligentsia would most likely have belonged had they resided in Hungary. 
As it was, the Executive Committee’s display of sycophancy towards Moscow sparked 
open revolt, the general feeling amongst many of its members perhaps best expressed 
through a letter – sent first to the EC on the 12th November, before being openly 
published in the New Statesman on December 1st following the Daily Worker’s refusal to 
print the document – by members of the Communist Party Historians’ Group: 
‘All of us have for many years advocated Marxist ideas both in our own special fields and in political 
discussion in the Labour movement. We feel therefore that we have a responsibility to express our views as 
Marxists in the present crisis of international socialism. We feel that the uncritical support given by the 
Executive Committee of the Communist Party to Soviet Action in Hungary is the undesirable culmination 
of years of distortion of fact, and failure by British Communists to think out political problems for 
themselves. We had hoped that the revelations made at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union would have made our leadership and press realise that Marxist ideas will only be acceptable 
in the British Labour Movement if the arise from the truth about the world we live in. The exposure of 
grave crimes and abuses in the USSR and the recent revolt of workers and intellectuals against the pseudo-
Communist bureaucracies and police systems in Poland and Hungary, have shown that for the past twelve 
years we have based out political analyses on a false presentation of the facts… If the left-wing and Marxist 
trend in our Labour movement is to win support, as it must for the achievement of Socialism, this past must 
be utterly repudiated. This includes repudiation of the latest outcome of this evil past, the Executive 
Committee’s underwriting of the current errors of Soviet Policy.’361 
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The letter was signed by some of the leading intellectuals of the British communist 
movement – including Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Doris Lessing and Hugh 
MacDiarmid. Notably, John Savile and EP Thompson do not appear on the list of 
signatories – though this was a consequence of the fact that they had already been 
expelled from the Party by the time of the letter’s composition (as a result of the 
publication of the third volume of the Reasoner shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in 
Hungary) rather than a disagreement with its sentiment.362 Equally, it should be noted that 
not all of the letter’s signatories split from the Party, Eric Hobsbawm in particular 
remained a member of the CPGB, it seems partially out of a sense of idealistic nostalgia, 
and by 1960 had been rehabilitated with Party leadership.363 Nevertheless, with the 
exception of Hobsbawm the letter cemented the rift within the Party between its 
leadership and academic wing. As Gollan remarked to Bill Wainwright (assistant General 
Sectary from 1956 to 1959) in October 1957, ‘I would not invite Christopher Hill to a 
Party meeting if he were the last historian alive.’364 By the time of the CPGB’s 25th 
National Party Congress in late April 1957, the Party had haemorrhaged some 7000 
members – around a third of its total membership.365 What Christopher Hill referred to as 
a ‘smug little world of our own invention’366 had fallen apart. As a result of Hungary, and 
the CPGB’s subsequent mismanagement of its internal dissent, the well intentioned 
naivety which had supported intellectual interest in the communist movement collapsed. 
After 1956 it was no longer possible for intellectuals on the radical left of British politics 
to delude themselves that the Soviet Union offered any kind of moral leadership for the 
world. 
Whitehall’s Influence in CPGB Dissent 
All of this was watched with pleasantly surprised interest by the Eden government. 
Regular updates concerning the Daily Worker’s reporting on Hungary appeared in the 
summaries of communist activity circulated to the AC (H) by IRD,367 whilst MI5’s 
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surveillance of leading communist intellectuals was inundated with records of letters and 
telephone conversations indicating the breakdown of Party unity – typically weeks before 
such dissent became widely known even within the Party itself.368 By way of example - 
MI5 possessed the full text of the Historians’ Group letter as early as the 20th November – 
the day it was first received by members of Executive Council itself and a full fortnight 
before it was printed in the New Statesman.369 Meanwhile - the Security Service was also 
aware even by the end of November that John Gollan (General Secretary of the CPGB 
following Pollitt’s resignation as a result of post-Hungary discontent)370 had become so 
paranoid about dissent from what he termed ‘right-wing elements’ within the CPGB that 
he was calling in private for the ‘liquidation’ of dissenting voices in order to ensure the 
Party’s survival.371 By late 1956, the Security Service’s surveillance of the CPGB was so 
all pervasive that the government often had a clearer and timelier picture of intra-Party 
politics than even the members of the CP’s Executive Council. As previously mentioned, 
the headquarters of the CPGB – at 16 King Street in London – was fully covered by 
listening devices, Home Office warrants for the interception of personal communications 
had been obtained for all its leading figures, some 90% of its membership had been 
positively identified and even John Gollan’s personal secretary, Julia Pirie, was in fact an 
MI5 agent.372 Indeed, since 1955 MI5 coverage had only become more comprehensive. In 
mid-1955 the Service achieved another major coup against the CPGB, via a STILL LIFE 
operation codenamed PARTY PIECE. Following monitoring by F Division (Communism 
Home), MI5 became aware that a considerable quantity of Party membership records 
were stored at the house of the well-to-do communist Berger family in North-West 
London.373 On learning that the Bergers took in lodgers, MI5 secured access by sending 
an officer to masquerade as a prospective tenant. Once the officer had convinced the 
family to allow him to rent a room on the top floor of the house, it was found that the 
property contained only a single staircase, which thus meant that the Service now had 
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access to the entire house via its embedded officer’s key.374 Whilst the family was away 
for a weekend retreat in the Lake District, A Division (General Services) officers were 
able to break into the property and copy some 55,000 files related to CPGB 
membership.375 As remembered by Peter Wright (the ex-MI5 officer who later achieved 
notoriety on account of his conspiracy theory riddled memoir Spycatcher): 
‘PARTY PIECE gave MI5 total access to the Party organisation. Every file contained a statement, 
handwritten by the recruit, explaining why he or she wished to join the Party, accompanied by full personal 
details, including detailed descriptions of the circumstances of recruitment, work done for the Party, and 
contacts in the Party organisation. More important than this, the PARTY PIECE material also contained the 
files of covert members of the CPGB, people who preferred, or whom the Party preferred, to conceal their 
identities.’376 
PARTY PIECE therefore eliminated those small gaps in coverage of the CPGB which 
had persisted since STILL LIFE began in the late 1940s. The acquisition of 
comprehensive details regarding the Party’s covert membership in particular did much to 
reassure MI5 that comprehensive coverage of the Party had been achieved. Indeed, the 
only gap of note was the full identification of all those who had been involved in 
communist politics during the inter-war period. Such a task would not be accomplished 
until the late 1960s and the creation of the Universities Research Group.377  
Given such a level of coverage Whitehall’s knowledge of events is unsurprising. 
Interestingly however, Whitehall made little effort to capitalise upon the discord caused 
by 1956. The government to large extent was content to sit by and allow the CPGB to war 
amongst itself. Of course in the short-term, much of Whitehall was otherwise preoccupied 
with events in Egypt as the military elements of the Suez crisis unfolded concurrently 
with the Hungarian uprising.378 Meanwhile, the debacle following the Crabb affair in 
April 1956 – during which MI6 had attempted to photograph the propeller of the Soviet 
cruiser Ordzhonikidze whilst docked in Portsmouth harbour, only to have its appointed 
frogman Lionel Crabb disappear mid-mission – meant that Eden was extremely leery of 
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authorising any further direct covert action on British soil.379  Beyond these factors 
however, official inertia would seem to have been as much a failure to comprehend the 
significance of Hungary for the domestic communist movement as it was a conscious 
decision. AC (H) commentary from 1957 seems to have regarded Party upheaval caused 
by the revolution as a fairly transient event. The Committee fretted in August that: 
‘With memories of the Hungarian rising beginning to fade, there was a danger that communist influence in 
the unions might again increase. It was very important, therefore, that the momentum of the anti-communist 
campaign should be maintained.’380 
Though, as shall be discussed shortly, the CPGB’s industrial membership was the section 
of the Party affected least by events in Hungary, it is notable that less than 12 months 
after the revolution’s occurrence officials believed that the event was already declining in 
relevance. With this in mind, the failure to exploit post-revolutionary malaise as part of 
wider anti-communist strategy becomes more understandable. Action on Hungary was 
taken - the Home Office in particular was heavily involved in the resettlement of refugees 
from the conflict, facilitating the immigration to the UK of some 20’000 persons by 
October 1957 & aiding the passage of a further 25’000 to Canada,381 however there is no 
evidence to suggest that such actions were subsequently utilised for propaganda purposes 
by IRD, or indeed any other government department. Governmental reporting of the 
events of 1956 as well as the dissent they caused within the CPGB’s intelligentsia was 
remarkably passive. Whilst the government had sought to direct a particularly aggressive 
campaign of counter-subversion against communist intellectuals in the early ‘50s, it made 
little effort to capitalise upon the Communist Party’s internal turmoil in the wake of 1956.  
This being said, it is likely that attempts at exploitation would have produced negligible 
benefit. So inept was the CPGB Executive Council’s management of its membership’s 
discontent that it is hard to see what greater benefit counter-subversive action could have 
achieved. Even a cursory glance at the body’s statements makes it clear makes it clear 
that many of the problems it experienced could realistically have been avoided had John 
Gollan et al merely chosen to take a less combative line. The EC’s attitude was one of 
only token reconciliation – its unwillingness to brook meaningful debate over policy 
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within the Party confirmed with the issuance of a general letter to all CPGB members in 
May 1957, whereby it was stated: 
‘The adoption of the principles of the Majority Report on Inner-Party Democracy… made clear the firm 
adherence of the party to the principles of democratic centralism. Congress… decisively rejected all forms 
of factionalism, campaigning on inner-party questions outside the structure of the party, the counterposing 
of membership and leadership and other questions which would have weakened the strength and 
effectiveness of the party… It would be a mistake however to imagine that the attempts to disrupt the party 
will be abandoned… An organized effort is being made by people hostile to the party, open Trotskyists and 
some ex-members, to draw party members into their circle by persuading them to participate in 
‘independent’ journals or ‘discussion forums’ run under their auspices for the purpose of attacking 
Marxism-Leninism, the international communist movement and the Communist Party.’382 
The EC chose to adopt a position of total hostility towards dissidents within the Party. 
The ‘Minority Report’ – which presented the position of those dissenting academics and 
intellectuals at the 20th Party Congress and essentially called for more open debate to be 
permitted by the EC – was entirely ignored; leading directly to the resignation of 
Christopher Hill, who had been one of its main architects and proponents.383 Meanwhile, 
the EC’s decision to castigate individuals such as Saville & Thompson – not to mention 
the 7000 others who had left the party between November 1956 and May 1957 – as 
Trotskyists and wreckers, served only to ensure that the damage wrought to the CPGB’s 
intellectual base by 1956 was rendered irreparable.384 Under the circumstances, it is 
difficult to see what Whitehall could have done to ensure that the disenfranchisement of 
radical leftist intellectualism from the British communist movement would be more 
complete. The near-total removal of intellectual communism as a security concern for the 
government was the result of internal dissent within the CPGB as brought about by 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism in the February of 1956 and the brutal repression 
of the Hungarian revolution by Soviet troops in the latter part of that year rather than a 
product of propaganda or covert action on the part of the government. Official counter-
subversion policy did very little to either directly help or hinder this schism. Somewhat 
ironically, one could make the argument that the Kremlin inadvertently was far more 
responsible for the marginalisation of communism in Britain than the British government.  
Confidence in Positive Vetting 
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Even with all this in mind however, given the progress of the official investigation into 
Soviet espionage within British intelligence (ongoing since Burgess and Maclean’s 
defections in 1951) it is still remarkable that officialdom diminished its focus on 
intellectual communism by such a notable amount post-1957. By the mid ‘50s MI5 had 
established fairly clearly the narrative behind the pair’s flight – dating back to their 
recruitment in the 1930s. Moreover, the Service had also by this point correctly identified 
the role of Kim Philby in the whole affair as well as his links to the wider communist 
movement, even though it still could not prove this. Investigations at this point were more 
hampered by the fact MI6 was openly hostile to accusations that one of its own could be a 
traitor (and remained unconvinced of Philby’s guilt until 1961 and the defection of KGB 
major Anatoliy Golitsyn):385 
‘In the summing up of the case by the Security Service which was agreed with my predecessor... it was 
stated of the case against PEACH that… “It is not for the Security Service to pass judgement on a case 
which it cannot prove; investigation will continue and one day final proof of guilt or innocence may be 
obtained”. I understand that the Security Service stand by the views expressed in their previous summing 
up… I am copying this letter to Roger Hollis.’386  
This being said, the Service had still not yet fully grasped the full scale and extent of 
Philby’s activities. Most notably, the Service failed to connect 1955 VENONA decrypts 
of KGB messages (largely due to lack of analytical staff),387 dating from September 1945, 
with Philby. The messages concerned the activities of a long-standing Soviet agent 
referred to as STANLEY, in relation to ‘events in Canada in the line of the Neighbours’ 
work.’388 Given the timing and reference to ‘the Neighbours’ (the KGB euphemism for its 
military intelligence counterpart the GRU) the messages evidently referred to the 
Gouzenko case. Meanwhile importantly, the only two SIS officers aware of the Gouzenko 
case in September 1945 were its then Chief – Sir Stewart Menzies – and Kim Philby. An 
awareness of this link would have greatly improved MI5’s case against Philby in the late 
1950s. Unfortunately however, the significance of the STANLEY decrypt was only 
realised on re-examination by the Service in 1965.389   
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However, by 1957 the Service was at least aware of the circumstances of Burgess and 
Maclean’s recruitment by Soviet intelligence and was equally conscious of Philby’s 
similar communist links during the 1930s. In many ways the recruitment and subsequent 
activity patterns of Philby, Burgess and Maclean (and indeed Anthony Blunt and John 
Cairncross) were classic examples of Whitehall’s worst fears regarding subversion. All 
had been first exposed to communism primarily through their undergraduate experiences 
at Cambridge in the 1930s, whilst all had first been recruited to as Soviet agents via third 
party subversive groups. Philby’s path to recruitment by Soviet intelligence was a text-
book example of the way in which subversive activity could eventually lead to espionage. 
Following exposure to communist groups in Cambridge, Philby joined the front 
organisation World Federation for the Relief of German Fascism in 1933 on the advice of 
the Cambridge Marxist economist Maurice Dobb - described by MI5 as having been ‘a 
powerful influence in stimulating communism at the University during the 1930s’.390 As a 
direct result of his involvement with the group, Philby met his first wife and fellow 
communist Litzi Friedmann in Vienna in February 1934 through whom he was introduced 
first to Edith Tudor-Hart and subsequently Arnold Deutsch – who recruited him to the 
NKVD in the June of that year.391 Maclean had followed a similar path – being heavily 
involved in communist politics as an undergraduate student, which lead to his meeting 
and being recruited by the Soviet agent Theodore Maly, again in 1934.392 Burgess 
similarly had been active in student communism and was also recruited by Deutsch in the 
later months of 1934. The introduction of all to Soviet intelligence was facilitated by their 
prior involvement in subversive groups. Though the full details of each individual’s 
activities were still yet to become known to the British government (the exact timeline of 
Philby’s recruitment in particular proved difficult to establish), those facts which had 
been discerned by the mid-50s appeared to provide ample justification for many of the 
counter-subversion measures which had been introduced since the late 1940s.  Therefore, 
it is on first examination perhaps odd that 1957 should have seen a wholesale shift away 
from monitoring communism in the universities and white-collar professions given the 
evidence emerging from the Cambridge spy ring investigations. Explanation is provided 
partially by the government’s over-confidence in its security procedures. By the mid-50s, 
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the government was reasonably confident that the introduction of positive vetting 
measures since 1951 would prevent the reoccurrence of a similar incident. A 1954 FO 
report requested by Sir Patrick Dean examining the potential impact positive vetting 
procedures would most likely have had on Philby’s employment lays the salient points 
out well: 
‘I think there is no question at all that provided the positive vetting procedure had been fully carried out… 
Peach’s background could not possibly have remained concealed. It is clear that he was recruited into SIS 
on an “old boy” basis, that he told the grossest lies at the time of his recruitment and that if investigations 
had been made these lies would have been revealed. Field enquiries would certainly have been made in 
Cambridge. These would have revealed that while at the University Peach was a militant Communist. His 
tutor… described him in exactly these terms and stated that he had “extreme views on social questions”… 
Field enquiries would also have revealed that Peach’s first wife was a Communist when he married her in 
1934 and that after their separation he remained friendly with her until 1945… [Helenus Milmo’s 
investigation for MI5 concluded] that Peach had for many years been a Soviet agent, that he had a 
thoroughly Communist background at Cambridge, that he had deliberately and grossly lied about his 
background when he was recruited into SIS… There is therefore to my mind no doubt that the positive 
vetting procedure, carefully and thoroughly applied, would have shown up Peach as a person wholly 
undesirable on security as well as general grounds for any position of trust in the Government service  ’393 
Of course, subsequent experience would prove that positive vetting was not a sure-fire 
measure for preventing espionage. John Vassall was positively vetted in the mid-50s, yet 
was successfully able to hide his homosexuality (a secret which in turn lead to his 
blackmail by Soviet intelligence), Michael Bettaney was vetted multiple times during his 
employment with MI5 during the 1980s,394 Geoffrey Prime by GCHQ in 1966,395 Aldrich 
Ames by the CIA in the mid-1960s,396 Robert Hanssen by the FBI in 1976,397 Edward 
Snowden in 2006 etc.398 Nevertheless, during the mid-1950s Whitehall seemed to have 
felt that positive vetting would prevent the occurrence of further spy scandals akin to the 
magnitude of the Cambridge spies (a delusion shortly to be shattered in the early ‘60s).  
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Nevertheless, in the mid-1950s positive vetting still appeared to be functioning as 
intended. Moreover, as previously discussed, the level of coverage of CPGB activities 
achieved by MI5 by 1955 meant that British intelligence appeared able to accurately 
identify potential communist subversives. Therefore, although the Burgess, Maclean and 
Philby cases in many ways appears to justify earlier fears concerning subversion as a 
facilitator of espionage, a switch in focus away from treating subversion as fundamentally 
an espionage-related problem still occurred due to perhaps misplaced confidence on the 
part of the government that post-1951 vetting measures would more than adequately 
guard against any repeat scandals. 
Counter-Subversive Policy Frustration in Industry 
As a consequence of the turmoil suffered by the CPGB in the wake of Hungary, from 
1957 onwards intellectual communism within the UK essentially disappeared from the 
Macmillan government’s list of subversive concerns. Though MI5 continued to maintain 
files on many of the intellectuals who had formally left the Party, regular discussion of 
communism within academia, science and the teaching professions ceased at a Cabinet 
committee level from mid-1957.399 Instead, attention became almost overwhelmingly 
towards the question of communist activity within the trade unions. This being said, 
concerns over communist activity within the unions had never really ebbed since the early 
1950s, as despite overwhelming evidence that strike action was almost never a product of 
communist instigation, ministers continued to fret that industrial militancy and 
communist infiltration went hand in hand. Anthony Eden in particular, following his 
elevation to Prime Minister in April 1955, remained convinced that strike action must be 
the result of communist agitation. Strikes at the Hawker Aircraft factory in Blackpool and 
Rolls Royce plant in Glasgow provoked particular tension between the PM and those 
departments responsible for monitoring industrial relations. Eden was especially keen to 
issue public statements denouncing the actions as communist plots – much to the dismay 
of the Department of Labour and Security Service. MI5 counselled that at Hawker ‘until 
recently there has been little evidence of direct communist activity in this strike’ and that 
of the 3000 employees involved only three were actual communists, with another two 
sympathisers.400 The proportion of communists in Glasgow was slightly greater – some 
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200 employees out of a total of 7500 – but again the root cause was a wider dispute over 
wages, with the strike officially backed by the non-communist Amalgamated Engineering 
Union.401 The Ministry of Labour’s advice was blunt: 
‘The Ministry of Labour point out that there is always some sort of industrial grievance associated with the 
strike, even where individual Communists are involved and perhaps taking a leading role…  There is a very 
real danger that Government statements impugning the motives of men on strike or suggesting that they are 
mere dupes will have the opposite effect than that intended… The Hawker strike which has now ended was 
made official by a number of the unions concerned, whilst the Rolls Royce strike is in process of being 
made official the unions involved. Clearly, these unions would strongly resent that their actions were 
Communist-inspired… It would be very easy for public utterances by Government spokesmen to do more 
harm than good.’402 
Eden’s frustration with this advice is apparent, to the Security Service he complained ‘Do 
we ever speak out about all this?’403 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labour received the 
sullen response of ‘The Prime Minister noted that it was thought inexpedient to speak out 
now, but doubted whether the arguments for not speaking out would hold good for the 
future. On day, he said, they will not suffice’.404 Despite Prime Ministerial reticence, the 
Security Service consistently stressed that communist policy on strike action was geared 
towards exploitation rather than instigation – almost every study compiled since 1947 had 
indicated that this was the case.405 Retrospective analysis undertaken by the Security 
Service at the time again confirmed this theory communists had far greater interest in 
effecting control over the union movement than utilising it as a tool of short-term 
economic disruption. The conclusion of MI5’s report examining industrial unrest over the 
period 1953-1955 (published in early 1956) stated that:  
‘On first sight it might seem curious that while strikes were often instigated and maintained by individual 
Communists, the Party, as a Party, played little, if any part in them. But although not opposed to strikes as 
an instrument of policy, they judged everything in terms of tactical expediency. At present they were 
concentrating on penetration and control of the trade union movement rather than in fermenting industrial 
unrest. By doing so, they doubtless hoped that it would assist them to extend their influence among the left 
wing of the Labour Party, to establish themselves as a respectable political party independent of Moscow 
control, and thus to create some form of popular front.’406 
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As such, it was far more important to work to frustrate the means by which communists 
gained control over trade union executive councils than it was to tar strikers as the 
stooges of subversive malcontents. Fortunately, Sir Norman Brook possessed greater 
sense than the PM in this regard. As such, the AC (H) adopted the same conclusions as 
the Service as to where industrial counter-subversive policy should be best targeted: 
‘The main difficulty was to stop the political apathy which existed amongst the non-Communist rank and 
file. The Communist Party geared their whole machine to securing the election of their candidates, and this 
effort was not matched on the other side… Moreover, it was likely that the majority of the rank and file 
would not be prejudiced against a leader merely because he was Communist, so long as he gave proof of 
effective leadership.’407 
Again, MI5 had stressed this point to Eden during his time in office – estimates provided 
to the PM in 1956 calculated that only around 1 in 500 trade unionists was an avowed 
communist, however that the Communist Party was thought by that point to control ‘the 
Executive Committees of three trade unions; and thirteen general secretaries and at least 
one in eight full-time officials.’408 Fortuitously, Eden’s apparent inability to grasp the 
nature of the CPGB’s industrial strategy proved to be of minor importance in the long run 
– the Suez debacle soon served to captivate Prime Ministerial attention, whilst Eden’s 
resignation, and subsequent replacement as PM by Harold Macmillan, in January 1957 
removed the issue as an ongoing concern.409 
These episodes under Eden’s tenure illustrate well how British intelligence and the Civil 
Service sought to resist politicisation of counter-subversive policy, even in the face of 
Prime Ministerial disagreement. Where ministers were typically guided by more 
immediate political concerns – in this case it would have been highly expedient for Eden 
to be able to blame strike action solely on the actions of hardened militants – the Security 
Service recognised that for counter-subversive policy to be successful in the long run, the 
temptation to indulge in such scapegoating had to be resisted.  
Communism in Industry post-1956 
This was ultimately just as well, for communist influence in the unions remained a 
concern even post-Hungary. The tumult of 1956 failed to undermine communist influence 
in industry the same way as it had amongst the more intellectual wing of the movement. 
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Despite the mass exodus of intellectuals from the CPGB and British communist 
movement more generally post-1956, communists within the trade unions largely retained 
their loyalties to both Party and ideology. The Security Service’s 1957 assessment of 
communism within the trade unions (commissioned in large part to assess the impact of 
1956’s upheaval)410 summated the situation thusly: 
‘The reaction of the trade union wing to the Stalin issue was one of bewilderment rather than resentment 
and, after an initial period of doubt, the trade union leaders were content to leave the issue to be resolved by 
the party leadership…. [As a result of Hungary] the B.C.P. leadership took a calculated risk and called upon 
the top flight of communist trade unionists to announce in the Daily Worker their continued allegiance to 
the party… The gamble came off as no union has yet imposed any new ban, and the party, at the cost of 
serious losses among rank and file trade union members, has emerged with its industrial leadership 
substantially intact.’411 
Indeed, the Party was to an extent riven along class lines post-‘56, as the trade unionist 
wing of the CPGB saw the turmoil caused by Hungary as an opportunity to secure control 
over the direction of British communism whilst marginalising the distrusted bourgeois 
intelligentsia who had previously dominated the Party.412 Ergo, though the appeal of 
communism to academics, scientists, teachers and so forth was a problem which had 
essentially resolved itself, communist influence in industry was an issue which still 
required further official attention. 
Direct options for countering communist influence within the unions continued to be 
limited however. Not least because officials were still terrified of the political fallout 
should Security Service monitoring of trade unionists have become publically known. 
Though MI5 undoubtedly represented the greatest official repository of information 
concerning communist aims and tactics, the information it possessed had to be managed 
very carefully. Information procured by the Security Service concerning Trade Unions 
was of tremendous importance to Whitehall in so far as it illuminated communist designs 
and capabilities – however, the continual need to protect the sources of such information 
meant that its exploitation for counter-propaganda purposes relied upon close liaison with 
IRD.413 As such, the Department continued to be essential to domestic counter-subversion 
efforts, a fact which has been often missed in previous histories of the period.414 Its 
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usefulness as a domestic asset had grown tremendously since its teething problems with 
circulation rates in 1953. As was made clear by an August 1957 report concerning the 
IRD’s performance from 1954 to the spring of 1957, the Department’s influence had 
grown significantly over the course of the 1950s: 
‘The methods of operation used by I.R.D. during the period had proved very successful. In particular, the 
technique of writing or helping to write booklets about communism which were then published by outside 
bodies had been used to good effect; and in the trade unions excellent results had been obtained by the 
launching of the periodical IRIS and by inspiring the Daily Mail to spotlight the scandals in the Fire 
Brigades Union. It was also satisfactory, although in some ways surprising, that these successes had been 
achieved without I.R.D. coming to public notice.’415 
That IRD continued to escape public notice was a particularly welcome asset for the 
Macmillan government. Given that much of the Department’s role involved liaison with a 
variety of private individuals –including journalists, trade unionists and academics – it is 
remarkable that the department continued to function without its existence becoming 
more widely known.416  The utility this granted to officials was assisted by the fact that 
IRD continually operated effectively with a minimal investiture of both personnel and 
budget. Despite a growth in workload, the English Section (the name is misleading – the 
section’s remit included the entirety of the United Kingdom) continued to be staffed by a 
mere two civil servants, one on rotation from outside the Foreign Office, the only addition 
since 1951 the acquisition of the services of a ‘student advisor’ for matters pertaining to 
the universities.417 Whilst the Security Service’s role in British counter-subversion 
strategy had necessitated an increase in both budgetary allowance and personnel 
requirement,418 IRD’s English Section required remarkably few resources in order to 
prosecute its campaign of counter-propaganda. This combination of continued discretion 
and relative affordability helps to explain the confidence with which the Foreign Office’s 
1957 report on the English Section was able to conclude: 
‘I do not recommend any change in the existing methods used to counter Soviet influence in the UK. Given 
the limitations on what IRD can do at home, and the need for discretion in doing it, the present methods 
have worked well. No doubt they can be further refined and new fields may be found in which to apply 
them: but no major changes in technique or emphasis seem necessary.’419 
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As things were, the main difficulty encountered by IRD post-1953 was securing the 
cooperation of union leadership. Whilst anti-communist trade union leaders were 
typically grateful for any information passed on by the government, there was also a 
degree of pride in their attitude towards counter-subversion action in the unions - ‘They 
regard this as very much their battle and although they were very woolly about what they 
were going to do about it they seemed quite clear that they did not want any Government 
pronouncements or speeches to deal with the threat of Communism in the trade 
unions.’420 The political considerations of government/union relations meant that any 
counter-subversion actions attempted had to be enacted that much more delicately than 
had been the case in Whitehall’s previous major anti-communist campaigns. The 
introduction and steady tightening of vetting procedures had been a relatively simple 
matter by comparison given its ‘in-house’ nature, whilst counter-subversion efforts 
directed against the communist intelligentsia had not carried nearly the same weight of 
political disaster should evidence of official meddling have been uncovered. The AC (H) 
was heartened therefore to be informed in late July 1956 of the formation of ‘Industrial 
Research and Information Services Limited’ (henceforth IRIS) – a private company 
founded and run by trade unionists (including Jack Tanner – the former President of the 
AEU & past President of the TUC – as well as William McLaine, former TUC Assistant 
General Secretary)421 for the explicit purpose of countering communist designs in the 
union as well as encouraging the ‘full and constitutional working of trade union 
organisations.’422 Here was an organisation which seemed to bridge the problems which 
had vexed officialdom since the early 50s. Firstly, as a company both founded and run by 
trade unionists it had the potential to correct the political apathy amongst the majority of 
workers which Whitehall believed facilitated communist gains. Secondly, as a firmly 
private organisation, it gave the government a means of ensuring the plausible deniability 
it craved. IRIS gave the Macmillan government an immediate route through which IRD 
(and thus by proxy MI5) material could be routed on a regular basis to trade unionists 
with relatively little official exposure. Indeed, the use of IRIS for counter-propaganda 
efforts produced immediate positive results – demonstrating the veracity of Whitehall’s 
suspicion that communist gains amongst trade unionists were typically a result of political 
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disinterest rather than wide-spread hard-left sentiment (by way of example, only 9% of 
the eligible membership elected to vote in the AEU’s 1959 general elections).423 MI5’s 
1957 report concluded that: 
‘The party owes much of its past success in the unions to superior organisation contrasted with wide-spread 
apathy. In recent months two new factors have emerged; communist trade union activity has received more 
frequent and sharper comment in the press and radio, and inside the unions anti-party organisations – 
notably Industrial Research and Information Service – have exerted more influence on union elections. 
These developments have been stimulated and assisted by information and advice from IRD, and they are 
now causing the party considerable concern… They are particularly worried by the amount of information 
IRIS has been able to obtain, but they appear to have no idea of its sources nor do they attribute any official 
backing to it.’424 
In particular, the greater organisation of counter-propaganda efforts facilitated via the 
utilisation of IRIS’s contacts and capabilities was directly attributed to helping break 
communist control of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) via utilisation of contacts in the 
Daily Mail, Association of Scientific Workers (AScW) and to the failure of the 
communist electoral campaign within the Amalgamated Engineering Union.425 As an 
aside, it is interesting to note that IRD’s collaboration with the Daily Mail coincided with 
communist historian Eric Hobsbawm’s own partnership with the newspaper. Hobsbawm 
published a series of jazz reviews in the newspaper under an assumed name during the 
late 1950s, much to the chagrin of the CPGB when this fact was eventually discovered by 
the Party in 1959.426 To return to the main point, there was perhaps an a certain amount of 
wishful thinking on the part of the Macmillan government as to IRIS’ utility – the decline 
of communist influence within the AScW in particular was almost certainly significantly 
linked to the retirement of its honorary General-Secretary W.A. Wooster, a committed 
communist who had helped lead the union since the mid-1930s, rather than a sudden 
change of opinion caused by an official counter-propaganda offensive.427 Nevertheless, 
such communist losses cannot wholly be discounted as unrelated to the government’s 
renewed counter-propaganda efforts – utilisation of the state-private network approach as 
facilitated via IRIS did produce positive results, thereby helping to further convince 
officials that communism within industry could be contained via counter-propaganda 
efforts alone. 
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However, whilst organisations such as IRIS (and similar think tank-esque groups such as 
‘Economic League’, ‘Common Cause’ and ‘Aims of Industry’)428 provided more avenues 
for the dissemination of counter-propaganda, none were able to provide a solution to the 
problem of how to increase anti-communist sentiment amongst those unions which had 
tended to resist official counter-propaganda efforts in the past. The NUM a case in point: 
‘The most important union where IRIS had failed to make headway was the National Union of 
Mineworkers, but this could be accounted for largely by the fact that some of the officials of this Union, 
and in particular its general secretary, Arthur Horner, being themselves communists, were naturally 
unsympathetic towards it.’429 
Similar outcomes were experienced with regards to both the Electrical Trades Union 
(ETU) as well as within the shop stewards.430 In those areas where either governmental 
information was too sensitive to be released counter-propaganda efforts had only a 
limited capacity for success. For example, in the case of the ETU, where due to MI5’s 
desire to protect its sources of information allegations of communist cheating in union 
elections were next to impossible to prove openly. Also, the shop stewards, which had a 
significant communist makeup yet could not be confronted directly for fear of 
undermining their role in underpinning the authority of the Trades Union 
Congress.431Governmental counter-subversion capabilities with regards to trade unionism 
continued to be restricted to reactive measures only. Whitehall was able to respond to 
opportunities for propaganda victory when they presented themselves, but equally was 
unable to independently generate such opportunities without outside stimulus. Indeed, 
Cabinet officials were typically resistant to calls for more aggressive measures. When the 
FO complained in 1959 that public awareness of communist infiltration had not 
automatically lead to greater anti-communist voting in union or elections (or often greater 
voter turnout at all), the response from the AC (H) was firm: 
‘The only action we could take was to keep up the pressure on them [communists] through publicity… 
Persuading members to vote in union elections was not a matter for Her Majesty’s Government; this was a 
problem which could only be tackled, and solved, by the leaders of the Labour movement. The most that 
Her Majesty’s Government could do was to make this fact clear to the Labour leaders.’432 
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At the Cabinet committee level Whitehall continued to maintain a firm sense of its own 
constitutional limitations – it was committed to playing only an advisory role in anti-
communist actions within the unions. It was the aforementioned ETU electoral fraud case 
which would test official limitations to their utmost. July 1956 saw the Security Service 
report to the AC (H) that it had obtained evidence of communist cheating during elections 
for the Electrical Trades Union which had led to the appointment of a communist as 
Assistant General Secretary.433  Such a development would not necessarily have been 
cause for concern in of itself had it not undermined the central preconception which 
official understanding of communist strategy in the unions had been predicated upon. 
Namely, it had been assumed up until 1956 that communists for the most part would stop 
short of illegal practice in the pursuit of their goals – favouring continued legality over 
short disruption. The consequences of MI5’s discovery were potentially grave:  
‘The long term significance of these developments is plain and does not need to be underlined. Control of 
an important Trade Union places in the hands of the Party the power to paralyse the nation’s economic life, 
together with large funds, a widely circulating magazine which can be converted into a propaganda organ, 
the opportunity to spread Marxist doctrines through union training courses and an immensely influential 
pressure group to give backing to the Party’s political programme’434 
This being said, the revelation brought with it a significant silver lining – if proof of 
communist cheating could be made public, it would provide the government with the 
ideal means to decimate communist influence in the unions that officials had long pined 
for. This the government already knew, for trade union leaders had said as much during 
their meeting with the Minister of Labour in July ‘Union leaders told me that one ounce 
of real proof of Communist cheating in AEU or other trade union ballots would be more 
valuable than any number of speeches’.435 Initial response was muted – preoccupied more 
with preventing contagion across the wider engineering unions by spreading news of the 
fraud, whilst ensuring that the exact provenance of the information remained secret.  As 
put: 
‘There was no security reason why the Minister [of Labour – then Ian Macleod, future editor of The 
Spectator & very briefly Chancellor of the Exchequer under Ted Heath]436 could not discuss the position in 
confidence with Carron, the new President of the A.E.U. [the Amalgamated Engineering Union – with 
whom the ETU was closely linked & would eventually merge in the early 90s]… In any discussions which 
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took place it was important to avoid giving the impression that the large amount of information available 
about Communist influence in the Unions came direct from the Security Service.’437 
It was not until late 1957 that official attempts to expose foul play in the ETU began to 
gain real traction. The autumn of that year saw former communist and long-time ETU 
man Leslie Cannon attempt to run for a position of the Executive Council of the union. 
Despite narrowly winning the contest, in the aftermath the union’s Executive chose to 
disallow on technical grounds the votes in a number of branches where Cannon had won 
a majority – reversing the result.438 Following this, an emergency meeting of the Union’s 
Rules Revision Conference to ensure that no legal challenge could be made in the 
aftermath.439 In many ways Cannon provided an ideal public champion to front 
government efforts at rolling back trade unionist communism. A prodigal son like figure, 
Cannon had been a full member of the Party since 1939, growing steadily more 
disillusioned with its overt hypocrisy during the 1950s before quitting in 1956.440 He was 
also popular within the trade union movement more widely, having worked in heavy 
industry since his youth across a variety of sectors. Charismatic, hard-nosed and proudly 
working class, he possessed both the personal toughness to weather any CPGB 
propaganda war directed against him as well as the credibility required to win over wider 
union support.441 As such, the episode provided the government the excuse it needed to 
begin to whittle away at the ETU Executive’s position. Therefore, it is here that the value 
of earlier official efforts to cultivate contacts within the wider union movement and 
journalistic profession bore fruit. By early 1957 the ETU was steadily becoming the 
subject of not insignificant press interest thanks to concerted efforts by both MI5 and 
IRD.442 In the spring of that year, the Security Service noted that Cannon was swiftly 
becoming the focal point of communist opposition within the union, passing the 
information on to IRD who proceeded to tip off the editors of both the News Chronicle 
(bought out and absorbed by the Daily Mail in 1960)443 and Star (London evening 
newspaper which ceased publication in 1960 – not to be confused with the contemporary 
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Daily Star tabloid) newspapers that Cannon may be willing to supply information 
regarding communist malpractice at the heart of a major British trade union.444 
Subsequently, the papers began publishing a regular stream of articles based on 
information received from Cannon attempting to prove that communists on the Executive 
Council had been engaging in electoral gerrymandering in 1956. Affairs at the ETU were 
therefore already of media interest – it was only following reports that Cannon’s election 
had been actively obstructed through underhanded tactics that the union became front-
page news however.445 Indeed such was the furore surrounding the scandal that a decision 
was taken by BBC Panorama to commission a full programme on the union (this in of 
itself testament to the power of the story – at the time the BBC was dependent on ETU 
members for many of its technical requirements & therefore was wary of alienating the 
union)446 – which was duly broadcast in December 1957. Following prompting by the 
IRD, IRIS volunteered its services as a consultant for the programme – thus meaning that 
much of the material used in the episode’s production was supplied by the government 
indirectly.447 Matters were also helped by the fact that the presenter – Labour MP 
Woodrow Wyatt – had been a regular beneficiary of information previously circulated by 
IRD.448 Indeed, Wyatt was an extremely important contact for IRD, due to the fact that 
his dual roles as an MP and presenter of Panorama made him an extremely well-known 
public figure with significant influence over the course of public discourse.449 The 
programme succeeded in advancing the government’s position on two fronts – firstly, the 
broadcast itself was captivating and sensational enough to ensure that public attention 
would remain fixated on the union: 
‘The fact that a number of the E.T.U. members whom he [Woodrow Wyatt] interviewed insisted on having 
their faces obscured and voices distorted, for fear of reprisals by the Executive, made it all the more 
dramatic and compelling. A week later Wyatt dealt with the subject again. The Communist leaders of the 
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union declined to appear, saying they would only do so if they were allowed to present their case without 
commentary being made on it and on the understanding that they would not be questioned.’450 
Secondly, it served to reign in further short-term communist activity on the part of the 
union Executive – the Security Service noting that the publicity had left ‘E.T.U leaders 
badly shaken… they will be careful not to act in such a way as to revive it.’451 Although 
Whitehall continued to be frustrated by its inability to directly counter communist 
subversion within industry, the episode did prove that by cultivating media attention and 
providing a steady stream of low level information it could ensure that when communist 
malpractice did occur openly, it would be both noticed by the national press and elevated 
to the level of national scandal. By June 1959 the FO were able to report that: 
‘The publicity campaign on this subject [communism in the trade unions] has continued to go well; the 
topic is now generally accepted as ‘news worthy’ by all major UK dailies and weeklies due largely to the 
slogging match in the Electrical Trades Union between the Communist Executive and the dissidents. 
Communist activities in less spectacular unions – e.g. the Civil Service Union – now arouse immediate 
public interest.’452 
By December 1959 it was clear that the CPGB was firmly on the defensive as several 
ETU branches went into open revolt across the country from early 1958.453 Meanwhile, 
the editorial line of the communist press made the level of discomfiture being inflicted by 
the publicity campaign clear, as the paper began declaring repeatedly that Fleet Street was 
the single greatest enemy of the communist cause.454 Whilst counter-propaganda and 
information dissemination proved ineffective at directly countering communism, it did 
prove extraordinarily helpful in fostering anti-communist sentiment within the national 
press and thereby general populace. In the short term, Whitehall’s counter-communist 
strategy in the trade unions experienced only limited success – however in the long-term 
they helped to fundamentally undermine the ideology’s foothold in organised labour by 
steadily whittling away at public apathy and helping to ensure that British media opinion 
was firmly anti-communist. In doing so the government helped create the popular 
sentiment required to ensure that the marginalisation of communist sentiment in the 
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unions would be near-total following the case’s progression to a civil trial in 1961 – as 
shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Communism in the Media 
With regards to the transmission of the BBC Panorama programmes on communist 
malpractice in the ETU, it is interesting to note the level of official interest its broadcast 
caused. Greater curiosity regarding how film and television might best be exploited as a 
facet of counter-subversion rose exponentially over the late 1950s – the FO was asked to 
consider how best ‘sound and television broadcasting’ could be used as a means of 
reducing communist influence, whilst media output in general began to be scrutinised to a 
far greater extent than it had been in the past. In past years, attention had mainly been 
paid to those media outlets which were obviously and overtly instruments of the Soviet 
government – a case in point being the TASS Agency (the Soviet foreign broadcasting 
agency) monitoring station at Whetstone in North London. A relic of the Second World 
War, the station had come to British governmental attention following concerns raised by 
the air ministry in 1950 that the facility could be used to monitor operational messages 
relayed by Fighter Command during exercises, whilst also serving as a means for the easy 
broadcast of pro-Soviet programming.455 After considerable deliberation and 
disagreement across Whitehall (MI5 in particular were unconvinced by the Air Ministry’s 
argument)456 by not only the fledgling AC (H), but also JIC the station was forcibly 
closed in late 1951, ending the matter.457 Since that point however, explicit discussion 
regarding broadcasting matters in relation to counter-subversion policy had been few and 
far between, excepting routine communication with the BBC on the part of the Security 
Service to ensure the Corporation was not inadvertently exploited as a platform for the 
broadcast of communist ideas.458 The later ‘50s however exhibited far greater official 
interest in broadcasting as a facet of counter-subversion policy – particularly film and 
television. Such a change appears to have been prompted by overtures from the Foreign 
Office in 1957 to begin resumption of what were described as ‘unostentatious cultural 
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contacts and exchanges with the Soviet bloc’ – which had been formally suspended since 
the Hungarian Revolution.459 Though the British public were already exposed to a not 
insignificant amount of pro-Soviet propaganda by this point – Radio Moscow broadcast 
freely in the UK, whilst the Daily Worker was freely available as was formal propaganda 
circulated by the Soviet embassy (all with negligible effect on public opinion) – the 
request does seem to have caught official attention to the extent that the profile of 
broadcasting concerns was significantly raised in meetings of the AC (H) thereafter.460 
The report concluded with the following: 
‘In exchanges with the Iron Curtain however, which it will probably not be possible to limit entirely to the 
unobtrusive variety, there is naturally the risk of increased influence by Soviet, Satellite and Chinese 
propaganda, whether through Khrushchev on television screens, a flattering reception of visitors to the 
Soviet Union, the impact of visiting Communist from the Soviet Union, or the artistic virtues of musical 
and other entertainments. The Committee may therefore like to take note of the general picture and in 
particular its likely impact on the home front.’461  
Limiting exchanges with the Soviet Union to the ‘unobtrusive variety’ was difficult 
enough for officials when the state fully controlled the means of media production and 
dissemination. However, the advent of private television in the UK (ITV & its subsidiary 
news network ITN were founded in the spring of 1955)462 complicated matters. Such a 
loss of state control could prove problematic. For example, in late 1956 when ITN in 
combination with its London contractor, Associated Rediffusion, attempted to negotiate 
with Soviet television authorities to secure exchange and broadcasting rights in their 
respective countries.463 Negotiation attempts ended (perhaps inevitably) as follows: 
‘Associated Rediffusion had made an agreement with Soviet Radio under which each party undertook not 
to exhibit and programme to which the other objected. But whereas the Russians were interested mainly in 
the propaganda value of such exchanges, Associated Rediffusion were concerned with the popular appeal of 
the programme to be shown in the United Kingdom; and they had consequently got themselves into the 
unfortunate and ill-considered position whereby they had agreed to show in this country a programme 
extremely favourable to the Soviet viewpoint, and to a programme extremely unfavourable to ourselves 
being shown in the Soviet Union.’464 
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Here again was an example of the difficulties Whitehall faced in attempting to formulate 
effective counter-subversion policy outside of those sectors it directly controlled. Whilst 
the BBC could be coerced and directed fairly straightforwardly into avoiding 
broadcasting pro-communist programming (indeed the BBC willingly collaborated with 
the government on matters related to communist subversion),465 private companies could 
not be as easily guided into toeing the governmental line on communism. Though ITN’s 
negotiations were undoubtedly benignly intentioned, nonetheless they had inadvertently 
provided an avenue for the broadcast of communist propaganda in the United Kingdom 
(though it must be stressed, to a comparatively tiny audience – households with access to 
the new channel in 1956/57 numbered somewhere around 500’000).466 A similar event 
occurred in mid-1959 when the British Film Institute (BFI) consented to the screening 
and distribution of a pair of East German propaganda films designed to ‘discredit and 
weaken NATO and Western Germany’.467 The films, entitled ‘Holiday in Sylt’ (depicting 
German repression of the Warsaw uprising) and ‘Operation Teutonic Sword’ (a 
documentary which claimed to prove that General Hans Speidel – then Supreme 
Commander of NATO ground forces in Central Europe – had played an instrumental role 
in the assassinations of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister 
Louis Barthou in 1934)468 had been exhibited at a special exhibition of foreign cinema at 
the BFI’s National Film Theatre in late 1958 by Plato Films – a British-based company 
which specialised in the distribution of communist films (other works produced by the 
company include 1951’s ‘Coventry Greets Stalingrad’ and 1954’s imaginatively titled 
‘Labour Delegation meets Mao Tse-Tung’).469  
The central problem for the government was two-fold – firstly, the BFI then as now 
received a significant public subsidy leaving Whitehall open to the allegation that it was 
indirectly funding the dissemination of communist propaganda within the United 
Kingdom.470 Secondly, given that the films had already been exhibited in Britain, it was 
difficult to make the argument that they should not receive wider circulation to ‘ordinary’ 
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cinemas.471 On the second point – it is interesting to note still just how wary officials 
were of propaganda causing a mass surge of pro-communist opinion amongst the general 
British public. Despite the fact that all evidence suggested that the British populace were 
overwhelmingly at most apathetic to the ideology - CPGB membership had declined 
steadily since 1945, as had its share of the popular vote - the national press was reliably 
anti-communist. Meanwhile, MI5 had reduced its earlier wartime contingency estimates 
to the extent that a mere 110 British subjects would have been detained should the 
hostilities with the Soviet Union have commenced (in addition to 11 foreign nationals).472 
Hardly a sizeable fifth column given years of tolerated pro-Soviet propaganda by the 
Daily Worker and Radio Moscow – officials still fretted that pro-communist propaganda 
could unleash some here-to-fore unseen Marxist zeal amongst the public. Indeed such 
was the concern amongst members of the AC (H) that the Security Service was 
immediately tasked with compiling a report on the extent of communist infiltration within 
the BFI.473 Meanwhile, the Director of the BFI (film administrator James Quinn)474 was 
also contacted directly to provide assurances that he was aware of the dangers of 
communist propaganda and to vouch for the moral character of his staff.475 Whilst it 
would appear that the investigation was carried out with discretion, there are somewhat 
uncomfortable echoes of McCarthyite Hollywood present here – the BFI asked to account 
for the showing of films outside the government’s definition of political acceptability. 
Though the full report concerning MI5’s investigation into the BFI remains classified, the 
AC (H) commentary indicates (perhaps predictably) the futility of the entire exercise: 
‘The Security Service would expect their normal cover of the Communist party to have revealed any 
significant Communist activity in a body such as the British Film Institute. But they have never had any 
such indication. In addition, they had now made this intensive study of the British Film Institute itself and 
of those individuals closely connected with the running of it. They still had not found any signs of 
significant Communist influence in the BFI… The Committee agreed that there was no need for them to 
pursue the question of Communist influence in the BFI any further.’476 
Even despite all available evidence being to the contrary – the British government at a 
Cabinet committee level continued to be deeply concerned that communist propaganda 
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had the capacity to significantly impact upon public opinion. The old trope of communist 
machinations being able to manipulate a populace into unthinking obedience refused to 
fade away. Whilst Whitehall assessments from a multitude of departments were 
ultimately reaching the conclusion that communism was a declining threat to British 
stability and security, nonetheless officials remained paranoid that communist influence 
could gain traction at any point if left unmonitored and unchecked. Whilst MI5 may have 
been confident that the problem was well in hand - Roger Hollis (Director General of the 
Security Service since 1956) was assured enough to state firmly to the Home Secretary 
Rab Butler in 1960 that ‘On the subversive side I thought we had the British Communist 
Party pretty well buttoned up’477 – the BFI incident demonstrated that ministers remained 
convinced that communism presented a real and immediate threat to the security of the 
United Kingdom even as late as 1959. 
Attitudes to the Non-Communist Left 
Though old – and increasingly unfounded - fears concerning communist influence may 
have remained strong, official attitudes towards the radical left as a whole displayed 
considerably greater nuance. As a result of the mass defections from the CPGB post-
1956, from 1957 onwards considerably greater governmental attention began to be 
applied to the question of the subversive potential of the hard-left as a whole. Though 
IRD included a short report on what it termed ‘”Dissident” Communist activities in 
Britain’ with its briefing packet for June 1957 (which mainly remarked without comment 
on the sudden spate of new left-wing publications such as The New Reasoner and 
Universities and Left Review which had sprung up since the Hungarian uprising)478 
official attention was not really captured until early 1958. Official interest appears to have 
been piqued by the inclusion of a London Times editorial dating from February 1958 
speculating on the future of the circa 8000 former communists who had left the CPGB 
since 1956. Included in the AC (H) briefing packet for that month, the article speculated 
that:  
‘A large proportion of them [former CPGB members]… have probably disappeared from the political 
scene... Some will have had only a short time in the party and were glad to leave it without attracting 
attention. Others, after a score or more of dedicated years, broke with the party with much anguish of spirit 
and grimly turned their backs on politics… Political forums founded in the wake of Hungary have now 
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served their purpose as transit camps for ex-Communists on their way to other sections of the Labour 
movement. Possible more lasting in their influence will be the various publications which have sprung up 
with ex-Communists grouped round them… Much more influential is the well-produced four shilling 
quarterly ‘The New Reasoner’, edited by the Yorkshire university rebels Mr. Saville and Mr. Thompson… 
Their circulation is approaching 3000. An intellectual rival is ‘The Universities and Left Review’.’479 
Though with the benefit of historical hindsight the article was wrong on many points – 
former communists retained their appetite for politics, leading directly to the genesis of 
the ‘New Left’, a school of political thought which attempted to bridge the gap between 
increasingly defunct Marxism-Leninism and the labourite tradition,480 the attention of the 
AC (H) appears to have been captured by the report, most likely due to the speculation 
that many ex-CPGB members would in all probability migrate to other sections of the 
Labour movement, potentially causing trouble in the process. September 1958 saw the 
publication of an IRD report concerning ‘Dissident Communist Activities in Britain, 1956 
– 1958’,481 which categorised the ex-communists as belonging to two separate and 
distinct groups. The first, ‘Trotskyists and neo-Trotskyists’, – were defined as those who 
may have broken from the CPGB yet retained the same adherence to dogma, rigidity of 
thought and penchant for entryism as those who still retained their Party loyalties (what 
was termed by the IRIS sponsored 1958 anti-communist polemic The British Road to 
Stalinism as ‘boring from within).482 The second group meanwhile received the title of 
‘creative Marxists’, defined as being: 
‘Far more radical in their approach, rejecting out of hand much of the claptrap accepted by Communists and 
Trotskyists alike. The reject, not only the bureaucracy of Moscow, but the whole concept of a rigidly 
controlled party, and they are trying to reshape their familiar ideology along sound Marxist principles but in 
an atmosphere of free intellectual discussion.’483 
Again, John Savile and E.P. Thompson were singled out for special mention, with the 
New Reasoner (successor magazine to the ultimately short-lived Reasoner) being deemed 
the flagship publication for the latter group.484 The emergence of such groups presented 
the government with a quandary. On the one hand, these individuals had for varying 
lengths of time been members of the Communist Party of Great Britain and in select cases 
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even attracted the attention of the Security Service, such was the potential danger their 
views had appeared to pose. On the other hand, much of the premise of Britain’s post-war 
counter-subversion strategy had been predicated on the argument that communism and 
communists ultimately posed a danger due to their capacity for exploitation by Soviet 
intelligence and not due to the substance of communist views in of themselves. Initial 
wariness related to the adoption of a wide-ranging counter-subversion programme in the 
late 1940s had largely centred on the point that it was not the government’s place to 
engage in political witch-hunting and that individuals should be deemed ‘subversive’ only 
if their actions could be said to pose a genuine threat to the security or stability of the 
United Kingdom. The Security Service in particular had set great store by the fact that it 
was even-handed in its approach to assessment and surveillance – radical leftist 
sympathies did not in of themselves warrant a threat to the State if they were unconnected 
with Soviet communism. An excellent example of this in practice can be found in the 
vetting report for the author and playwright JB Priestley, compiled by MI5’s F Division 
in 1956 following a request by the Foreign Office to investigate Priestley prior to being 
offered a position as a British Council lecturer: 
‘J.B. PRIESTLEY can be fairly described as a Socialist whose first fine fervour has been tempered by 
reflection on the events of the past twenty years. He has been associated with a number of left-wing and 
quasi-Communist organisations, usually in the role of champion of individual rights, but his association 
therewith has been that of an independent left-wing liberal whose conscience seems to be answerable not to 
any political party, but rather to the radical tradition as he conceives it.’485 
As has previously been examined, the Security Service were anxious to avoid any 
political bias of the sort which had tarnished the reputation of the FBI during the 
McCarthy years. As Priestley’s vetting report shows, an adherence to radical leftist 
politics was not necessarily a qualifying factor to label someone as a ‘subversive’ as long 
as such sympathies were isolated from communism. With the advent of a post-communist 
radical left in Britain following 1956, the government was placed in the uneasy position 
of having to reassess the premise of its counter-subversion policy – did the radical non-
communist left now pose a threat and if so to what extent? As it was, monitoring 
remained consistent, if low level, from the August of 1958 onwards. Certainly the matter 
of British Trotskyism required little official action. Even by the summer of 1959 the 
movement was ‘discredited, though not yet entirely scotched’.486 Given that the 
Trotskyists – centred around The Newsletter journal, edited by Daily Worker’s former 
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Hungary correspondent Peter Fryer, and the fledgling ‘Socialist Labour League’ (a group 
which would eventually morph into the more well-known Workers Revolutionary Party 
in the early 1970s)487 – were essentially stricken by the same doctrinaire attitude as the 
CPGB, their lack of general popularity or wider influence is perhaps unsurprising. The 
movement according to official estimates amounted to at most no more than a thousand 
members scattered throughout the United Kingdom.488 Indeed it could easily be argued 
that the emergence of a formal Trotskyist organisation did the ideology’s sympathisers 
more harm than good - most had quietly existed under the umbrella of the Labour Party 
since the collapse of the short-lived Revolutionary Communist Party in the late 1940s.489 
The emergence of the Socialist Labour League however gave the Labour Party an entity 
to formally proscribe – in the process expelling a significant number of entryists who had 
joined Labour after the RCP’s dissolution in 1949.490 Official governmental action was 
limited to furnishing the Labour Party with an in-depth IRD analysis of the SLL.491 As 
had been proven in the past, when confronted with hard-left entryists within mainstream 
leftist politics the Labour Party often provided the best means of ensuring their 
marginalisation.492 
Considerably more complicated was the official reaction to what it had termed ‘Creative 
Marxists’, or what would now be recognised as the fledgling New Left - which would 
grow to become highly influential on both sides of the Atlantic over the course of the 
1960s. It is possible to see a certain amount of admiration in the governmental line on the 
movement circa 1948 – comments such as ‘rejecting out of hand much of the clap-trap 
accepted by communists’ and ‘trying to reshape their ideology… in an atmosphere of free 
intellectual discussion’ demonstrating at least a begrudging respect.493 As the New Left 
began to become more closely associated with the growing anti-nuclear movement 
however, official opinion soured considerably. By the late ‘50s possession of nuclear 
weaponry was still considered to be integral to British national security. Indeed, in an era 
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where significant defence cuts were having to be made, expenditure on nuclear 
development was rising.494 As stated within the 1957 White Paper on defence: 
‘While Britain cannot by comparison [with the United States] make more than a modest contribution, there 
is a measure of agreement that she must possess an appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power of her 
own. British atomic bombs are already in steady production and the RAF holds a substantial number of 
them. A British megaton weapon has now been developed. This will be tested and thereafter a stock will be 
manufactured.’495 
November 1957 saw the successful testing of the first British hydrogen bomb in a test 
codenamed ‘Grapple X’ – meaning that the UK was now the world’s third nation to 
possess the capability to design and manufacture thermonuclear warheads.496 Meanwhile, 
the scale and collateral damage caused by American nuclear testing in the mid-50s had 
finally granted impetus to the British anti-nuclear movement – which had been essentially 
stagnant since 1948 and the public announcement of British nuclear development.497 In 
particular, the aftermath of the 15 megaton US ‘Bravo’ shot at Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands on the 1st March 1954, led to significantly higher levels of public 
concern over nuclear testing and weaponry. The test – the largest ever conducted by the 
US military – inadvertently covered the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel ‘Lucky 
Dragon’, moored some 85 miles (well outside the officially mandated exclusion zone) 
from the drop site, with high levels of radioactive fallout – leading the entire 23 man crew 
to fall ill with acute radiation sickness by the time they returned to the port of Yaizu in 
south-eastern Japan.498 A formal complaint to the UN was filed by the Japanese 
government; and for the first time there began to be widespread international appreciation 
of nuclear warheads’ sheer destructive potential beyond immediate explosive 
capability.499 By 1957, the British anti-nuclear movement had finally begun to gain a 
measure of political significance, the Direct Action Committee being formed in April of 
that year – with its more publically well-known cousin the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament coming into existence in January 1958.500 Both groups fell outside of 
Whitehall’s understanding of the political spectrum. The Labour Party had rejected 
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unilateral disarmament during its Brighton Conference in October 1957 – from which 
came Aneurin Bevan’s famous line that to disarm Britain’s nuclear arsenal would be akin 
to making future Foreign Secretaries walk ‘naked into the international conference 
chamber.’501 British communism meanwhile was also hostile to unilateralism in the late 
‘50s – true to form, the CPGB continuously advocated the line adopted by Moscow that 
the only true solution to nuclear tension was multilateral disarmament.502 Indeed, 
throughout the mid-1950s the CPGB exercised its influence within the trade union 
movement (and thus, by proxy, inside the Labour Party) to ensure that all resolutions at 
annual conferences in favour of unilateralism were blocked – for example, in 1956, ’57 
and ’58, block voting on the part of the Electrical Trades Union was used at both annual 
meetings of the Trades Union Congress and also Labour Party to support their respective 
leadership’s multilateralism.503 As it was, the natural home for unilateralist sympathies 
was within the New Left movement – separate from both established wings of the left and 
also crucially outside of the full understanding of the government’s counter-subversive 
planners. Indeed, both the Foreign Office and Security Service advocated the view that 
the unilateralist movement would have been easier to understand and control had there 
been clear evidence of communist control.504  
The rise of unilateralism beyond the communist movement presented a clear problem for 
Whitehall. With the British government’s continued committal to the maintenance of a 
nuclear and thermo-nuclear arsenal as a central component of defence policy, the rise of 
such sympathies could be interpreted as a direct threat to national security. However, the 
threat was still not as clear cut as the British communist movement had been, nor indeed 
were counters to the movement as (in hindsight) straightforward. The CPGB was an 
essentially rigid and strictly hierarchal institution. The anti-nuclear movement meanwhile 
was not, rather it was comprised of individuals with a variety of political outlooks – 
former communists in part, but also Quakers (Horace Alexander, Ruth Fry & Laurence 
Hansman), philosophers (Bertrand Russell), members of the pacifist movement (Hugh 
Brock), leading historians (A.J.P Taylor) and so on. Moreover, whilst many anti-
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communist measures had been justifiable as prudent precautions to safeguard against the 
designs of Soviet intelligence, the idea of expanding officialdom’s counter-subversive 
focus to non-communist groups again raised the spectre of British intelligence being used 
to enforce political orthodoxy. Hennessey provides an apt summary of the situation, 
stating that ‘In a strange way, both MI5 and the CPGB knew where they stood with each 
other. Their struggle had been continuous… since July 1920… By 1957 however, both 
Party and Security Service had to face a new phenomenon which left both, initially, 
somewhat surprised and baffled.’505As was perhaps typical, Whitehall were initially 
puzzled by the emergence of what increasingly seemed to be a new subversive threat of 
relative significance & equally perplexed as to how best counter it. Moreover, the 
importance of groups such as CND and the wider New Left was not to be a passing 
phenomenon. Particularly as a result of the Labour Party’s resounding defeat at the 
October 1959 general election (its third successive loss), a crisis of confidence opened 
within the broader left which would allow for the flourishing of these new groups outside 
the traditional boundaries of the Labour movement. The late ‘50s therefore marked the 
beginning of a new chapter in British counter-subversion policy, even if it was not 
apparent at the time. Between 1945 and 1959, the British government had essentially 
considered the term ‘subversive’ to be synonymous with ‘communist’. In future, 
Whitehall would be forced to diversify its focus, definition of and approach towards the 
concept, as experiences over the course of the early 1960s would demonstrate. 
 
Summary 
May 1955 – October 1959 was a period of tremendous significance for British domestic 
counter-subversion policy and indeed the British communist movement more generally. It 
was in this period that Whitehall shifted its focus away in earnest from communism 
within the intelligentsia and white-collar professions, as had been the overriding 
preoccupation since 1947, and instead began to regard communists within the trade 
unions as the most pressing domestic subversive threat. Meanwhile, though many of the 
long-running problems which had vexed counter-subversion policy makers since Attlee 
continued to trouble the Eden and Macmillan governments – not least the relatively 
limited options available when dealing with communism in the private sector – the late 
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‘50s were also defined by considerably greater official confidence in the effectiveness of 
counter-communist measures than had been exhibited during the previous ten years of 
post-war efforts. The steady build-up of MI5’s network of CPGB surveillance and 
informants, coupled with the breakthrough provided by PARTY PIECE, meant that by 
1955, available intelligence on the movement had become near comprehensive, granting 
Whitehall a steady comprehensive stream of information concerning covert communist 
intent and capability which had been previously lacking. Meanwhile, the interior strife 
caused within the CPGB over the period of 1956 to 1957 as a result of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin, Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution and chronic 
mismanagement of discontent by the Party’s Executive Council served to reinforce 
official hopes that communism’s influence was rapidly declining. Even despite 
continuing disquiet regarding Burgess, Philby and Maclean, such was official faith in the 
strength of positive vetting procedure and MI5 surveillance that concern regarding 
historical Soviet espionage did not translate into any especially significant rise in anti-
communist measures either within academia or the civil service. The collapse of British 
intellectual communism following 1956, combined with a pervasive Security Service 
surveillance network, meant that the government could finally lay to rest the ghosts of the 
Gouzenko affair and Fuchs scandal. By the late ‘50s it appeared clear to officials that the 
chances of a network of highly placed intellectual subversives facilitating Soviet 
espionage were negligible. 
However, whilst concern in intellectual communism ebbed, worries about the influence of 
communists within British industry steadily grew more pronounced over the late ‘50s. 
Despite IRD’s proven effectiveness as a generator and distributor of counter-propaganda, 
nevertheless the organisation struggled with limited short-term impact – particularly 
within those unions which were lacking in strong anti-communist leadership. Although 
matters were somewhat improved by the utilisation of private groups such as Industrial 
Research and Information Services Ltd the government still struggled to reverse 
communist gains in the short term as political apathy amongst the union rank and file 
allowed organised communist groups to install their members in a variety of leadership 
positions within industry. In the long term however, the government’s campaign of 
counter-propaganda against communist trade union members succeeded in generating a 
hostile media climate which steadily made communist gains more difficult to achieve and 
sustain. In the face of intense scrutiny by Britain’s national press – whose attention had 
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been caught primarily as a result of the dissemination of IRD material – communists 
found it considerably harder to exploit electoral technicalities (and indeed perpetrate 
outright fraud). The case of the Electrical Trades Union in particular significantly 
damaged communism’s standing within the wider trade union movement – demonstrating 
that counter-propaganda campaigns if properly directed and sustained could eventually 
erode communist influence. 
Meanwhile, officialdom struggled to adapt to changing technology and political realities. 
Though heartened by the fragmentation of the radical left in the late 1950s, the rise of the 
influential New Left and its ties to the burgeoning unilateral nuclear disarmament 
movement increasingly gave the government cause for concern. Further to this, the 
growth of public access to visual media in the form of television broadcasts and foreign 
film also gave officials pause – despite all evidence being to the contrary, senior 
politicians and civil servants continued to worry that communist propaganda could 
undermine the stability of Britain’s parliamentary democracy. British counter-subversion 
policy therefore entered the 1960s at something of a crossroads. Gone were the old 
concerns over communists within the civil service and academia, which had largely 
defined policy since 1947. In their place came steady unease over communist influence in 
industry and a growing discomfort that old assumptions regarding counter-subversion 
were rapidly being rendered obsolete in the face of advancing technology and a radically 
altered political landscape. By the time of Macmillan’s re-election in the autumn of 1959 
though domestic communism appeared to be a diminishing threat, Whitehall did not yet 
consider the matter to be wholly resolved. 
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Loose Ends: November 1959- October 1964 
 
As the Macmillan government was returned to office following the October 1959 general 
election, official appraisals regarding the strength of domestic communism were 
characterised by a sense of cautious optimism. With the CPGB still reeling from the 
aftereffects of Hungary and the Party’s disastrous 25th Congress, and the ongoing 
electoral fraud scandal within the Electrical Trades Union causing significant damage to 
wider communist credibility within the trade unions, it seemed plausible for ministers to 
begin to suppose that the domestic communist threat was firmly on the decline. 
Meanwhile, the steady growth in popularity and influence of the unilateral nuclear 
disarmament movement provided strong evidence that communism no longer constituted 
the sole domestic threat to British security interests. For the first time since 1947, serious 
attention began to be turned to the reduction of domestic anti-communist measures as 
well as the diversification of counter-subversion policy more broadly. This sea change 
over the course of the early ‘60s – from communism being regarded as the central 
domestic subversive threat to merely one amongst many – was not a straightforward one 
however. In particular, communist infiltration into the lower ranks of the CND gave rise 
to fears that the nuclear-disarmament movement could become merely another 
mechanism for the advance of Soviet interests. Meanwhile the growth of interior dissent 
within the Labour Party, following a decade in the political wilderness, once more gave 
credence to old concerns – both within the PLP and without – that communist entryism 
was on the verge of co-opting Labour into a vehicle for the covert advancement of radical 
leftist politics.  
Communist activities continued to be monitored intently by all the usual wings of the 
British government. Indeed, in many respects the period between 1960 and 1964 was 
marked by greater introspection regarding counter-subversion policy than at any point 
since 1951 and the substantial strengthening of Attlee’s 1947 reforms. As the reduction of 
counter-communist measure began to be discussed in earnest, serious attention was turned 
across all branches of government as to the overall state of Britain’s domestic counter-
subversion strategy and whether the contemporaneous anti-communist stance continued 
to be justifiable in the face of the sweeping political turmoil which had affected the 
movement in the late 1950s. Further to this, the simultaneous outbreak of multiple, 
communist-related espionage scandals over 1961 and 1962, once again raised the profile 
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of official security arrangements and called into question many of the assumptions which 
had underpinned counter-subversive and counter-espionage efforts since the early 1950s. 
Counter-subversion policy in the latter years of conservative hegemony was therefore 
defined by three key traits. Firstly, a general cautious optimism on the part of ministers as 
well as governmental departments that the domestic communist problem may have been 
on the verge of resolving itself in a manner favourable to national security. Secondly, a 
renewed interest in the overall state of British communism, rather than its component 
parts, combined with critical introspection of counter-subversion policy to an extent 
unseen since the early ‘50s. Third and finally, a definitive move towards a more diversely 
targeted policy by 1964, characterised by a marginalisation of communism as a leading 
domestic security interest. By the end of the Attlee government communism had 
dominated domestic security concerns; by the election of Harold Wilson the threat had 
finally ebbed to the point of secondary importance. 
 
Impact of the ETU trial 
The events of the late 1950s had left British communism in a state of disarray. The CPGB 
had lost somewhere between a quarter and a third of its membership, whilst meanwhile 
the ETU vote-rigging scandal finally seemed to be accomplishing what ministers had long 
puzzled over – securing the collapse of communist credibility within British industry. The 
case had already been damaging to communist interests within the unions due to 
consistent negative coverage in the national press since 1957.506 Meanwhile, further fuel 
was added to the fire as a result of the re-election in 1959 of the ETU’s communist 
general secretary Frank Haxell.507 MI5’s monitoring of CPGB headquarters confirmed 
that Haxell’s re-election had also been the product of electoral fraud – though this 
information could be passed no further than the Ministry of Labour owing to the 
sensitivity of its collection.508 Nevertheless, a media frenzy was once more whipped up 
around the case – to such an extent that the Foreign Office worried that ‘there is a danger 
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that if carried to excess, this criticism might arouse such hostility in the trade union 
movement towards the Press that it would defeat its own object’509 – and by May 1960, 
the General Council of the TUC had been forced to intervene. The ETU was presented 
with an ultimatum – either instigate legal proceedings to clear its name, or submit to a 
formal inquiry by the TUC into the allegations. The ETU chose the latter, only to have 
further argument arise between the two bodies following disagreement over who should 
conduct the inquiry – the TUC favouring a ‘person of judicial authority and ability’ while 
the ETU demanded that the position should go to a ‘trade unionist of some integrity and 
standing’.510  
Whilst the organisations bickered – adding still further negative press coverage – Les 
Cannon and Frank Chapple brought a civil suit against the ETU leadership in early 1961. 
With the plaintiff’s barrister, Geoffrey Gardiner QC, claiming that the case represented 
the ‘biggest fraud in the history of trade unionism’511 over the course of a fortnight the 
government watched with glee as the ETU’s communist executive was systematically 
discredited and exposed as fundamentally dishonest.512 Though Haxell resigned his 
CPGB membership following the case and the Party did its best to distance itself from 
accusations of wrongdoing – the damage to communist credibility within the trade union 
movement was done. That CPGB involvement was a central feature of the case was made 
plain by the closing comments of the presiding judge, Mr Justice Winn, who found that 
‘not only was the ETU managed and controlled by Communists and pliant sympathisers, 
but it was so managed in the service of the Communist Party’.513 As a direct consequence, 
the TUC demanded that Frank Foulkes (communist president of the ETU) immediately 
submit himself for re-election. When the request was refused, the TUC expelled the ETU, 
forcing a crisis within the union which resulted in the total dismissal of the ETU 
executive board, to be replaced by an entirely non-communist leadership following open 
                                                          
509 ‘Communism in the Trade Unions’, Note by the FO to the AC (H), 6th October 1960, TNA, CAB 
134/1345 
510 Ibid. 
511 Gerald Gardiner QC, final speech for the plaintiffs, June 15th 1961, op cit. C.H Rolph, All Those in 
Favour? An Account of the High Court Action Against the Electrical Trades Union and its Officers for 
Ballot-Rigging in the Election of Union Officials, as Prepared from the Official Court Transcript, (Andre 
Deutsch, London, 1962), p. 215 
512 The evidence brought was damning – particularly proof of the extra 30’000 envelopes which had been 
commissioned by Haxell to sway the vote. For a full transcript of all evidence presented, see Rolph, All 
Those in Favour, pp. 22-102 
513 Judgement of Mr. Justice Winn, 28th June 1961, as cited in Rolph, All Those in Favour? p. 233 
146 
 
elections in 1962.514 Importantly, the whole incident passed without a single mention of 
Whitehall interference at any stage – further adding to official satisfaction: 
‘So far as concerned Electrical Trade Union matters, publicity had been very successful, and it was 
particularly gratifying that no Government Department had been mentioned by the Communist Press as 
having had a hand in their recent discomfitures. The whole issue must however be kept in front of public 
opinion.’515  
The suit and subsequent judicial findings against the ETU executive board effectively 
broke communist power within the unions whilst granting Whitehall a hefty propaganda 
victory without the political cost which would have been borne had the full extent of 
government involvement come to public light. News of the loss of communist control 
over the ETU’s executive committee was carried as the first or second story in most of the 
national press, whilst favourable editorial comment was published in the Times, Daily 
Express, Telegraph, Guardian and Daily Mail.516 The Daily Worker meanwhile rather 
carried a rather feeble editorial complaining that the result had been brought about by: 
‘The monopoly press which has worked indefatigably for this result for the last 12 years… never in the 
history of the whole trade union movement has a group in opposition to an executive received such 
unanimous support… (the anti-communist campaign has been conducted by) the Right Wing, aided by the 
Tory Press, its trade union organisations, IRIS, the Economic League and influential Labour Party and trade 
union leaders.’517 
Notably, the Worker carried no mention of the involvement of any official department or 
government minister. Both industrial communism and the CPGB had been exposed on the 
public stage as fundamentally untrustworthy – more interested in securing positions of 
power than representing the interests of British workers – in a manner which to the public 
seemed natural and entirely devoid of official meddling. Though weak protestations of 
the whole affair being a crude government stitch-up would continue well into the early 
noughties to little avail,518 the effect on the mainstream trade union movement was such 
that earlier apathy began to be replaced with a general wariness and distrust of communist 
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motives. As the Security Service assessment of the case’s aftermath rather jubilantly put 
it:  
‘The Party has been hit at the point where its strength and capacity for mischief was greatest – in the key 
trade union of a key industry. Its whole industrial apparatus has suffered as a consequence… The CPGB 
leaders are in no doubt about the implications of the defeat and intend to take disciplinary action against 
certain Communists on the ETU executive in a belated attempt to remove the stain of fraud from the Party’s 
image.’519 
The ETU case effectively halted the spread of communist influence in the trade unions, as 
the movement could no longer rely upon an apathetic union electorate in its pursuit of 
influence within British industry. Though the Communist Party continued to attempt to 
exploit British trade unionism for some time to come (indeed, the centre of the Party’s 
strength remained the union movement through the late 1960s)520 and indeed continued to 
maintain an influence ‘greatly disproportionate to its size and influence in the country as a 
whole’ its future attempts to infiltrate and control the executive committees of influential 
unions would never again prove as successful as they had in the late 1950s. 
Quantitative analysis of strike action over the previous decade, bears out that communist 
gains amongst trade union leadership produced little by way of notably adverse effects on 
industrial relations. Whilst the immediate post-war period had constituted an all-time low 
for the occurrence of strike action – with the number of disputes per year weighing in at 
around 3.3 million days lost – the years since 1955 saw only a minor increase in industrial 
dispute.521 1955 to 1964 saw a rise in the total numbers of strikes to consistently above 
2000 individual (mainly low-level) strikes recorded per year – peaking in 1957 (2859) 
and 1960 (2832) to bring the average to 3.6 million days lost per year by the mid ‘60s.522 
To place these figures in context, only 1 in 2000 working days was lost to industrial 
action over the period from 1951-1960 - a markedly lower rate than either the US, 
Belgium, Canada, Italy, Australia or France experienced over the same timeframe;523 and 
considerably less than would be experienced by the country in the worst years of late 20th 
Century British industrial agitation in 1979 (the winter of discontent resulted in 29.5 
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million days lost that year)524 and 1984 (the effects of the miners’ strike produced 
something in the region of 27.1 million days lost).525 Such a period of relative calm in 
industrial relations helps to explain Whitehall’s more positive outlook with regards to 
communist subversion at the beginning of the decade. Indeed, to policy-makers 
examining British communism’s capabilities and intent over the period of 1960 and early 
1961, it seemed as if ‘50s predictions that communist infiltration into union leadership 
would inexorably lead to a marked worsening of industrial relations had been proven 
false. The deep blow dealt to trade union communism as a result of the ETU scandal 
combined with 50s predictions failure to materialise gave the government good reason to 
reassess communism’s industrial influence. 
Counter-Propaganda in the early 1960s 
It is worth noting here just how sophisticated official counter-propaganda efforts had 
become by the early 1960s. Though still run by a small three-man office under the 
auspices of the Foreign Office,526 the English Section of the Information Research 
Department had, since its founding in 1951, acquired reach and influence which far 
outweighed its size. By 1962, the Section’s monthly summary of communist related 
activities (compiled from overt sources) had achieved a circulation of 163 copies per 
month – a substantial proportion of which served to inform the holders of senior positions 
in wider government departments.527 In particular, by the early ‘60s the Section was in 
regular liaison with the Ministries of Labour and Education as well as the Home Office – 
giving it significant clout over how communism was understood and perceived across the 
government.528 Meanwhile, the Section’s ‘unattributable’ papers had reached a circulation 
of figure of some 300 recipients by 1960 – both at home and abroad.529 IRD’s success in 
circulating anti-communist material had attracted attention from several Commonwealth 
governments – most notably the Australian – who subsequently sought to utilise the 
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Department’s experience in formulating their own counter-subversive policies.530 
Meanwhile on the domestic front, the English Section played a consulting role (on a 
strictly unofficial basis) to numerous opinion-forming bodies across various spheres of 
British public life. By 1961 not only did it, predictably, advise the research departments 
of both the Conservative and Labour Parties, but also the Church of England Council on 
Inter-Church Relations, the Quakers, the British Legion, National Union of Students, 
National Union of Teachers, the Boy Scouts and – somewhat improbably – the Lawn 
Tennis Association.531 Meanwhile however, though the Section maintained links across a 
wide variety of groups, the vast majority of its attention during the ‘60s continued to be 
focused upon communism within the trade union movement. Again, the official approach 
in this area remained relatively unchanged and relied upon utilisation of private third-
party actors for the dissemination of counter-propaganda material. In particular, IRIS 
remained the most utilised non-governmental group. Despite leadership difficulties over 
1958/59 (a protracted squabble amongst the group’s executive board during this period 
had nearly resulted in the company’s dissolution)532, by 1960 the company had returned 
to a functioning state and was once more filling the role of chief outlet for IRD counter-
propaganda. Its advantages over rival groups were significant, as stated by the Foreign 
Office: 
‘There was general agreement that Industrial Research and Information Services (IRIS) was the most useful 
of the anti-Communist organisations, at least from the point of view of the Government. The others were 
either more or less overtly Conservative Party organisations, such as the Economic League, Common Cause 
and Aims of Industry, or religious institutions such as the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, the 
Industrial Welfare Association and Moral Rearmament. IRIS could usefully expand its activities, especially 
at the local level.’533 
The perceived usefulness of IRIS to the government – due to both influence within trade 
unionism as well as plausible deniability – was proven by Whitehall’s willingness to 
bankroll the company to ensure its ability to expand. Indeed, the AC (H) was willing to 
offer up to £6000 per annum to the company (roughly equivalent to £50’000 in 2016) 
such was the belief in its utility to wider counter-communist policy.534 This being said, 
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IRIS’s revered position was also almost certainly heavily influenced by the pedigree of its 
trustees and their closeness to the Conservative government. Sir Hartley Shawcross 
actively lobbied Harold Macmillan to invest more official funds via the Secret Vote,535 
whilst by 1964 the board of trustees also included Viscount Chandos, Lord Southborough 
(the 2nd), Sir Patrick Hennessy and Sir Christopher Steel.536  
Nevertheless, despite such nepotistic undertones, faith in the organisation was well placed 
insofar as it was effective in its intended role. IRIS allowed the government to effectively 
channel information into union politics in such a way as aroused neither undue suspicion 
and typically produced outcomes favourable to official policy. Meanwhile, the fact that 
official cooperation with the company continued well into the 1960s demonstrates that 
such utility was not merely temporary. For illustration of this, the case of elections held 
by the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) in early 1962 provides 
an excellent example. In the run-up to the elections (which held relevance for the 
government due to the USDAW’s status as fifth largest union at the time),537 through its 
routine monitoring of known British communists, the Security Service learned of the 
news that the communist backed candidate for the post of general secretary had been in 
recent contact with the World Federation of Trade Unions (the Soviet backed 
international trade organisation from which the Trades Union Congress had split in 1949 
– along with most other Western national level trade union groups – as a result of 
disagreements over the Marshall Plan. Recognised as a communist front, membership of 
the WFTU was proscribed by the Labour Party).538 This information was duly passed to 
IRD’s English Section, who in turn were able to pass a ‘sanitised’ version (omitting of 
course key details regarding the exact provenance of the information) to IRIS who then 
communicated the intelligence to anti-communist elements within the union, whilst 
simultaneously publishing the allegations in a generally released newsletter circulated 
immediately before the election – as a result ‘a resounding majority for the non-
Communist candidate was recorded.’539 The whole system worked as an effective 
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pipeline for intelligence, so that information uncovered by the Security Service via covert 
means could be effectively exploited to its maximum potential whilst ensuring that the 
sensitivity of the Service’s sources was not compromised and nor was the general public 
made aware of the scale and pervasiveness of the monitoring. Indirect interference in 
union elections was not a one-off affair. Similar interventions were made in a number of 
unions over the same period – including the Transport and General Workers Union, 
National Union of Mineworkers and Amalgamated Society of Painters and Decorators.540 
The system worked well and went a considerable way towards solving earlier problems 
which had troubled ministers under the Attlee and Churchill governments – namely the 
political impracticality of direct intervention in union affairs as well as official unease in 
tampering directly with the democratic process. By channelling intelligence through 
propaganda streams, Whitehall was able to both mitigate communist influence – 
communists could no longer rely upon disorganised electoral opposition – whilst 
reassuring ministers that the government’s hands were, in some sense, still clean.541 
It is curious to note however that IRIS continued to be such an effective outlet for official 
counter-propaganda for such a lengthy period of time. Since the company’s founding in 
1957, it had been subject to repeated attack within the communist press – particularly the 
Daily Worker – and did possess a reputation as a news source with heavy anti-communist 
bias. By 1962, the CPGB was attacking it directly: 
‘An indirect tribute to the effectiveness of anti-Communist propaganda in Britain was voiced by Mr Peter 
Kerrigan, the Party’s national industrial organised, in a speech at a Communist conference in Prague. His 
catalogue of anti-Communist organisations included the Labour Party, the Trades Union Congress, the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, IRIS, Common Cause, the Economic League and the 
British Press – but not Government Department was held responsible.’542 
Though the tone here is understandably self-congratulatory – undoubtedly it was one of 
the government’s most significant successes in its prosecution of anti-communist policy 
that IRD’s and the Security Service’s links to organisations such as IRIS never became 
publically known – it is interesting to note that official counter-subversion efforts do not 
appear to have been unduly hampered as a result of IRIS’ (and similar groups’) public 
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reputation as fundamentally anti-communist in outlook. Despite the fact that it was 
expected that IRIS would produce anti-communist material, this does not appear to have 
damaged its reputation more broadly – the communist movement itself was of course 
overwhelmingly hostile however the ‘middle ground’ of British trade unionism, those 
groups that ministers had despaired of as ‘overwhelmingly apathetic to communist gains’ 
appear to have regarded IRIS as a trustworthy and reliable source of information. The 
company’s obvious lack of impartiality did not hinder its effectiveness as a vehicle for the 
transmission of officially sourced, anti-communist counter-propaganda. Whitehall’s co-
option of private groups gave its counter-propaganda efforts an efficacy which had been 
previously lacking – particularly during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
 
 
Continued Necessity of a Robust Counter-Subversive Policy 
As such, with counter-propaganda efforts going well, British communism seemingly 
almost wholly politically irrelevant, and the CPGB’s industrial influence markedly 
diminished, attention began to be turned in late 1960 as to whether governmental counter-
subversive and anti-communist measures were still warranted in light of what appeared to 
be an improved situation. As recorded at the AC (H)’s meeting for the 24th October 1960: 
‘MR. MURRAY [IRD representative to the Committee] invited the Committee to consider the stage their 
work had now reached; as was reflected by the four papers prepared by the Foreign Office for the Agenda, a 
somewhat static situation now obtained as a result of their previous studies having been prosecuted to the 
fullest extent possible in present circumstances. He suggested, therefore, the time was opportune for 
bringing together all aspects of Communism in Britain in a comprehensive paper which might point to other 
areas worthy of attention and treatment.’543 
As Murray had stated, albeit in a slightly round-about fashion, those papers presented at 
both meetings of the AC (H) in 1960 had all indicated the satisfactory resolution of the 
various problems related to the British communist movement which Whitehall had 
recently been monitoring. It had been found that ‘there was good evidence that the 
Communist Party were seriously worried by the adverse publicity which had been given 
to their malpractices in the Electrical Trades Union’, whilst the Seventh Communist 
World Youth Festival held in Vienna in 1959 had passed without incident (remembering 
that the 5th Festival had been a public relations disaster as a result of clashes between 
British students and US troops stationed in Austria – the 6th Festival in 1957 had been 
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largely boycotted by Western communists over Hungary)544, largely as a result of the 
indifference shown to it by its Austrian hosts: 
‘There was evidence that the Communists were disappointed with the degree of success they had obtained; 
they had clearly hoped that attendance as a whole, and, consequently, the number of those who were 
favourably impressed would have been greater than they actually were. The attitude of the Austrians was 
undoubtedly one of the main reasons why this Festival’s impact had not been as great as its promotors [sic] 
had hoped.’545 
Amongst the other reports mentioned meanwhile was the MI5 investigation into 
communism in the BFI (previously discussed in the last chapter), whose results had ‘fully 
satisfied the Foreign Office, who had originally raised this matter’546 as a well as a brief 
paper concerning ‘The Communist Party of Great Britain and its Attitude Towards 
Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament’ which had concluded that ‘at present the general 
attitude of the leaders of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was disdainful towards 
the CPGB, whatever the difficulties might be in maintaining this attitude in the months 
ahead’.547 With many of the major issues which had preoccupied counter-subversive 
policy seemingly in hand, the time appeared right for a comprehensive analysis of the 
British communist movement which would incorporate all aspects of the phenomena and 
provide ministers with a complete picture of British communism’s intent and capabilities 
for the first time since essentially 1951.548 The Security Service were tasked with 
producing such a paper and duly delivered the circa 110 page document, based upon 
‘material drawn from every type of source, some of great secrecy and of great and 
continuing national value’549, to the Committee for their first meeting of 1961 at the 
beginning of May. Demonstrating that communism still continued to attract attention 
from the very highest levels of government, beyond the AC (H) the paper was also 
circulated to the Lord Privy Seal, Ministers of Labour and Defence, Foreign Secretary, 
Home Secretary as well as the Prime Minister himself.550 Contrary to what might have 
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been expected – given all evidence which had been produced up until this point – the 
Service’s conclusions were deeply troubled. As stated: 
‘Our broad conclusion is that during the last year the Communist threat has become more serious than at 
any time since the death of Stalin. It would be wrong to assess the CPGB’s chances of success at its own 
evaluation of them, but account must be taken of the opportunities presented to it by the present situation on 
the Left which are broader in scope than at any time since 1945. By exploiting its position in the trade 
unions, the Party hopes to exacerbate differences in the Labour Movement as to split it wide open and 
thereby facilitate its direct entry into the political arena. Even granted that the Party may exaggerate its 
abilities and the scope of its opportunities, the desirability of commensurate counter-measures is 
nevertheless clear enough. Normally in Britain public opinion can be relied upon to produce its own 
corrective to this sort of situation. In this case however, it is doubtful whether even informed public opinion 
is fully aware of what is happening, and it is in the sphere of publicity… that most needs to be done.’551 
Had MI5 not typically acted as the voice of moderation and caution within Whitehall 
since the first introduction of active counter-subversion measures in 1947, it would be 
easy to dismiss such a conclusion as reactionary nonsense brought on by bureaucratic 
inertia. Given however that the Security Service had typically advocated for moderation 
in anti-communist measures, and given the fact that (as previously discussed) the Security 
Service had by this point built up a comprehensive, relatively complete and well 
understood picture of British communism, the fears expressed are worthy of deeper 
analysis.  
 
Much of the Service’s angst can be traced back to the relative weakness of the Labour 
Party in 1961, which was still struggling to come to terms with the political blow it had 
been dealt at the 1959 General Election. Despite widespread popular discontent with 
Conservative governance following 1956’s Suez crisis,552 by 1959 an improved economy 
had granted Macmillan the political capital needed to be able to increase the overall Tory 
majority by 20 seats – to a total of 107 seats overall - over his Labour rivals, the third 
such consecutive increase in as many elections.553 The scale of the defeat significantly 
damaged Labour Party membership’s faith in its leadership – as well as the leadership’s 
faith in itself – opening a schism within the Party regarding its political direction, as well 
as granting communists their first chance at legitimisation via the vehicle of Labour since 
the CPGB’s last attempt at affiliation in 1946. As stated within MI5’s report: 
‘1959 was also to provide the Party with opportunities for a more direct intervention in Labour Party affairs. 
The inquest held by the Labour Party on the results of the 1959 General Election brought the Clause 4 issue 
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into prominence and the Communist leadership sensed a split in the Labour movement… By mid-summer 
of 1960 the Party was convinced that it had in its grasp a real opportunity to assume the classic Communist 
role of vanguard of the proletariat, or at least of the large section of the left which is unilateralist. This 
opportunity came largely from its penetration of the trade unions, and in particular of the National 
Committee of the AEU, which enabled the Party, at a time of serious dissension in the Labour Party, to 
influence policy at the annual TUC and Labour Party conferences on both the issue of Clause 4 and of 
unilateralism… 1959 and 1960 thus saw a radical change in the opportunities open to the CPGB… In 
moments of exaggerated self-confidence, it even sees the possibility of dismantling both the British nuclear 
deterrent and the right wing leadership of the Labour Party.’554 
The situation was demonstrative of two facts – firstly just how continuously important the 
Labour Party was to wider cross-party anti-communist policy. In its role as the political 
representative of the moderate left, the existence of the Labour Party had provided a 
viable outlet for the British left to compete for and exercise power within the system of 
parliamentary democracy. Moreover, its refusal to grant affiliation to the CPGB had 
denied the British communist movement the political legitimacy it so craved and ensured 
that its popularity was constrained to a relatively small minority of the British 
population.555 Loss of belief by the Labour Party in trans-atlanticism coupled with a 
growing unilateralist sentiment amongst the Party’s rank and file held the potential to 
open the door to communist affiliation and theoretically grant the movement greater 
political influence than it had ever previously enjoyed. Secondly, that communist 
determination to exploit dissension within Labour ranks at the cost of all other matters 
demonstrated that British communism was ultimately far more interested in the 
acquisition of political legitimacy than it was in fifth-column-esque covert espionage and 
subversion. The extent of the CPGB’s determination to exploit Labour’s crisis was stated 
openly in its Political Resolution for the 27th Party Congress, held in London in 1961: 
‘The present developments in the Labour Party are the vindication of the outlook of the Communist Party… 
Now a point has been reached when the progressive forces of trade unionism, alongside the fighters for 
socialism in the Constituency Parties, have made possible the reversal of the old automatic right-wing 
majority and the winning of left-wing majorities… The strengthening and increased political consciousness 
of the progressive alliance engaged in this struggle, can and must lead to the final elimination of right-wing 
capitalist influence in the Labour Party, and the victory of a united Labour movement in which the 
Communist Party as the political class party of the working-class struggle for power and socialism will 
fulfil its role in comradeship and partnership with all the advancing sections of the organised working 
class.’556  
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The CPGB were determined to advance the cause of British communism via the vehicle 
of the Labour Party, even at the expense of Moscow-approved doctrine. The Party’s 
position on unilateralism in particular saw a total reversal – from staunchly against to 
openly advocatory – in early 1959 as CPGB leadership began to recognise that the 
burgeoning nuclear disarmament movement offered a pathway back from the electoral 
irrelevancy which had befallen the Party since its rout at the 1950 General Election.557 
Disagreements within the Labour Party on nuclear policy as well as the continued 
relevance of Clause 4 of the 1918 Labour constitution (which laid out the Party’s 
commitment to nationalisation of industry and ‘common ownership of the means of 
production’)558 seemed to the CPGB to offer an opportunity to find common ground with 
the pacifist, unilateralist and anti-American elements on the left of the Labour Party.559 
Theoretically, potential existed for the CPGB to instigate the creation of a hard-left voting 
bloc at the Party conference which could challenge Labour leadership and facilitate the 
entry of the CPGB into the Labour Party.560 In particular, the success of the inaugural 
CND organised Aldermaston march in April 1959 helped to convince CPGB leadership 
of the wisdom of adopting a unilateralist line – in direct contrast to the Soviet Union’s 
multilateralist policy.561 The march, which consisted of a 52 mile procession between the 
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment located at Aldermaston in Berkshire and 
London’s Trafalgar Square, had attracted some 15’000 participants in its 1959 incarnation 
– demonstrating that CND had a relatively broad base of popular support which cut across 
traditional political divisions.562 Though the leadership of CND was not explicitly 
communist,563 the group’s demonstrated ability to garner mass support rendered it a target 
for communist penetration. As such, immediately following the 1959 march the CPGB 
suddenly switched policy from one of opposition to CND to support and penetration – 
targeting local level CND committees and the ‘ground-level’ infrastructure of the 
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group.564 Though this tactic produced only limited direct success for the CPGB – CND 
leadership remained devoid of communist representation – this switch in support did have 
the knock-on effect of bolstering the political clout of the anti-nuclear movement within 
both the trade union establishment and also the Labour Party itself (by proxy via the 
CPGB’s lingering influence on certain unions).565 During the mid-summer of 1960, 
unilateralist resolutions were passed at both the annual TUC and Labour Party 
conferences due to the direct support of communist-backed voting blocs.566 For the first 
time in decades the CPGB appeared to have the potential to represent the vanguard of the 
British left. 
Beyond the Security Service and Conservative government, the CPGB’s foray into 
unilateralism and renewed assault on Labour, also worried many within the upper 
echelons of the Labour Party itself. Indeed, as has been previously argued by Andrew, the 
early 1960s marked the period in which Labour leadership was more worried about 
communist subversion within their own party than at any point since the expulsion of the 
‘Lost Sheep’ MPs in the latter 1940s.567 By 1961, Hugh Gaitskell – in agreement with 
Deputy Leader George Brown and Shadow Home Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker – had 
become sufficiently concerned about the issue to directly seek help from the Security 
Service in identifying communists within his party.568 With a decade out of power having 
left Labour hopelessly out of the loop of government security, the MPs were forced to 
first approach the sensationalist journalist Chapman Pincher for instructions on how to 
contact the Service (Gaitskell was loathe to go through official ministerial channels for 
fear of gifting electoral ammunition to his Conservative rivals).569 Following a letter to 
Roger Hollis from Gordon Walker, a meeting was arranged between the Shadow Home 
Secretary and Graham Mitchell (then Deputy Director General) for the 5th September. 
With Gordon Walker furnishing a list of sixteen Labour MPs whom were believed to be 
secret Communist Party members, Mitchell recorded the meetings as follows: 
                                                          
564 ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, Note by the FO to the AC (H), 27th April 1961, TNA, CAB 
134/1346 
565 The ETU in particular, also the AEU. 
566 Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Conference: A Study in the Politics of Intra-Party Democracy, (Allen 
Lane, London, 1978), p. 112 
567 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, (Allen Lane, London, 2009), pp. 412-415,  
568 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 412 
569 A decision Brown & Walker would later come to regret. Pincher, perhaps inevitably, published the full 
details of their meeting in the Daily Express 7 years later. Gaitskell was, of course, past caring. Chapman 
Pincher, ‘A Communist Spy in the Labour Machine’, Daily Express, 28th June 1968 
158 
 
‘The Labour leaders were aware that there were quite a lot of Communists within their ranks in the House 
but they had in mind to expel only about 6 or 8. When it came to taking this action they would take it 
openly, expelling the Members as being Communists. They hoped that if they made these examples “the 
others would be very careful”… Gordon Walker may have gathered from my expression that his project 
was not meeting with much enthusiasm. He said that Labour leaders were very ready for us to say “no” and 
indeed half expected it. They would fully understand if the DG found that he could not comply with their 
request [for information regarding communist penetration of the Parliamentary Labour Party]. In that event 
Gordon Walker would volunteer a one-way traffic, through safe channels, from him in person to any 
member of the Security Service whom we cared to nominate.’570 
Overtly, this offer was too rejected – Mitchell stating that ‘it was incumbent on the 
Security Service to be very careful to do nothing which could be represented as partaking 
of a party political nature’.571 The Service did however quietly investigate ten names on 
Walker’s list without informing PLP leadership.572 Ironically, the name at the top of the 
list - Will Owen, Labour MP for Morpeth – was at the time dismissed by the Service as 
being of little interest. It was only following investigation nine years later that it was 
discovered that Owen was an agent of Czechoslovakian intelligence.573 The implied 
distrust here perhaps a consequence of Labour’s decade out of power – whereas, as 
previously discussed, the Service had had a very close working relationship with the Party 
during the Attlee years (Attlee remained on the circulation list for IRD’s information 
briefings up until his retirement from Party leadership in November 1955)574 – the 
Service by 1961 had no direct line of contact with the PLP. Meanwhile, George Brown’s 
reputation for regular bouts of being ‘tired and emotional’ seems unlikely to have inspired 
Service confidence in Labour leadership.575 MI5 therefore had no trusted contacts within 
the Party as it had done during the Attlee government. Though the Security Service was 
happy to indirectly provide information to the Labour Party in the form of the 
‘unattributable paper’ series circulated by IRD’s English Section,576 the close working 
                                                          
570 Note by Graham Mitchell recalling meeting with Gordon Walker, 5th September 1961, op cit. Andrew, 
Defence of the Realm, p. 413 
571 Ibid. 
572 See Appendix 
573 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 413. Owen was joined in this endeavour by Conservative MP Ray 
Mawby, who provided Czech intelligence with political gossip & a hand drawn map of the PM’s office in 
the House of Commons. Unlike Owen, there is no indication that the Security Service were aware of 
Mawby’s activities. See Gordon Corera’s BBC report ‘Tory MP Raymond Mawby sold information to 
Czech spies’, 28th June 2012, accessed via: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18617168 
574 ‘Progress Report on the Work of the English Section of the IRD of the FO’, Memorandum by the FO, 
15th March 1954, TNA, CAB 134/740. Though explicit mention is not made after this report, it seems 
reasonable to presume that Gaitskell was kept similarly informed. 
575 Brown’s drinking was notorious throughout both the government and press. See Private Eye, Issue. 232, 
5th November 1970 for the origins of the phrase ‘tired and emotional’. 
576 ‘Progress Report on the Work of the English Section of Information Research Department’, Report by 
the FO to the AC (H), 27th April 1960, TNA, CAB 134/1346 
 159 
 
relationship which had defined the Attlee years had almost entirely vanished by the latter 
years of Conservative hegemony. 
Therefore, for a brief time the CPGB regained its status as a credible threat to Britain’s 
established political order. Concerns proved to be short-lived however, with the perceived 
threat diminishing markedly by late 1961 as once again CPGB mismanagement (as 
opposed to direct governmental counter-subversion measures) undermined the 
movement’s long-term designs. Much of MI5’s concern had been predicated on the worry 
that communist infiltration of the CND would lead to the steady growth of an anti-
leadership voting bloc within the Labour Party – which in turn could then be used to 
cement the PLP’s committal to unilateralism and given time unseat Labour leadership in 
favour of candidates more in line with communist mores.577 The outcome of Labour’s 
1961 conference held at Blackpool in November demonstrated that such concerns were 
ultimately invalid as the CPGB’s ability to affect the wider British left quickly dissipated 
over the months leading up to the conference. In particular, failure by the communist 
wing within the Amalgamated Engineering Union to convince the wider leadership of the 
merits of unilateralism over preserving unity within the Labour movement lead to the 
reversal of that union’s previously pro-unilateralist position at its annual conference in 
late April 1961 by a margin of twenty eight to twenty three.578 Due to the AEU being an 
influential union in its own right, plus the fact that its conference occurred towards the 
beginning of the unionist conference ‘season’ the precedent was set for within trade 
unionism more widely to favour anti-unilateralist resolutions. Thus meaning that by the 
time of Labour’s conference the general trend amongst the unions had comprehensively 
reversed to a position of anti-unilateralism. The CPGB was left in a still more awkward 
position by the increase in public attention given to the anti-nuclear Committee of 100 
group, founded in 1960 by Bertrand Russell and the American peace activist Ralph 
Schoenman. As reported by MI5: 
‘To make things worse for the Communist Party, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which it had 
sedulously courted and penetrated, was outclassed in publicity and nuisance value by the Committee of 100, 
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in which it has little influence and which promptly picketed the Soviet Embassy when the Russians, to the 
CPGB’s annoyance, resumed the testing of nuclear weapons.’579 
The two blocs, trade unionists and CND activists, the CPGB had banked upon to be able 
to pressure Labour into the formal adoption of a unilateralist stance – which would 
thereby undermine the authority of the current PLP leadership – had thus either switched 
back to anti-unilateralist positions, as in the unions, or had seen their influence whittled 
away by the rise of rival and more publically captivating groups by the time of the 
conference. As such the second leadership challenge in as many years at the 1961 Labour 
Party conference ended in a resounding victory for the PLP establishment – with Hugh 
Gaitskell garnering some 75% of the overall vote to Anthony Greenwood’s 25% - thus 
ending any further talk of intra-party regicide (though the conference the following year 
would of course see another leadership contest following the unexpected death of 
Gaitskell in January 1963, an event which resulted in the accession of Harold Wilson to 
the leadership)580 and demonstrating to both CPGB and Security Service alike that any 
possibility of British communism entering the fold of mainstream Labour was now almost 
impossibly distant.581 The brief and unexpected window of political opportunity that 
British communism enjoyed between the summers of 1960 and 61 closed as suddenly as 
it had opened. Though the opportunities for exploitation of the Labour Party were never 
as great as hoped for by CPGB leadership – as was acknowledged within the MI5 report 
‘it would be wrong to assess the CPGB’s chances of success at its own evaluation of 
them’582 – the fact that for a moment significant communist gains within the mainstream 
left seemed at least theoretically plausible was enough to give the government pause and 
remind policy-makers that British communism was not yet a totally spent threat. Counter-
subversive policy relied to large extent on the existence of a robust, moderate left – as the 
CPGB’s marginal gains at the 1960 Labour Party conference served to demonstrate. 
Limited Options 
                                                          
579 ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, Memorandum by the Security Service, 24th November 1961, 
TNA, CAB 134/1346 
580 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, (HarperCollins, London, 1992), pp. 255-261 
581 There were no further attempts by the CPGB to affiliate with the Labour Party, Chronology of Labour 
Party/CPGB relations, Longman Companion to the Labour Party, ebook edition, accessed via: 
http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/pearsonlabour/chronology_of_labour_and_communism/0?id
=9794223 
582 Conclusion to Security Service report ‘Communism in the United Kingdom and Counter-measures’, 
March 1961, TNA, CAB 134/1346, p. 15 
 161 
 
Even brief resurgences of relative communist influence - such as the period between the 
1960 and ’61 Labour Party conferences - tended to produce intense worry on the part of 
the government for the simple reason that still, even some thirteen years after significant 
counter-subversive reform measures began to be introduced under Attlee the extent of 
available official counter-measures to communism remained remarkably limited. The 
continued status of the Communist Party as a legal political organisation necessarily 
limited the actions which could be taken against it, whilst the privileged legal and 
political position of the trade unions again made official counter-communist action there a 
complicated matter.583 There was however little appetite to change this by the early ‘60s 
(although equally formal prohibition of the CPGB had never seriously been considered at 
any point previously either) and the general arrangement of political and legal 
considerations with regards to communism were by now regarded as essentially 
immutable by the British security state. As stated by MI5: 
‘Whether to go the whole way and ban a Communist Party or, as the Americans say, to “harass” it to the 
extent that it virtually becomes illegal, is essentially a political decision to be taken a government in the 
light of the traditions, constitution, security situation and public opinion of the country concerned. Mention 
has already been made of the fact that in a stable and prosperous democracy like the UK tolerance of the 
Communist Party produces in some degree a check to its more extreme activities in the short run. This is 
not, however, the basic reason why the CPGB is allowed to exist. Rather it is a consequence of British 
traditions. The United States is also a stable and prosperous democracy but it has taken measures against its 
Communist Party which have driven it underground. The pros and cons of taking such drastic action can be 
argued, but… it is realistic to assume that the present position will be maintained whereby the CPGB is 
allowed to function as a legal political party and that direct government action against Communists will not 
in normal times go beyond the 1948 policy of denying them employment in work the nature of which is 
vital to the security of the state.’584 
With direct action essentially politically and legally impossible, government response 
continued to be limited to indirect measures and the exploitation of counter-propaganda. 
As has previously been discussed, such an approach had both advantages and drawbacks 
– clandestine, government-backed anti-communist propaganda had helped to inculcate a 
hostile attitude towards the communist movement with the national press as well as 
slowly wear away at the political apathy within the unions over the long term even if in 
the short term the government relied upon communist ineptitude more than proactive 
measures. The fact was that there were ‘relatively few chinks in the Party’s armour which 
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could be widened without changing the law’585 – the government relied upon the strategy 
of encouraging an anti-communist climate within the wider British public and hoping that 
the exposure of communist malpractice would lead naturally to the eventual collapse of 
any popular goodwill or apathy that British communism may have hoped to exploit. This 
being said, continued governmental tolerance of the communist movement did have the 
unlikely side-effect of helping to ensure that it was actually in the CPGB’s best interests 
to restrict itself to legitimate and open activities as much as possible. As the CPGB 
believed its best hope for formenting a revolution of the proletariat was through the 
exploitation of pre-existing British political structures, it was in the paramount interest of 
the Party to maintain and preserve its constitutional status as a legal political party.586 
Ergo, the Security Service was able to comfort itself in the knowledge that the Party was:  
‘Not prepared to engage in espionage and has no espionage apparatus. It does not agree to card-holding 
Party members spying and it is indeed a blunder of the first magnitude for a Party member to be caught out 
as a spy.’587 
This in itself was a marked change from the Party’s pre-1945 behaviour. Elements of the 
CPGB had definitely dabbled in espionage both before and during the Second World 
War. Arguably, the most notable example of this was Douglas ‘Dave’ Springhall’s 
passage of SOE information to the Soviet Union in 1943 whilst employed as the CPGB’s 
national organiser.588 As a result of the backlash against the case the Party had begun to 
insist that whilst it would not deny a communist – whether Party official or rank and file 
member – the right to take a personal decision and spy for the Soviet Union, such 
individuals should sever all connections with the Party and resign their membership 
before engaging in such activities. It was equally understood meanwhile that the Party 
had no sabotage apparatus, even if certain members of the Party did possess knowledge of 
explosives handling and could perhaps carry out sabotage on their own initiative.589 These 
understandings meant that the official understanding of the communist threat had almost 
entirely shifted from initial estimates carried out in the 1940s following the Gouzenko 
revelations. Whereas in the late ‘40s communist subversive groups had been understood 
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predominantly as facilitators of Soviet espionage – granting Soviet intelligence a 
recruiting pool from which to select individuals with the correct temperament, ideological 
loyalty and access to sensitive information – by the early ‘60s Whitehall officials 
understood that the ultimate aims of British communism were political in nature and 
directed at garnering influence within wider left-wing institutions with the intent of 
gaining power. As stated by the Security Service: 
‘The programme of the CPGB for obtaining power is essentially political and not industrial or subversive in 
the narrow sense of underground, conspiratorial, “bloody-revolutionary” activity. During the 1950s, 
however it got nowhere through purely political and parliamentary means because it was politically 
hamstrung by the Labour Party’s ban on known Communists in its ranks… The object of its penetration of 
the unions, however, remained essentially political. As Peter Kerrigan, the Party’s Industrial Organiser, 
wrote in ‘World News’ (November 26th 1960), “We have always said that the way to change the policy and 
leadership of the Labour Party is through the trade unions.” The CPGB has accordingly placed all its 
emphasis on the Labour Movement as a whole as opposed to the Labour Party in particular, and aims to 
control the latter through the former by a skilful use of its penetration of the trade unions.’590 
With official understanding by 1961 being that the threat to British security emanating 
from the CPGB was ultimately political rather than security-based in nature, the need for 
direct counter-measures was lessened and a reliance upon counter-propaganda tolerated. 
Although the CPGB was a ‘fundamentally revolutionary party’ which was ‘thoroughly 
disloyal and with not more than tactical respect for existing law and order’ its continued 
desire to remain a legal and acceptable party meant that its threat and ambitions could be 
effectively managed via indirect means. The Party was engaged in an attack ‘offensive 
and defensive, open and concealed’591 however the fact that its political strategy as of the 
late 1960s meant that it could not afford to be caught breaking the law gave Whitehall a 
degree of leeway in how best to counter CPGB machinations.  
 
 
 
Judicial options for countering subversion 
This was, in many ways a considerable blessing for the government. Indeed, when 
reviewing the period it is remarkable to witness just how slight legal provisions were for 
dealing with not only subversive activity, but also outright espionage. Though, as 
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previously discussed, this problem had received considerable examination by both the 
Attlee and Churchill governments, by the early 1960s the Macmillan administration was 
still no closer to an acceptable solution. The fundamental problem of formulating an exact 
legal definition of ‘subversion’ and ‘subversive’ remained intractable. As such, the ability 
of successive governments to secure successful prosecution of subversives was ultimately 
fairly limited. Conviction for subversive activities was essentially dependent upon 
successful prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, whilst evidence to secure such 
would often be either undesirable to admit in open court or indeed outright inadmissible. 
Such a fact is demonstrated well by an examination of the more concrete issue of 
espionage. As a succession of cases during the early 1960s proved, the government 
struggled even to secure successful prosecution for espionage – thereby indicating that it 
would be nigh on impossible for the State to predicate a case on the considerably more 
nebulous grounds of ‘subversive activity’. This problem had been brought to the fore 
during 1958/59, when the return of Guy Burgess to the United Kingdom (in order to tend 
to his sick and elderly mother)592 seemed a very real possibility. The news provoked 
consternation at the very highest levels of government – prompting a full Cabinet meeting 
on the matter in February 1959. Official options were less than satisfactory: 
‘We have reviewed the evidence against Burgess and are satisfied that it is quite insufficient to sustain a 
prosecution under Section I [penalties for espionage]593 of the Official Secrets Acts. Nor does it seem likely 
that any further evidence will be found. We cannot hope to obtain legal proof that Burgess has committed 
any treasonable act while in the Soviet Union or any seditious act here. Evidence does exist that he has 
committed technical breaches of Section II [wrongful communication of information] of the Official Secrets 
Acts, insofar as he has improperly retained official classified documents in his possession. But these 
documents are of little significance and the Attorney-General would not be willing to proceed on such a 
minor charge. It will therefore be impossible to dissuade Burgess from trying to return to this country by 
confronting him with evidence on which he might be prosecuted. Indeed if he knew how little evidence we 
had, he would be more likely to be encouraged than deterred. This applies also to a possible prosecution for 
homosexuality’594 
Even when confronted by one of the most severe cases of espionage to trouble British 
security in the post-war era, Whitehall still could not secure prosecution. If the British 
government could not guarantee the successful prosecution of a major foreign agent such 
as Burgess, it held little hope of utilising the same legislation as an effective counter to 
the comparatively slighter issue subversive activity. Individuals had to be caught 
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essentially red-handed in order for conviction to be obtained – as in the case of the 
Portland spies – an episode whereby the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment 
based at Portland was discovered, by way of a tip-off passed to American intelligence, to 
have been penetrated by a Soviet spy ring.595 The group, which consisted of a disaffected 
former Naval master-at-arms (Harry Houghton), his lover, as well as three Soviet 
‘illegals’ (i.e. – Soviet nationals acting as espionage agents without diplomatic cover) had 
been passing considerable amounts of data concerning British naval research and 
development efforts to Soviet intelligence since the early 1950s. On their arrest in January 
1961, members of the group were found to have in their immediate possession large 
quantities of classified film and photography related to HMS Dreadnought (the Royal 
Navy’s first nuclear submarine)596 as well as the technical specifications for naval engine 
components.597 Meanwhile, arresting Special Branch officers (member of the Security 
Service, of course, having no powers of arrest) discovered cryptographic broadcasting 
equipment once certain members of the group’s homes were raided.598 With such 
overwhelming evidence to hand, the government could achieve successful prosecution in 
a relatively straightforward manner – in the case of the Portland ring sentences between 
fifteen and twenty years were handed down at Bow Street Magistrates Court in March 
1961.599 To obtain successful prosecution under the Official Secrets Act the government 
had either to obtain confession from the perpetrator(s) or otherwise catch them in the act 
of misappropriating or conveying sensitive material to hostile third parties.600 
The succession of espionage scandals which followed the Portland Case – and were in 
part eventually to force the resignation of Harold Macmillan in October 1963 – showed 
the dangers inherent to overzealous application of the Official Secrets Act(s) however. 
The prosecution of George Blake in May 1961 was a particular case in point. Blake had 
served as an intelligence officer with SIS since the Second World War – initially on 
secondment from the Royal Navy and from 1947 as a permanent employee – helping to 
build up the Dutch intelligence network during the War before moving to Hamburg at the 
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conflict’s end, where he was entrusted with developing intelligence networks in East 
Germany.601 At the end of 1947, Blake was posted to South Korea as Vice-Consul to the 
British delegation – his brief being to recruit agents in the north-eastern provinces of 
China and eastern regions of the USSR.602 Following the outbreak of war in June 1950 
and subsequent invasion of the South by North Vietnamese troops, Blake and the rest of 
the British legation were taken into custody – leading Blake to spend the next three years 
in North Vietnamese custody. During his time imprisoned in a North Vietnamese 
internment camp, Blake was converted to communism.603 Following release in spring 
1953, Blake subsequently met with KGB officers stationed in London and agreed to begin 
spying for the USSR. From October 1953, until his eventual discovery by British 
intelligence in 1961 as a result of the revelations of Polish defector Michael Goleniewski 
(a former Polish intelligence officer who had defected to the United States in the January 
of that year), Blake worked to systematically undermine ever British intelligence program 
to which he had access. Most notably, Blake passed to Soviet intelligence full details 
regarding the names and identities of numerous British agents (estimates vary) working 
behind the Iron Curtain as well as the details of the joint US/UK operation to tunnel into 
East Berlin and tap into the telephone lines of Soviet Army Headquarters.604  
The discovery of Blake’s treachery was thus understandably embarrassing for the 
government particularly given ongoing efforts at the time to cultivate good relations with 
the newly elected Kennedy administration in the United States.605 As such, the decision 
was made to set an example in the court-room. The unorthodox decision was taken to 
split his period as a double-agent into five separate periods – each able to be individually 
tried and sentenced under provision one of the Official Secrets Act. Addressing the judge 
for only eight minutes, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller QC (whose daughter, Eliza 
Manningham-Buller would go on to serve as Director General of MI5 in the early part of 
the 21st century) asserted that due to Blake’s access to ‘information of very great 
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importance’ it was the Crown’s case that he had inflicted ‘most serious damage to the 
interests of this country’.606 Blake had already admitted his guilt following his arrest in 
April 1961, making acquittal impossible – the defending barrister Jeremy Hutchinson QC 
(who also defended John Vassal, the Committee of 100 & Christine Keeler, amongst 
others)607 made the best out of a bad situation and argued in mitigation that Blake’s 
conversion to communism had occurred whilst under severe duress, that as an immigrant 
he could not be held to the same standards of loyalty as an ‘ordinary Englishman’608 and 
that he never intended the information he passed on to the USSR to cause direct harm to 
the United Kingdom – only to frustrate Western offensive espionage efforts.609 Such 
arguments, perhaps predictably, were not enough to sway the presiding judge – Lord 
Chief Justice Parker (already possessed of something of a severe reputation following his 
imprisonment of Brendan Mulholland of the Daily Mail and Reginald Foster of the Daily 
Sketch for refusing to reveal sources during the Vassal tribunal)610 – who proceeded to 
hand down a sentence of 14 years (the highest penalty available under the Official Secrets 
Act) for each count of espionage, thereby amounting to a total sentence of forty-two years 
imprisonment (certain sentences were instructed to be served concurrently with each 
other).611  
Though Blake was undoubtedly deserving of punishment – his actions had fundamentally 
undermined British espionage activity in East Germany, the Stasi judged that ‘Blake’s 
work substantially laid the foundations for the liquidation of British secret service agents 
in the GDR’,612 and had cost hundreds of individuals both their freedom and in many 
cases their lives – by enacting such a severe punishment (Blake’s was the longest 
sentence to be handed down by a British court until the conviction of Nezar Hindawi for 
the attempted bombing of a Israeli passenger jet in 1986)613 Lord Justice Parker 
essentially altered the nature of the trial from being a criminal proceeding to being a 
matter of politics. Even the Prime Minister judged that the Parker had meted out a ‘rather 
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savage sentence’,614 Sir Dick White (now head of SIS) expressed shock at the sentence,615 
whilst Hutchinson argued in the subsequent appeal (which was denied) that such a 
sentence was ‘so inhumane that it was alien to all the principles on which a civilized 
country would treat its subjects’616 and faced with such a sentence a man had only the 
option to ‘lose his sanity or gain his freedom’.617 Such words would prove oddly 
prophetic as Blake duly escaped from Wormwood Scrubs prison on the night of the 22nd 
October 1966. Blake himself would later attribute much of the success of his escape to the 
severity of the sentence imposed upon him: 
‘The sentence was such that it was almost a question of honour to challenge it. Moreover I looked upon 
myself as a political prisoner and as such, like a POW, had a duty to escape… It is to this long sentence that 
I owe my freedom. It secured me the sympathy not only of many of my fellow inmates, but also of the 
prison staff. It made me determined to attempt to break out of prison, as I truly could say that I had nothing 
to lose but my chains… Had I been given fourteen years… it would have excited much less interest and 
sympathy in others. And very likely, I would have served my sentence to the end.’618 
Though, where legally feasible, the judicial hammer may have been a satisfying option 
for the government to turn to in the short-term – reassuring ministers, as well as allies, 
that Britain was tough on espionage (J Edgar Hoover was particularly approving of the 
sentence, telling MI5’s Liaison Officer in Washington that ‘The British have guts!’)619 –
over-zealous application of judicial measures was ultimately detrimental to Whitehall’s 
position. Meanwhile, of course, the prosecution of subversives and other agents of 
espionage always bore the side-effect of exposing the government to criticism that it was 
doing less than it should to ensure British security. Macmillan’s oft-quoted outburst 
following the news that John Vassall had been caught spying for the USSR illustrates this 
point nicely: 
‘No, I’m not at all pleased. When my gamekeeper shoots a fox, he doesn’t go and hang it up outside the 
Master of Foxhounds’ drawing room; he buries it out of sight. But you can’t just shoot a spy as you did in 
the war. You have to try him… better to discover him, and then control him, but never catch him… There 
will be a terrible row in the press, there will be a debate in the House of Commons and the government will 
probably fall. Why the devil did you ‘catch’ him?’620 
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Out and out spy trials had the tendency to attract only negative publicity for the 
government. Indeed, it could be argued that the successive espionage scandals which 
enveloped Macmillan’s government did far more to undermine its authority than 
communists – or indeed any other subversive group – could possibly have dreamed of. 
Somewhat ironically meanwhile, the Profumo affair, the case which in the view of 
Macmillan’s private secretary John Wyndham ‘did more harm than anything else in the 
whole of his administration’621 had in reality no real implications for national security. 
Minister of War John ‘Jack’ Profumo’s brief affair with showgirl Christine Keeler in 
1961 arguably did more to damage the standing of the Conservative government than any 
other scandal during Macmillan’s administration. Once the story broke in 1963, a 
substantial proportion of press and Labour opposition outrage was predicated on Keeler’s 
ties to Yevgeny Ivanov, the Soviet naval attaché, who was alleged to have been engaged 
in a sexual relationship with Keeler during the same period as Profumo’s liaison.622 MI5’s 
investigation of the matter concluded however that it was highly unlikely that Keeler 
could have passed on any particularly sensitive information to Ivanov: ‘Although 
undoubtedly attractive, Keeler was vacuous and untruthful. Ivanov had no need to sleep 
with her to discover that’.623 A similar conclusion was reached by US officials, who 
regarded the affair as a matter of public hysteria rather than genuine security scandal. As 
communicated by the US embassy in London to Kennedy’s National Security Adviser 
McGeorge Bundy: 
 ‘The enclosure (the report included a copy of News of the World’s initial expose of the affair, complete 
with famous photograph of Keeler posing nude in a strategically positioned chair) shows to what depths 
British journalism has sunk over the Profumo affair… There is an 18th Century ring about the dog collar 
and chain.’624   
There is a deep irony to the fact that the case which, due the tremendous publicity which 
surrounded it, arguably most shaped public perceptions of subversion had in actuality 
almost no security dimension whatsoever. As a result of successive espionage scandals, 
both real and imagined, the Macmillan government found itself politically crippled by 
1963, with the Prime Minister himself stepping down in the October of that year. A US 
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Presidential briefing provided to John F. Kennedy that same year regarding the state of 
British politics summates the situation rather well: 
‘The Conservative government is in a sad state… it has run down dreadfully. Its solid achievements are 
largely forgotten. People are bored with it and fed up with it. They feel as if it has been in office forever… 
Today that government can do nothing right. It seems hopelessly accident prone. It is detested by most of 
the press. It is derided on radio and television. Comedians make savage jokes about it. It sinks steadily in 
the public opinion polls under the weight of old age, unemployment, Soviet espionage, the Common Market 
failure, Skybolt625 and personal scandal. It reeks of decay; and the press and the opposition, sensing a rout, 
are moving in for the kill.’626 
The public exposure of espionage cases often had the tendency to result in embarrassment 
and humiliation for the Macmillan government, a factor which helped contribute to the 
administration’s destabilisation by late 1963. Therefore it follows that, where possible, it 
was far better for all official action to remain covert and utilise the assistance of non-
official third parties to secure favourable anti-communist results. Overt action was fraught 
with peril and tended to be accompanied by heavy political cost. The Electrical Trades 
Union case was in large part so successful in undermining communist support due to its 
status as a civil case brought by private individuals against their employer – the wider 
public had little idea of the extent to which Whitehall had carefully funnelled information 
and directed press attention so as to ensure that the case received both a favourable 
outcome as well as considerable media attention. With all of this in mind, it is easy to see 
why both MI5 and the AC (H) continued to favour covert surveillance of communist 
subversives coupled with counter-propaganda as the bedrock of counter-subversion 
policy. Direct counter-measures attempted via the British legal system would likely have 
resulted only in either failed prosecution for lack of acceptable evidence, or would have 
carried so great a political cost as to outweigh any potential good which could have been 
gained from the disruption of the communist movement. As demonstrated, the options 
provided by legislative measures were inflexible at best and potentially counter-
productive at worst. As such, deniable anti-communist propaganda remained the 
government’s best tool in its struggle against the British communist movement. Judicial 
measures were typically likely to fail against subversive threats, whilst if successful 
prosecution was, by some outside chance, obtained the overall result would almost 
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certainly be detrimental to the government’s position – engendering public sympathy for 
communists, rather than dissuading further subversive activity. 
 
 
 
Espionage, and Readiness for War 
Such cases are also indicative of a secondary trend – over the early 1960s it became 
increasingly apparent that the vast majority of espionage threats to the security of the 
United Kingdom did not originate from the domestic communist movement. George 
Blake’s conversion to communism had occurred whilst incarcerated in North Korea – far 
from the, by comparison strikingly genteel surrounds, of CPGB headquarters on 
London’s King Street.627 Vassal’s betrayal meanwhile was a product not of ideological 
devotion, but rather Soviet intelligence’s exploitation of the civil servant’s homosexuality 
in a classic ‘honey trap’ scenario.628 Kim Philby – whose dramatic flight from Beirut in 
January 1963 finally proved irrefutably his employ as a Soviet agent – was perhaps the 
exception. His treachery had been initially facilitated by the British communist 
movement, whilst much of his initial exposure and conversion to Soviet-communism had 
been a result of subversive groups. The subversive element of his case was however 
ultimately historical and the relatively favourable climate for British communists of the 
1930s certainly did not exist in Britain by the early years of the 1960s. Meanwhile, 
political circumstances in Britain were indicative of a broadening subversive threat more 
disparate in nature than British communism had been since it had assumed its position of 
central concern to ministers in the late 1940s. In many ways, the stability of the State over 
the period from 1960-1964 appeared to Whitehall to be on the whole be threatened more 
by the unilateralist movement, and indeed the actions of the government’s own ministers, 
than by the domestic communism. The tactics of the Committee of 100,629 focused as they 
were upon direct action as opposed to CND’s strategy of non-violent protest, possessed 
far greater potential for the disruption of immediate British national security than did 
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British communism. As stated by Sir Hugh Fraser (then Secretary of State for Air) to 
Harold Macmillan and Henry Brooke (Home Secretary) in 1963: 
‘I must reiterate the concern which I expressed to you earlier this week. These demonstrations are aimed at 
operational airfields, at which armed aircraft are at constant readiness. I can only prevent interference with 
the operational effectiveness of RAF and USAF bases by providing protection which involves a heavy drain 
on RAF resources and their normal tasks. Sooner or later, the Committee of 100 will realize that a relatively 
small effort on their part can impose a significant reduction in the efficiency of our deterrent bases or a 
disproportionate effort to prevent this. Moreover, if these demonstrations recur (and not all the 
demonstrators appear to act on strictly pacifist principles) there is an obvious risk of ugly incidents.’630 
Nuclear readiness in 1963, a matter at the very forefront of the cabinet’s security concerns 
as a result of October 1962’s Cuban Missile Crisis, was threatened most significantly in 
the eyes of ministers not by domestic communism, but rather by the threat of direct action 
from the more radical wing of the unilateralist movement. Moreover, beyond the 
immediate danger such demonstrations posed to matters of security, potential diplomatic 
and political repercussions were equally troubling – the continued presence of American 
service personnel, equipment and nuclear warheads on British soil complicating matters 
still further. The American attitude to the Committee of 100, as communicated directly to 
the Prime Minister, was straightforward – if blunt: 
‘The USAF have made it clear that they cannot permit the demonstrations (planned to occur at Third USAF 
Headquarters at Ruislip & the USAF nuclear bases located at Wethersfield, Essex and Brize Norton in 
Oxfordshire) to impair the operational capability of the bases. They have said that if demonstrators persist 
in approaching sensitive area, and disregard the orders of the sentries, the latter will be compelled to open 
fire… They are willing to leave the protection of the airfield (other than the close protection of sensitive 
areas) to the UK authorities and have asked us to do all we can to avoid a direct clash between 
demonstrators and USAF personnel.’631  
Ergo, by 1961 it could be convincingly argued that the readiness of Britain’s national 
security was threatened more by unilateralist direct action than by the communist 
movement. It is difficult to overstate the scale of domestic political damage that would 
have been inflicted upon the Macmillan government had US troops opened fire upon 
British citizens, protesting a not unpopular cause within the territorial confines of the 
United Kingdom. Such an incident would almost certainly have precipitated a vote of no 
confidence in Macmillan’s leadership within the House of Commons whilst inflicting 
deep damage and embarrassment to British relations with the United States. A 
particularly grave consequence when it is taken into account that since 1958’s reluctant 
                                                          
630 Hugh Fraser to Harold Macmillan and Henry Brooke, 16th May 1963, TNA, PREM 11/4284 
631 Julian Amery (Secretary of State for Air), to Harold Macmillan, 5th December 1961, TNA, PREM 
11/4284. Macmillan replied giving full authority for all actions short of shooting. Macmillan to Amery, 6 th 
December 1961, TNA, PREM 11/4284 
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adoption of the Thor missile system,632 the United Kingdom was wholly reliant on 
continued US co-operation for the purchase and deployment of nuclear weaponry.  
Further to this, it is interesting to note that the JIC adopted a similar line to Committee of 
100 protesters as it had members of the Communist Party some 15 years prior. In case of 
transition to war, the Committee judged: 
‘If hostilities are imminent, natural loyalties will come into play and only a minority (of unilateralists) will 
be prepared to take active steps to impede to operation of the bases. A similar state of affairs will be 
obtained in the Communist Party, which will lose much rank and file support. Those who continue to accept 
the Party’s discipline, however, can be expected to be particularly militant, stimulated not only by a desire 
to help Russia but by a belief that, when it comes to a real crisis, provided everything has to be done to 
undermine their position, the imperialists will give in without a fight. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, 
that while the number of nuclear disarmers and Communists will be considerably reduced in a period of 
tension, there will be a militant rump which will try to be as obstructive as possible.’633 
Similar to plans for war drawn up under the Attlee government, it was decided in 1962 
that in case of war, certain members of the disarmament movement should be included 
amongst those scheduled for detainment.634 Though tremendously reduced from the early 
1950s – Operation HILLARY had recommended close to 3000 people for internment, 
mainly communists, whilst the FELSTEAD committee recommended a mere 100 in total 
– it is interesting to note again the diversification of individuals perceived as dangerous to 
the State. The inclusion of the more militant individuals associated with the disarmament 
movement in a programme which previously had only been populated by communists and 
persons associated with hostile foreign intelligence agencies showed again just how 
seriously the government appraised the threat posed by the unilateral disarmament 
movement and particularly its direct action wing. Militant unilateralists’ willingness in 
the early ‘60s to overtly engage in illegal activity at the cost of personal imprisonment in 
order to achieve short-term disruption of British nuclear interests briefly made them of 
severe concern to Whitehall’s security planners. The briefness of this concern should be 
noted however – disarmament militancy was really only relevant up until 1963 – after 
which the harsh sentences imposed on earlier activism, combined with a general waning 
of enthusiasm across the unilateralist movement, began to have significant impact on the 
frequency of anti-nuclear civil disobedience.635 The imprisonments of Patrick Pottle and 
Michael Randle following their involvement in protests held at RAF Wethersfield in 1962 
                                                          
632 See minute sheet for TNA, AIR 21/4561 for a sense of the level of griping across both Whitehall and the 
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633 ‘Anti-Nuclear Demonstration at RAF Airfields in a Period of Tension’, JIC (62), 16th November 1962, 
TNA, CAB 158/47, op cit. Peter Hennessy, The Secret State, (Allen Lane, London, 2010), p. 118 
634 Hennessy, Secret State, p. 118 
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in particular helped to deprive militant unilateralists of much of their early momentum.636 
The British communist movement by contrast, though undoubtedly possessed of similar 
overall intent lacked by this point the means by which to seriously damage Whitehall’s 
credibility and political stability as well as the willingness to expose itself to legal 
punishment – as MI5’s assessment of the CPGB showed. 
 
Given the correlation in dates, it seems likely that the events of the Cuban Missile crisis 
in October 1962 provided the final catalyst for the decline in concern regarding domestic 
communist subversion. The crisis, which took the form of a tense stand-off between the 
United States and Soviet governments following the deployment of Soviet nuclear 
warheads to Cuba, highlighted to both the public and officialdom alike the point that 
should war with the USSR come, the end result would be total nuclear annihilation within 
a matter of hours, if not minutes. To quote Pete Townshend: 
‘In the middle of the first term of my second year [of art school], the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted. On the 
critical day in October 1962 I walked to college absolutely certain that life was over; why was I even 
bothering to attend class? When the end didn’t come, I was glad not to have been one of those who had 
panicked, wept or chattered compulsively until the good news was announced.’637 
The government had been aware of the level of destruction which could be expected in 
the event of a hydrogen bomb detonation over the United Kingdom since studies were 
first commissioned in the mid-1950s,638 however had persevered under the delusion that 
thermonuclear attack would be survivable. As indicated by the Strath Committee report - 
which was issued in 1955 and laid out the government’s response to nuclear attack in full 
– defence planners continued to insist through the mid-1950s that counter-subversive 
action would be required following a nuclear exchange: 
‘In some parts of the country… there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse. 
In such circumstances the local military commander would have to be prepared to take over from the civil 
authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of government. He 
                                                          
636 Although once incarcerated in Wormwood Scrubs the pair proceeded to facilitate George Blake’s 
escape, so imprisonment was, perhaps, counter-productive. See Michael Randle & Pat Pottle, The Blake 
Escape: How We Freed George Blake and Why, (Harrap, London, 1989) 
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638 ‘Radioactive Fall-Out from Hydrogen Bomb’, Atomic Energy Research Establishment study, 8th October 
1954, TNA, DEFE 7/2208. The charts showing the extent of lethal radiation superimposed over maps of 
densely populated areas of the UK make for particularly chilling reading 
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would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he 
considered necessary to restore order.’639 
Such a view was not shared by the Security Service. By 1956, the Director General of the 
Service Roger Hollis had realised that ‘it was no good envisioning an organised Head 
Office existing anywhere; indeed there would be nothing to do’. No plans were made for 
the vast majority of MI5’s staff in the event of nuclear war beyond token provisions for 
two to three senior officers to enter TURNSTILE, the government bunker constructed 
beneath the Cotswolds.640 Such a stance represented a wholesale reversal of the Service’s 
position at the beginning of the Second World War, at which point a tremendous amount 
of resources were committed to frustrating the (largely imagined) efforts of suspected 
fifth columnists.641 Throughout the Cuban crisis meanwhile, MI5’s staff were not briefed 
regarding developments in the Caribbean, nor were they formally notified at the event’s 
end.642 The Service’s lack of activity appears to confirm that Hollis’ theorisation, bleak 
though it was, was accepted by MI5’s senior staff. In the case of thermo-nuclear war with 
the Soviet Union, there would be little call for the enforcement of domestic security; the 
entirety of the country, communists, civil servants, factory workers and soldiers alike 
would soon be so much smouldering ash. This being said, even post-Cuba delusions that 
government representatives would be troubled by subversive elements persisted amongst 
defence planners. As stated within the Defence Policy Staff’s 1968 paper for the Chiefs of 
Staff entitled ‘Military aspects of the Home Defence of the United Kingdom’: 
‘The possibility of widespread strikes including a breakdown in our public transport and shipping systems 
could seriously affect our delicately programmed mobilisation and movement plans… Anti-war action 
might spread and involve considerable numbers of normally stable and law-abiding people. The Soviet bloc 
could bring to bear the full weight of their subversive activities, sabotage and psychological warfare… 
Subversive organisations are likely to survive and the general chaos of the post-attack struggle could 
provide a better opportunity for them to succeed than anything which could be obtained pre-attack.’643 
The Service was leery of this sort of thinking as early as the late 1940s. As recorded by 
Guy Liddell in 1949: 
‘In regard to malicious damage we should say something about our experiences during the war, when large 
numbers of cases were investigated. In no case was the act found to be due to enemy action, and in many 
                                                          
639 Minutes of the Home Defence (Strath) Committee, 17th March 1955, TNA, CAB 134/940, op cit. 
Hennessy, Secret State, p. 171 
640 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 329 
641 Ibid. pp. 229-230 
642 Ibid. p. 329 
643 ‘Military Aspects of the Home Defence of the United Kingdom’, 1st October 1968, TNA, DEFE 4/232, 
op cit. Hennessy, Secret State, pp. 206-207 
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cases where the solution was found the act was due either to some disgruntled element, or to negligence, 
through bad inspection, or to a desire by a firm to find an excuse for incompetent work.’644 
Whether mass acts of sabotage by enemy agents and subversive would have occurred was 
a highly debateable point. The logic of the argument was sound, however the evidence of 
World War Two indicated that such fears tended to be overblown. Similar conclusions 
were expressed to the defence staff in 1968: 
‘The USSR probably still has some capability for sabotage in the United Kingdom, though the likelihood of 
its being used in a period of tension is questionable; there is no evidence to suggest other organisations have 
sabotage plans on a substantial scale, though the possibility of isolated acts by individuals cannot be ruled 
out.’645  
In the event of war, the likelihood of wide-spread sabotage by subversive groups was low. 
Meanwhile, in any event, from the Service’s point of view such matters were ultimately 
irrelevant. MI5 leadership realised as early as 1956 that such was the destructive potential 
of hydrogen weaponry that minor matters such as sabotage were of trifling importance. 
Though the defence staff may have continued to fret about fifth columnists, for reasons 
which in hindsight appear at best self-delusional, for those tasked explicitly with the study 
and practice of counter-subversion it was clear that in case of war such matters had been 
rendered irrelevant by the advance in destructive potential caused by the development of 
the hydrogen bomb.  
As such, by the early 1960s two of the chief concerns which had raised counter-
subversion as a priority appeared outdated. Domestic subversive movements clearly no 
longer provided the fulcrum of the Soviet Union’s espionage strategy – as the Blake and 
Vassall cases demonstrated. Meanwhile, the defence aspect of domestic communist 
subversion was removed as a going concern for the Security Service as a result of 
technological change. Disruption of the Communist Party in the case of war was lessened 
as a priority as such actions would almost certainly prove futile in the event of thermo-
nuclear attack. Two key facets of Whitehall’s concern regarding subversive movements 
had thus been resolved by the latter years of the Macmillan government. 
End of Ministerial Attention 
Final proof of domestic communism’s fall from the top of the list of governmental 
security priorities can be found in the quiet winding down of the Cabinet Committee on 
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Communism (Home) over the course of 1963. The 18th December 1962 marked the final 
meeting of the group; notably for the first and only time not under the chairmanship of 
Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook (shortly to be elevated to the peerage as Lord 
Normanbrook as of January 1963)646 since its convention in 1951. Its end was not 
formally planned – the minutes of the final meeting imply no sense of finality to 
proceedings – it simply failed to meet again after this date, such was the decrease in the 
relative importance of domestic communism as a security threat. Indeed, the slightly 
haphazard manner of its demise is demonstrated by the fact that the group remained 
officially on the list of Ministerial Committees until 7th January 1969 even despite the 
lack of activity.647 In part this was a consequence of the proceedings of the late 1962 
meeting – of which the main topic of discussion was a private letter (most likely from Sir 
Hartley Shawcross) received by Macmillan in November 1962.648 The letter, whose 
substance was considered important enough to be recommended for official discussion by 
the Prime Minister, advocated for the creation of a small working-party to deliberate over 
questions of security and counter-subversion measures.649 Whilst on the face of it this 
would seem equate to nothing more than the slightly unnecessary duplication of 
responsibilities covered already by the AC (H), the Committee nevertheless agreed with 
the letter’s sentiments, justifying the decision on the grounds that the AC (H) was an 
increasingly unwieldy body, and recommended that a smaller ad-hoc working group be 
established.650 Said working group (chaired by Sir Burke Trend, following Lord 
Normanbrook’s retirement)651 achieved little of note – its main accomplishment seems to 
have been penning an official letter to Benjamin Britten warning him against accepting 
the presidency of the British-Hungarian Friendship Society (Britten accepted the position 
regardless)652 – however it did naturally divert attention away from the AC (H), leaving 
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the main committee to wither.653 Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the regular 
monitoring of communist activity was starting to be regarded as something of a joke by 
officials at this time. Notification of Britten’s appointment to the British-Hungarian 
friendship society provided in the following manner: 
‘You should be aware of the existence of Communism in the Sunday Schools, among folk musicians and 
among the “Woodcraft Folk”. And, more seriously, the attached minutes confirm that Benjamin Britten has 
become President of the British-Hungarian Friendship Society.’654 
This being said, the committee’s main offshoot – IRD’s monthly bulletin of ‘communist 
influenced activities’ - continued to be circulated under the Committee’s name until 
January 1964,655 at which point full responsibility for its distribution was officially 
subsumed by the Foreign Office.656 Indeed, IRD’s English section would continue to 
operate full-time up until the formal dissolution of the Department as a whole in 1977.657  
It follows that communist subversion did not cease to be regarded as a threat at any exact 
moment. Instead, it melded into a patchwork of numerous other subversive threats, all of 
which demanded official attention in some capacity, yet none of which were significant 
enough to warrant the sort of intense focus which had defined Whitehall’s counter-
subversive approach during the 1950s and later 1940s. ‘Subversion’ itself did not cease to 
be a concern for successive governments – it was simply considered to be far more varied 
in nature than had previously been the case. To look forward slightly, this much is 
demonstrated by the formation in 1968 of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home 
under Sir Burke Trend – the discussion surrounding the formation of the new body 
demonstrating the degree to which official thinking had shifted. 
‘The Official Committee on Communism (Home) has not met since 1962… In a recent submission, Sir 
Burke Trend suggested to the Prime Minister, who agreed, that the title might more appropriately be the 
Official Committee on Subversion (Home). Probably the best course would be to dissolve the Official 
Committee on Communism (Home) and its Working Group, and to replace them with an Official 
Committee on Subversion at Home, with a composition flexible enough to meet at Permanent Secretary or 
lower level as required, and with fairly broad terms of reference (which should, however, explicitly exclude 
counter-measures within the public service).’658 
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This correspondence from a few years after the final meeting of AC (H) demonstrates that 
communism was now considered merely one amongst a myriad of threats – a direct 
contrast to deliberations in the later 1940s where exactly the opposite conclusion had 
been reached. Analysis of an MI5 report on subversion from 1967 (distributed to Harold 
Wilson) demonstrates similar thinking within the Service: 
‘The subversive threat has become more diffuse. Phenomena like Protest and Flower People can present a 
threat to law and order but can become subversive when there is an element of organisation, be it only in a 
loose anarchical group. The Communist Party remains the most disciplined and highly organised subversive 
organisation and, with the possible exception of the Socialist Labour League, the only one capable of 
having a long-term strategy. Despite its pseudo-respectability and its overtures to the Left, it constitutes a 
threat by its very existence. Dissatisfaction with its gradualist approach, however, and the erosion of its 
discipline as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, have led to an increase in the nuisance value of those 
extremist organisations which lack the Communist Party’s fundamental discipline and are willing to take 
short-term risks. Here the threat impinges on law-and-order and is primarily a police responsibility. These 
groups however thrive on publicity and the less they are given the better.’659 
By the time the Wilson government were elected into office in October 1964, domestic 
communism had been relegated from its position of centrality amongst Britain’s domestic 
subversive threats. This being said, the Party still maintained a position of importance 
within the panoply of subversive groups and organisations. As 1967’s report stated, its 
discipline and experience meant that it still retained a modicum of its old influence, 
particularly when compared to some of the more bizarre organisations listed in the 
document (the Free Wales Army of particular note in this regard).660 Nevertheless, it 
follows that British communism was no longer deemed of such extreme importance as to 
warrant regular and continual ministerial attention from 1963 onwards. As has been 
demonstrated by Peter Hennessy in his revised 2010 edition of The Secret State, this 
diversification of subversive threats was to be the prevalent trend which would define 
future counter-subversion policy for at least the next decade. By the mid-1970s the 
Security Service categorised its list of ‘Subversive Organisations in the United Kingdom’ 
into a total of five categories, with no less than twenty-six parties, groups and 
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organisations contained within each.661 ‘Orthodox Communist Organisations’ were joined 
by ‘Trotskyist, Anarchist and Extreme Left Organisation; Fascist Organisations; 
Nationalist Organisations (most notably the Irish Republican Army – notable only for 
their absence in the vast majority of early Cold War counter-subversion assessments)662 
and Racialist Organisations’ as the main threats to the domestic security and political 
stability of the British state.663 The combination of the anti-communist verdict in the ETU 
case, the failure of the CPGB to capitalise upon Labour disunity in the summer of 1961 
and the steady occurrence of other major domestic security incidents unrelated to the 
domestic communist movement meant that British communism over the course of the 
1960s was finally relegated from its position as the central domestic subversive concern 
for successive governments. British communism did not cease to be a subject of interest 
for the government – as demonstrated above, both the Wilson and Heath administrations 
maintained Security Service coverage of the movement, as indeed did the governments of 
Callaghan and Thatcher – however post-1963 it never captivated ministerial attention to 
quite the same degree as it had done since the end of the Second World War and 
throughout the 1950s. 
 
Summary 
The early years of the 1960s was the period in which Whitehall realised that the varying 
components of the domestic communist threat had been largely resolved. Initially, the 
early years of the decade saw something of a resurgence of communism as a perceived 
threat to stability. Contrary to what events and analysis would have seemed to suggest in 
the later years of the 1950s, the British communist movement seemed to enjoy something 
of a brief renaissance between the Octobers of 1960 and 1961. Though the Hungarian 
revolution and subsequent exodus had appeared to indicate that the Party’s political 
influence was doomed to terminal decline, the Conservative Party’s surprising dominance 
in the 1959 General Election opened a rift within the mainstream left which seemed for a 
moment to offer the CPGB a route back to political relevance. The Parliamentary Labour 
                                                          
661 ‘Subversive Organisations in the United Kingdom’, Annex to JIC report ‘The Security of the United 
Kingdom Base in a Situation leading to a Threat of General War’, 23rd March 1971, TNA, CAB 186/8 
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Party’s disarray following its third successive electoral loss (and more importantly, its 
third consecutive loss of seats), coupled with the rise in popularity of the upstart unilateral 
disarmament movement gave the CPGB the two conditions it needed to potentially 
ingratiate itself within the mainstream political left, thereby gaining the legitimacy and 
influence it had craved essentially since its formation as a political party in July 1920. By 
aligning itself with the unilateralist movement, a position it had long opposed due to 
Moscow’s multilateralism, the CPGB appeared to have found a mechanism whereby it 
could weaken the position of the Labour leadership and facilitate the accession of 
individuals who would look more favourably upon the Party. That such a scheme was at 
least vaguely plausible was indicated not only by the fact that the Party were able to 
secure pro-unilateralist votes at both the 1960 TUC and Labour Party conferences, but 
also by just how seriously the Security Service regarded the scenario in its thorough 
review of the communist movement from late 1960 to mid-1961. That the Service were 
so concerned again reinforces the argument that the failure of communism to 
encroachment in Britain deemed to partly be a result of Whitehall policy, but a policy 
which was strongly reliant upon the existence of the Labour Party as a moderate and 
politically strong left-wing party.  
Such fears were not to last however, the CPGB’s brief spark of activity in 1960 was a 
political last hurrah rather than a sign of improved fortune. The Communist Party lacked 
the necessary influence to sustain its attempted manipulation of the unions for more than 
a year. Meanwhile, Hugh Gaitskell’s easy victory in the Labour leadership contest at 
Blackpool in the October of 1961 made it clear that any left-wing insurrection within 
Labour was over, removing what had been the CPGB’s last slim chance of entry into the 
Labour tent. Meanwhile, the success of the anti-communist campaign which took place 
within the ETU – driven by private individuals and culminating in a civil court case, but 
supported heavily by the covert government channelling of information – finally ended 
the communist threat within the unions. The exposure of the communist ETU executive 
as fundamentally dishonest destroyed what remaining credibility communism had within 
the trade unions – whilst communists hung on in occasional bastions, their popularity 
within British industry more widely plummeted. Crucially, this victory was obtained 
without suspicion either on the part of the public or indeed the CPGB that the government 
had been in any way involved. Though both the Security Service and IRD had been 
instrumental in directing press attention towards the case as well as obtaining information 
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which proved communist wrong-doing, the public’s ignorance of their involvement 
allowed the affair to play out unhindered by suspicions of political motivation – 
exacerbating the damage done to communist credibility. Indeed the success of the ETU 
case bolstered governmental conviction that its counter-communist policy – with a heavy 
focus upon counter-propaganda and covert information channelling – was largely correct 
in its assumptions. It was as well it was, for as the succession of espionage cases which 
were to plague the Macmillan administration showed, the Official Secrets Act could not 
be relied upon as an effective counter-measure towards deterring subversive activity. 
Meanwhile, it was these same espionage cases which demonstrated that security 
assumptions regarding domestic communism’s importance to Soviet intelligence were 
increasingly outdated. Where the Gouzenko affair and atom spy cases of the late 1940s 
and early ‘50s had seemed to indicate the importance of the domestic communist 
movement as a recruiting pool from which Soviet intelligence could acquire highly placed 
and ideologically committed agents, the succession of espionage scandals of the early 
‘60s proved that this assumption was at best outdated and at worst fundamentally flawed. 
None of the major spy scandals (with the exception of Kim Philby for historical reasons) 
had their roots in domestic communism and none would have been prevented via a more 
thorough or pervasive application of counter-subversive strategy. Further to this, the rise 
of an increasingly militant wing within the unilateralist movement demonstrated that 
domestic subversive threats were beginning to diversify politically away from communist 
influence. Finally, the defence aspect of counter-subversion practice was removed 
entirely as a concern as Roger Hollis’ suspicions regarding the futility of such actions was 
proven by the development of events during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
As a result of these realisations, subversion as a concept was defined less and less by its 
relation to communist activity. From 1963 onwards, domestic communism began to be 
regarded as less of a centrally defining feature of subversive activity and more as one 
manifestation of the threat amongst many others. Though domestic communists would 
continue to attract interest from Britain’s intelligence apparatus for many years to come – 
indeed up to the fall of the Berlin wall – from 1963 onwards it ceased to capture high-
level ministerial attention in the same way in which it had essentially since September 
1945. With clear evidence that the CPGB was exhausted as both an immediate political 
and industrial threat, and that subversive dangers had diversified significantly - 
particularly since 1956 – subversive policy from the Wilson government onwards would 
 183 
 
be far more diffuse in focus than during the Attlee years and era of Conservative 
hegemony.  
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Conclusion 
 
From the Attlee through the Macmillan governments, countering domestic communist 
subversion was considered to be a matter of paramount importance for British security 
policy. The longevity of official concern alone is striking, and demonstrates the severity 
that the threat of communist subversion was perceived to pose. Even in the face of well-
organised and pervasive surveillance, tightened vetting procedures and a vast campaign of 
covert counter-propaganda, the problem succeeded in troubling the minds of ministers, 
civil servants and intelligence officers alike for the better part of twenty years. In 
immediate terms, concern regarding communist subversion served to directly affect the 
development of the post-war secret state. Moreover, as official understanding of the 
problem shifted to regarding domestic communism as an ideological as well as a security 
problem the matter served to impact upon a tremendously varied range of issues within 
wider British society. Whitehall’s campaign of counter-subversion directly affected the 
conduct of industrial relations, understandings of political liberties and development of 
the broader domestic left. To conclude, three points remain to be summarised: the 
efficacy of counter-subversion policy over the period examined, the manner by which 
official understanding of the problem developed and the extent to which anti-communist 
measures can be regarded in hindsight as proportional.   
Influence of Counter-Subversion Policy 
Whitehall’s campaign of domestic counter-subversion during the early Cold War did not 
unilaterally secure the marginalisation of Britain’s domestic communist movement. Anti-
communist policy did, however, succeed admirably in two endeavours. Namely: 
mitigating the potential for subversion to develop into espionage, and establishing a 
system of comprehensive and unobtrusive surveillance. By the early 1950s, the domestic 
communist movement had ceased to function as a fruitful recruiting ground for Soviet 
intelligence as it had done in the inter-war period, and the creation of a covert, 
comprehensive and pervasive network of surveillance had been achieved with remarkable 
speed. Vetting measures were arguably the most successfully implemented element of 
counter-subversion policy. Reforms brought in – albeit reluctantly – under the Attlee 
government and strengthened by the Churchill administration succeeded in negating 
British communism’s ability to pose a direct danger to the inner workings of the state. 
Whilst the system of negative vetting enacted in 1947 was exceptionally rudimentary by 
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modern security standards, its introduction and subsequent escalation via positive vetting 
procedure in 1951 did succeed in preventing direct access to official secrets by the 
Communist Party and its fellow travellers. Though vetting was not a fool proof bulwark 
against espionage – as is demonstrated by the great panoply of espionage scandals which 
have befallen the British state since 1951 – post-introduction there were no further major 
espionage cases with their origins in the domestic communist movement or Party. The 
introduction of and strengthening of vetting procedures effectively mitigated the 
likelihood of subversion developing into potentially far more damaging espionage 
activity.   
Further to this, the introduction of a centralised system of vetting brought with it the long-
term benefit of forcing the Security Service to create a system of comprehensive 
surveillance through which to monitor the activities of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. Whilst the implementation and upkeep of such a system initially severely taxed 
the capabilities of the Service – rundown as it was by a depleted personnel complement 
and post-war budgetary constraints – its early success in both monitoring and cataloguing 
the activities of the CPGB meant that the formal element of the British communist 
movement was arguably removed as an immediate threat to state security as early as 1950 
(the point at which Sillitoe stated to Attlee that MI5 possessed an almost complete list of 
CPGB membership).664 Though it took the application of full half of MI5’s resources to 
achieve this outcome, in the long run the benefits far outweighed the costs.665 From the 
early 1950s onwards the government had access to a regular, comprehensive and timely 
stream of intelligence which fully exposed the aims and capabilities of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain. Such an asset was of immeasurable value, as it allowed accurate 
assessment of both the Party’s strengths and weaknesses as well as gave indication as to 
where counter-actions should be targeted. The value of said surveillance was greatly 
assisted by the fact that the Party never appeared to fully comprehend the extent of the 
monitoring it was under. CPGB leadership appear to have suffered from a certain amount 
of cognitive dissonance in this regard. Certainly Party members were aware that they 
were a surveillance target for MI5, as evidenced by Peter Kerrigan’s obfuscation on the 
matter of crypto-communist MPs in 1945,666 John Gollan’s rant regarding phone tapping 
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in 1948,667 and Peter Wright’s testimony of the occasional bug being discovered at CPGB 
HQ.668 Despite this loose awareness that the Party was a subject of interest, the extent of 
MI5’s pervasion appears never to have been realised by the CPGB, thus meaning that the 
Party never made any significant effort to disguise or otherwise obfuscate discussion of 
its activities within its headquarters premises. As such, MI5 had access to a stream of 
accurate information regarding the CPGB’s intent and capabilities. 
Official policy failed, however, to unilaterally secure domestic communism’s 
marginalisation. Though official efforts ensured that communist influence remained 
contained within small pockets of society, it was the British communist movement’s own 
poor leadership and lack of imagination which ultimately undermined its relevance, rather 
than any Whitehall initiative. The CPGB’s consistent adherence to Kremlin diktat limited 
the Party’s popularity and ensured that when proof of Soviet brutality arrived the 
repercussions for the movement were considerably graver than they might have been 
otherwise. It was Harry Pollitt and John Gollan’s ineptitude in handling the successive 
crises of 1956 which resulted in mass-desertion from the Communist Party, rather than 
any particular action on the part of the government. The Party’s failure to resolve political 
differences at its 25th Congress in February 1957 ensured the flight of its intellectual 
wing, not any particular action on the part of officialdom. Equally, the genesis of the New 
Left was an entirely organic process, initially predicated on dissatisfaction with 
Moscow’s hypocrisy following Khrushchev’s speech to the 20th Party Congress of the 
CPSU. Savile and Thompson’s decision to publish the Reasoner was not caused by any 
governmental anti-communist initiative, but was instead a direct reaction to Soviet 
communism’s failure to provide a moral alternative to capitalism.669 Official attempts to 
counter influential communists within academia during the early part of the 1950s were 
characterised by amateurism and lack of clear intent and it seems unlike that official 
action would have been able to artificially engineer the sort of schism which occurred 
naturally as a result of poor leadership and Soviet hypocrisy. As such, wider events 
beyond the control of Whitehall can be said to have played a highly significant role in the 
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decline of British communism’s influence. In contrast to the more defensive elements of 
counter-subversion policy, the government’s attempts to marginalise and undermine 
domestic communism within wider British society typically produced more mixed results. 
This was perhaps inevitable. Whitehall had full control over defensive policy and could 
manage it absolutely. The success of offensive policy, however, was in large part 
contingent upon convincing private groups and individuals of the government’s 
viewpoint, whilst co-opting these same elements to repress communist influence in areas 
which officialdom was unable to directly intervene.  
This approach produced uneven results, as was proven by the counter-subversion 
experience in the unions. Despite IRD focusing upon communism in industry as a matter 
of priority essentially from the formation of the English Section in 1951,670 progress 
during the early part of the 1950s was slow. Meanwhile, early counter-propaganda efforts 
seem mostly to have been effective only in those industrial sectors already predisposed to 
an anti-communist world-view. It follows that IRD’s early successes were nearly 
universally a product of preaching to the converted. The sectors of engineering, 
shipbuilding, vehicle building and construction all proved resilient to the Department’s 
overtures – which, by its own admission, was where the vast majority of communist 
influence was concentrated.671 Offensive efforts in the unions were in effect hamstrung. 
On the one hand, attempting to inform unionists of the dangers of communist influence in 
order to artificially manufacture anti-communist sentiment produced only limited results. 
On the other, Whitehall recognised that it could not interfere directly in industrial affairs: 
‘the only action we could take was to keep up the pressure on them (communists) through 
publicity’.672 It was only once the Security Service obtained information which proved 
that communists in the Electrical Trades Union had falsified electoral results that any 
notable headway against industrial communism was made. In retrospect, the decision by 
Frank Foulkes and Frank Haxell to rig the ballot against Leslie Cannon in 1956 was a 
strategic error of the highest magnitude. Though in the short term the exclusion of 
Cannon meant that the Communist Party retained its influence within the ETU, the longer 
term consequence was that Whitehall was granted a desperately needed chink in industrial 
communism’s armour. Had evidence of ETU ballot-rigging not emerged it is difficult to 
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see how the government’s strategy would have meaningfully undermined communist 
influence in industry. For counter-propaganda efforts in the unions to succeed, it had to be 
proved that communists were actively seeking to subvert the trade unions for their own 
ends. It is clear that, unlike Whitehall, many rank and file trade unionists did not 
instinctively consider communism to be a threat. Anti-communist propaganda was 
effective therefore only when outright proof of communist skulduggery could be 
obtained. IRD proved incapable of unilaterally generating viable anti-communist 
material. However, as a result of the comprehensive intelligence available via MI5’s 
surveillance network, the state was able to exploit communist weakness effectively 
whenever it presented itself. Once sufficiently damaging material was obtained, IRD’s 
domestic propaganda network, from 1954 onwards,673 did prove effective at 
disseminating material across a wide range of outlets. When proof of communist 
malpractice was obtained, the government had the tools available to ensure that the issue 
was kept in the public eye, which thereby facilitated a slow but steady turn of popular 
opinion firmly against domestic communism. Even Whitehall’s offensive measures were 
therefore to a certain extent reactive – when the full extent of IRD English Section’s 
contacts across the media were utilised, official material could have a staggeringly 
influential impact. However, the quality of information provided had to be sufficiently 
damaging and grounded in immediate fact to ensure that it would attract meaningful 
attention. In effect, a single BBC Panorama documentary about ballot rigging in the ETU 
accompanied by regular newspaper editorials on the subject accomplished exponentially 
more than the publication of endless tracts of anti-communist polemic had done over the 
previous eight years. Offensive counter-subversion efforts could be highly effective, but 
their success was contingent upon the acquisition of suitably damaging material with 
which to undermine communism’s credibility as a benign political philosophy. 
As such, domestic counter-subversion policy during the early Cold War succeeded in 
protecting the State, but was not ultimately responsible for British communism’s broader 
decline. Security policy played no role in effecting the Communist Party’s electoral 
collapse in 1950 and ’51, nor did it affect the ideology’s collapse in support following the 
events of 1956. British communism’s decline ultimately came about as a result of internal 
pressures, rather than official action. Government intervention was eventually responsible 
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to a significant degree for communism’s marginalisation within the trade union 
movement. Again however, the conditions which made this possible were generated by 
the communist movement itself. The government capitalised on proof of communist 
dishonesty as provided by the ETU ballot-rigging scandal, it did not artificially 
manufacture anti-communist sympathy through independent counter-propaganda efforts. 
Early Cold War counter-subversive policy proved effective from a defensive standpoint, 
and did effectively diminish the communist movement’s usefulness as a tool of Soviet 
espionage. British communism’s broader decline, however, was more the result of extra-
governmental factors. 
 
Longevity and Changing Official Understanding 
In large part domestic communism continued to be viewed as a grave threat by successive 
governments as a result of changing understandings of the nature of the problem. It seems 
clear that communism initially became viewed as a central threat to domestic security due 
to perceived links between subversive activity and Soviet espionage. Notably, the 
Gouzenko affair was in large part defined by its subversive component. The findings of 
the Canadian Royal Commission on the Gouzenko affair, published in 1946, stated 
outright that ‘the Communist movement was the principal base within which the 
espionage network was recruited’.674 That this conclusion had a significant impact upon 
official thinking in Britain is proved by the opening notes from the initial meeting of 
GEN 183 ‘The report of the Working Party reviewed the report of the Royal 
Commission… It concluded that most, if not all of the conditions in which the Canadian 
ring operated existed in this country.’675 Of course, Attlee himself entered office already 
wary of the potential dangers posed by domestic communism – as evidenced by his early 
meetings with the DG and DDG of MI5.676 Though a portion of Attlee’s concern was 
most likely party-political, it seems clear that the presence of crypto-communist MPs in 
the PLP was a problem ultimately due to national security implications. As evidenced by 
Attlee’s efforts to conceal discussions regarding atomic weapons development even from 
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his own Cabinet, the Prime Minister was aware of the fact that official secrecy was of 
paramount importance to post-war British interests. The presence of crypto-communist 
MPs had the potential to fundamentally compromise wider national security efforts. 
Gouzenko and crypto-communist concerns therefore propelled communist subversion 
from being regarded as a mere tangential concern to an issue at the heart of national 
security deliberations. The Gouzenko affair in particular served to shape initial 
understandings of the nature of the subversive threat. As put by Norman Brook 
communist ‘ideas evidently have a strong appeal to a certain type of intellectual; and 
scientists and artists, in particular, seem to be especially susceptible to them’.677 
Communist subversives were understood as the main potential pool for Soviet agent 
recruitment, hence the early focus upon a defensive strategy. It is telling that the first 
counter-subversive measures actively pursued – namely the introduction of negative 
vetting in 1947 and attempted creation of a treachery bill in 1950 – were explicitly 
designed to protect the state against communist incursion. Meanwhile, the Security 
Service’s creation of a comprehensive network of surveillance can also be understood to 
have been initially intended as a protective measure. In order for the provisions of 
negative vetting to work as intended, the Service required accurate information on who 
was directly or indirectly connected to the Communist Party. The bugging of King Street 
and execution of operations such as STILL LIFE were intended to provide the Service 
with comprehensive and timely information regarding the makeup of the CPGB’s 
membership. These were not measures intended to undermine the influence of, or 
otherwise ‘harass’ the Communist Party, as was made abundantly clear by the AC (M) in 
late 1949: ‘so long as the Communist Party remained a legal political organisation it was 
considered that it would hardly be proper for the Government in power to use 
Government funds and Government agencies for the purposes of discrediting it’.678 The 
Labour Cabinet was not willing to countenance offensive action against the CPGB during 
the initial years of Whitehall’s counter-communist campaign. It was believed during the 
first five years of the Attlee government that communist subversion was a matter which 
could be solved solely through the enaction of more thorough protective security 
measures. 
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Meanwhile, whilst Gouzenko raised the matter, domestic communism’s central place in 
the Whitehall panoply of security concerns was added to by the publication of the JIC 
report ‘The Communist Party as a Fifth Column in the Event of War with Russia’ in 
December 1946. The report concluded that the Communist Party inside the United 
Kingdom was ‘sufficiently well organised to be in a position to cause considerable 
dislocation of our war effort’.679 There was therefore an additional facet to initial concern. 
Namely that a strong domestic presence could prove a significant hindrance in case of 
transition to war with the Soviet Union. Events in the wider world indicated that such a 
conclusion was correct in its assumption. The steady Soviet assimilation of Eastern 
Europe in the years after the war proved that communist subversion could significantly 
interfere in the actions of the sovereign government, and in a worst case scenario lead to 
the total takeover of a country. Foreign Office reports from the early 1950s made 
consistent reference to the belief that Soviet policy hinged upon the encouragement of 
civil disorder, which would hopefully lead to a communist coup, demonstrating that this 
assessment was not a fleeting one.680 Similarly, deliberations regarding the mass 
internment of communists demonstrate that such fears were deemed credible enough that 
the government were prepared to attempt to disrupt the communist movement with 
outright force should war have come.681 However, similar plans from 1959 also show a 
significant reduction in the planned number of internees – demonstrating that there was a 
cooling of official concern as the decade wore on. Fears that communists could wreak 
significant havoc persisted within certain quarters of Whitehall – subversive activity still 
played such a major part in defence planners’ war-games even in 1968, showing that the 
military continued to regard such an eventuality as a realistic concern.682 However, for the 
Security Service and those on the AC (H) tasked with the explicit study of domestic 
communism, disruption in the case of war was at most a peripheral concern for the most 
part. Beyond brief liaison with the Cabinet Defence Committee in 1952, the impact of 
domestic communism on defence planning played little part in assessments of the 
movement’s strengths by the AC (H). Meanwhile, when the Security Service were asked 
explicitly to comment upon the likelihood of domestic communist disruption in 1968, the 
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Service’s view was considerably less worried than that held by counterparts in the 
Defence Staff. Ergo, it can be assumed that though the implications of domestic 
communism upon defence planning were taken into account at least initially – this aspect 
of the threat was not considered so pressing as to keep the problem central to cabinet-
level concerns for as long as it was. The defence aspect of the problem was more of a 
tangential issue, fretted over by the Armed Forces, but not a central concern for those 
explicitly tasked with the formulation and enaction of counter-subversive policy. 
In theory therefore, official worry regarding the domestic communist movement should 
have declined rapidly as of the early 1950s, had fears been predicated solely upon the 
espionage and defence aspects of the issue. As has been previously discussed, MI5 
experienced an extraordinarily high degree of success in its efforts to place the CPGB 
under comprehensive surveillance. By April 1950 Percy Sillitoe was able to state outright 
to the PM that the Service had ‘an almost complete list of the membership of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain with particulars of age, sex and employment’.683 
Therefore, it follows that fears regarding the Communist Party as a source of Soviet 
espionage should have dissipated rapidly, leading to a corresponding decrease in concern 
regarding domestic communist activity as a whole. Despite this however, communism 
remained central to the government’s domestic security concerns, with measures being if 
anything intensified in the early 1950s, with the introduction of positive vetting, creation 
of the AC (H) and granting of domestic remit to IRD all occurring over the course of 
1951. Initially at least, this was due in part to over-estimation by the government of 
domestic communism’s strengths. Despite the fact that in hindsight it can be seen that the 
Security Service’s early success in achieving near-complete surveillance coverage had 
essentially removed the Communist Party as a covert threat by 1950, it is clear that 
officials continuously felt that they were missing some crucial piece of the puzzle. 
Norman Brook’s 1951 report on the state of British intelligence included the judgement 
that ‘the crypto-Communists, fellow-travellers and intellectual-Marxists represent as least 
as great a danger as the actual Communist Party… There is here an undoubted gap in our 
knowledge of potential agents for the Russian intelligence service or of people who might 
be willing, and able, to convey useful information to the Russians.’684 A steady stream of 
espionage cases involving individuals who justified their behaviour on ideological 
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grounds – Fuchs, Burgess and Maclean amongst them – helped to give this narrative a 
longevity it might have otherwise lacked. Beyond this however, it can be seen that the 
centrality of the domestic communist threat persisted in large part as a result of a shift in 
Whitehall’s understanding at the turn of the decade. Foreign Office analysis dating from 
June 1951 judged that ‘Communist parties… are to work upon the masses through what 
Stalin calls “transmission belts” or “levers”… to create in the popular mind misgivings 
about policy contrary to that of the Soviet Union’.685 The communist threat moved 
therefore from being understood as a covert threat to the state, to one which was 
dangerous more for its influence upon wider society. 
As communists were deemed ultimately to be potential tools of Soviet foreign policy – 
which aimed, in the view of the FO, to achieve ‘world domination’686 – allowing the 
ideology to gain influence within British society was obviously highly undesirable. Focus 
therefore shifted from guarding against individual acts of espionage to attempting to 
undermine communism’s wider influence. Ergo, the move to begin monitoring those 
employed within academia and the teaching professions who would, according to this 
theory, be able to exercise their influence to ensure the spread of communist ideas 
amongst a new generation of young men and women. The AC (H) did not attempt to 
create fledgling state-private counter-communist networks via trusted colleagues in 
academia in order to guard government secrets against Soviet predations. Nor did the 
Security Service take an interest in the likes of Christopher Hill, Maurice Dobb and Eric 
Hobsbawm et al because they were worried that a group of radical left-wing economists 
and historians might be ferrying nuclear information to KGB handlers tucked in the 
sleeves of their gowns. Rather these actions were intended to garner information about the 
scale of communist influence in broader British society whilst seeking ways to 
marginalise that influence in the most discreet way possible. Official concern regarding 
domestic communism was thus perpetuated by the judgement that the movement 
possessed the real capability to adversely affect opinion across wider British society, not 
merely threaten official security directly. 
Out of all the areas of British society deemed in 1951 to be at risk of undue communist 
influence, it was industry which served to keep communism at the centre of concerns 
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until the early 1960s. Fears regarding the more highbrow aspects of communism 
dissipated as a result of the CPGB’s inner turmoil post-1956. As a result of MI5 
monitoring, as well as IRD’s regular updates from overt sources, both ministers and 
senior Civil servants alike were well aware that the mass-exodus from the Party post-
Hungary was proof of communism’s collapse amongst its adherents within the 
intelligentsia. Had official worry been predicated solely on academia and education as 
communist ‘transmission belts’ it is likely that domestic communist threat would have 
been downgraded at this juncture. The collapse of communism’s appeal in intellectual 
circles was not replicated in the unions however: ‘the reaction of the trade union wing to 
the Stalin issue was one of bewilderment rather than resentment’.687 As it was, the 
CPGB’s retention of influence within the unions combined with the failure of officialdom 
to make significant headway against the problem essentially until 1961 meant that the 
movement retained its status as a central threat well into the Macmillan government. The 
primary worry was that the Communist Party was slowly infiltrating trade union 
leadership in order to co-opt the Labour movement into a vehicle for its own ideological 
designs. Despite the Party’s small size, political apathy within the unions meant that it 
was able, via its organisational prowess, to exploit low turn-out and secure key seats on a 
number of union executives. Therefore, despite possessing only marginal representation 
in industry – 0.3% of the total industrial workforce as of 1954 – the Communist Party was 
able to wield a disproportionate influence over the trajectory of industrial politics.688 Here 
the perpetuation of Whitehall’s concern is fairly straightforward to understand. Though it 
identified the problem of communist influence over trade union executive councils as 
early as the 1940s, strategies to combat this achieved little success until the discovery of 
electoral fraud in the ETU elections. There is little evidence to suggest that IRD’s efforts 
ever succeeded in altering trade unionist apathy or significantly increasing turnout for 
industrial elections. Moreover, without direct proof of foul play, official counter-
propaganda efforts were unable to convince trade unionists that communism was an 
inherently negative influence. As stated by Norman Brook: ‘the majority of the rank and 
file would not be prejudiced against a leader merely because he was a Communist, so 
long as he gave proof of effective leadership’.689 It was only due to communist 
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malpractice within the Electrical Trades Union that the government was able to wear 
away at communist industrial influence. Even with this information to hand however, 
undoing communist infiltration of the unions was a slow process. Whitehall was unable to 
act directly against the ETU, whilst MI5’s information regarding the fraud was difficult to 
exploit owing to the sensitivity of its provenance. Though information regarding ballot 
rigging first emerged in mid-1956,690 the process of turning public opinion against the 
union’s executive still took another five years due to these reasons. Even where 
information was forthcoming, the process of altering wider opinion was ultimately a slow, 
onerous process. 
That the underlying theory upon which official concern was predicated was logical is 
demonstrated by the events of the 1960 Labour Party and TUC conferences. By 
leveraging its influence within the ETU and AEU, the CPGB was able to support the 
passage of pro-unilateralist votes at both conferences, directly against the wishes of both 
PLP leadership and the government itself. Though the following year the Party was 
unable to replicate the same feat due to its loss of control over the AEU,691 the 
implication here is plain. Even control over a small group of key unions gave the CPGB a 
degree of influence disproportionate to its size. By leveraging the ETU and AEU the 
Party was able to make a significant nuisance of itself. Had the Communist Party 
succeeded in capturing a wider range of union executives it could theoretically have 
exercised significant power over the direction of the wider Labour movement. Therefore, 
influence within the unions for a time gave the Party a continued political relevancy 
which it would otherwise have lacked. The Party was never an electoral force, its ability 
to act covertly was undermined as a result of Security Service monitoring and its 
relevance to the trajectory of wider radical politics was marginalised as a result of 
Hungary. Continued control over union executives therefore allowed the communist 
movement to retain a level of importance which would otherwise have been impossible – 
in the process ensuring that official attention remained trained on the issue of domestic 
communism for a far longer period than would otherwise have been the case. 
The genesis and perpetuation of official concern regarding domestic communism was 
therefore the product of a shifting understanding of the nature of the threat. Conclusions 
                                                          
690 Minutes of a meeting of the AC (H), 13th July 1956, TNA, CAB 134/1194 
691 ‘Communist Industrial Activity’, Paper by the Security Service, 4th December 1962, TNA, CAB 
134/1347, also ‘Communism in the United Kingdom’, Memorandum by the Security Service, 24 th 
November 1961, TNA CAB 134/1346 
196 
 
drawn on the basis of espionage cases in the late 1940s, which indicated that communist 
subversive networks offered fertile recruiting ground for Soviet intelligence, first raised 
the domestic communism to a position of central importance. As a result, the government 
responded with significant reform and escalation of vetting procedure and via MI5 began 
a pervasive campaign of surveillance against the CPGB. These actions essentially negated 
communism’s immediate threat to state security. However, by the time this was achieved 
official understanding of the problem had become equally concerned with communist 
influence within wider society, which necessitated the creation of more offensive 
machinery and the formalisation of IRD’s domestic anti-communist propaganda 
campaign.  Official attention was then held by the intransigence of communist influence 
in the unions – which proved remarkably resilient to official counter-measures and only 
really started to be undone once firm proof of malicious activity was obtained. British 
communism’s marginal electoral appeal and limited direct political clout was ultimately 
irrelevant to Whitehall’s calculations. It was always self-evident that the Party possessed 
little capability to impinge directly upon political stability. Even had the CPGB’s 
acquisition of two MPs at the 1945 General Election caused official concern – of which 
there is little evidence – the fact that the Party was wiped from the face of the electoral 
map in 1950 definitively proved at an early stage that British communism’s strength was 
not mass political appeal. In this sense the CPGB very different from its counterparts on 
the continent.692 Indeed, perhaps counter-intuitively, the political dynamic of the CPGB 
was the aspect that Whitehall was most at ease with. At the very least it was felt that the 
Party’s status as a legal political group kept it honest and removed the temptation to go 
underground where it might have been more difficult to monitor.693 Official 
understanding of domestic communism evolved over time – with the consequence that 
whenever one facet of the problem was solved, there was always another to take its place. 
Various aspects were solved steadily over time, however, this process still took the better 
part of twenty years before all the component parts of the problem were sufficiently 
resolved to ensure that the domestic communist problem had been firmly marginalised.  
                                                          
692 The French Communist Party achieved 26% of the vote in the 1945 French general election and 28.6% 
in 1946. The Italian Communist Party meanwhile had some 2 million members by the end of 1946. Donald 
Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, 
(HarperCollins, London, 1997), pp. 102-103 
693 ‘The CPGB’s Clandestine Activities and Security Measures’, Section of ‘Communism in the United 
Kingdom and Counter-measures’, MI5 report, March 1961, TNA, CAB, 134/1346 
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Politicisation 
A final question remains. Did the enaction of anti-communist measures during the Cold 
War represent a politicisation of security policy? Judging by the weight of available 
evidence it would seem overwhelmingly that Whitehall consistently at least attempted to 
ensure that all domestic counter-communist action remained predicated on national 
security, rather than political, concerns. It is important to remember that communists had, 
in effect, pronounced their ideological loyalty to a foreign power whose interests were 
diametrically opposed to the continued security and stability of the United Kingdom. 
When communists acted upon their political loyalties, the results for British security 
could be catastrophic. For instance, via atomic espionage efforts, the actions of 
ideologically motivated British communists actively assisted the Soviet Union in 
becoming an existential threat to the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, by its own admission, 
the CPGB sought actively via industrial and political activities to overthrow British 
parliamentary democracy.694 The communist world-view was hostile to continued 
governmental stability and there was sufficient evidence throughout 1945-1964 that 
showed that domestic communists were actively working to act upon this impulse. 
Domestic communism did pose a genuine threat to British stability during the early years 
of the Cold War.  
Official response could still have been politically motivated however. Fortunately, this 
was not the case. From the evidence available it can be seen that official policy was 
typically formulated around justifiable security concerns. Much of the credit for this can 
be attributed to the precedent established by the Attlee government combined with the 
resolutely apolitical culture of the Security Service. Counter-communist measures were 
adopted only with the utmost reluctance by the Attlee administration. Though in hindsight 
many of the arguments which slowed the initial adoption of vetting and subsequent 
escalation of counter-subversion were predicated ultimately on a certain naivety regarding 
the intentions of the communist movement, early restraint did establish a principle of 
moderation. Vetting was adopted only as a last resort: ‘this is not to say that all 
Communists would be prepared, even after long exposure to Communist indoctrination, 
to betray their country by consenting to work for Russian espionage agents; but there is 
                                                          
694 The British Road to Socialism, 1951 version, Communist Party of Great Britain Archive, 
CP/CENT/COMM/01/01 
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no way of separating the sheep from the goats’.695 In light of Attlee’s knowledge of 
considerable penetration of the PLP by crypto-communists, that the PM resisted the urge 
for reactionary reprisal is testament to his firm belief in measured response. Despite 
outcry from certain hard left MPs on the public announcement of vetting procedure,696 it 
is clear that the introduction of negative vetting was motivated solely by justifiable 
national security concerns and not out of political spite or reactionary tendency. The 
Gouzenko affair made it clear that Western governments were far more vulnerable to the 
predations of Soviet espionage than had been previously assumed, ergo the Attlee 
administration’s attempts to increase security were a wholly responsible act in light of the 
available evidence. Further to this, the judgement of the AC (M) that the Communist 
Party was to retain its status as a legal political entity was an important one, as it 
necessarily limited the range of options which could be taken against the Party (often to 
the regular frustration of successive Home Secretaries and Attorney Generals). As such, 
future counter-subversion policy had to be designed around the precedent that outright 
repressive force was an unviable option when seeking to mitigate the CPGB’s wider 
influence. The final long-term contribution of the Attlee government was of course the 
appointment of Norman Brook to the position of Cabinet Secretary. Those qualities of 
stability, calmness, and administrative skill which Brook brought to the role ensured that 
British counter-subversion policy was consistently moderate in its formulation and 
execution.697 
The Security Service itself also acted as a check on politicisation. MI5’s insistence on 
involving itself in matters only in matters of national security helped to avoid the 
occurrence of a politically motivated witch-hunt. As stated by Guy Liddell to Clement 
Attlee in 1946: ‘it had always been the policy of our office to keep entirely clear of 
politics’.698 That this principle remained a guiding part of the Service’s ethos is shown by 
Graham Mitchell’s reply to Patrick Gordon Walker when PLP leadership asked MI5 to 
investigate communist entryists in the early ‘60s: ‘it was incumbent on the Security 
Service to be very careful to do nothing which could be represented as partaking of a 
                                                          
695 ‘The Employment of Civil Servants, etc. exposed to Communist influence’, Working Party of the 
Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities, 1st May 1947 TNA, CAB 130/20 
696 Response by the AC (M) to the AC (O) on the latter’s report entitled ‘Possible Anti-Communist 
Activities at Home’, 19th December 1949, TNA, CAB 1/343 
697 For testament to Brook’s character see entry in ODNB, as accessed via: 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32089?docPos=1 
698 Serial 315a, Guy Liddell recalling conversation with Frederick Bellenger, 19th November 1946, TNA, 
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party political nature’.699 Of course, the Service’s moderation was also in part motivated 
by practical considerations. Early discussion of vetting makes it clear that MI5 resisted its 
introduction primarily due to fears that it would be swamped by investigatory work.700 
Given that by 1951 a full 50% of the Service was dedicated to communist related work,701 
this would seem to have been a valid fear. Had the demands on MI5 been any greater it 
seems unlikely that its capabilities would have been stretched to breaking point. It follows 
that even had overt repression of the communist movement been countenanced, the state 
would have lacked the necessary resources to carry it out. Beyond this, the most 
important contribution of the Security Service to ensuring proportional response was its 
extensive network of surveillance which surreptitiously monitored CPGB and wider 
communist activities from the late ‘40s onwards. On the face of it this may seem counter-
intuitive – the Service’s monitoring efforts, though fully legal, could be interpreted as the 
mass invasion of personal privacy and political liberty by the state. However, Security 
Service surveillance in actuality served to ensure that official measures stayed within 
reasonable boundaries. Due to the fact that ministers had a regular, accurate and timely 
source of intelligence regarding communist activities, undue paranoia was for the most 
part avoided. MI5’s surveillance of the Party had an actively calming influence upon 
counter-subversive policy. Incorrect presumptions – for example Anthony Eden’s 
insistence that communist strategy in the unions was to stir up strike action wherever 
possible – were able to be quickly discounted due to MI5’s direct access to high level 
CPGB discussions. Service monitoring meant that the government was able to establish 
the exact boundaries of domestic communism’s capabilities and intent and adjust the 
severity of counter-measures accordingly. There was no ‘red scare’ in Britain during the 
1950s in large part because MI5 were able to confidently identify circa 90% of British 
communists from the very beginning of the decade. Equally importantly, evidence 
available suggests that MI5’s surveillance of British communism was wholly professional 
in character. What Kim Philby termed ‘an air of professional competence which [SIS] 
never matched’702 carried over into the Service’s anti-communist work. Security Service 
monitoring was typically unobtrusive in character. Those under surveillance were usually 
never aware that they were being observed by the state, whilst intelligence was only acted 
                                                          
699 Note by Graham Mitchell recalling meeting with Gordon Walker, 5th September 1961, as cited in 
Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 413 
700 Comments of Sir Percy Sillitoe to meeting of GEN 183, 16th June 1947, TNA, CAB 130/20 
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upon if there was genuine evidence of wrongdoing. The purpose of MI5 surveillance was 
passive observation – not active repression. The Service was not actively looking for 
excuses for repression, but rather were monitoring the situation so that the threat domestic 
communism posed could be better understood and deescalated as calmly as possible. 
As such, there was little official appetite for mass repression of communists of the type 
which defined the American response over the same period. Indeed at points, counter-
subversive policy seems to have been designed to deliberately avoid the American model. 
For example, positive vetting was initially resisted on the proviso that ‘the FBI system is 
extremely elaborate… [The subject] has to fill in a detailed and lengthy form listing his 
ancestry and the whole of career, education etc. We consider that any such procedure 
would be repugnant to British thinking’.703 Moreover, it could be argued that because 
anti-communist hysteria in the United States became so virulent during the early Cold 
War, Whitehall had the benefit of watching from afar the perfect model to avoid. As a 
result of these various factors – a conscious decision on the part of the Attlee government 
to strive for impartiality, MI5’s apolitical corporate culture, and an immediate counter-
example provided by the American experience - Whitehall counter-subversion policy 
remained grounded largely within national security concerns. 
Summary 
To conclude, knowledge of the development of British domestic anti-communist policy 
between the years of 1945 and 1964 adds considerably to broader understandings of post-
war British history. As has been shown, domestic communism worried the British 
government greatly during the early years of the Cold War. Such concerns helped to 
actively shape the structure of the modern state as well as inform the development of 
industrial relations and indeed the wider Labour movement itself. Analysis of counter-
subversion policy over the period proves the still consistently overlooked importance of 
secret intelligence to the Attlee government in particular and also helps to demonstrate 
that whilst historians may argue over use of the term in other areas, ‘post-war consensus’ 
was very much a reality with regards to the development of security policy.704 The degree 
to which the second Churchill government fully accepted – and indeed embraced – the 
                                                          
703 ‘Committee on Positive Vetting Report’, 27th October 1950, as circulated to the Cabinet Committee on 
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Labour’s conclusions regarding domestic security is striking. Equally, study of domestic 
counter-subversive policy shows that whilst senior figures within Whitehall were actively 
concerned by communist influence during the early Cold War period, adherence to 
traditional principles of political liberty and the independence of the Labour movement 
remained of consistent importance to policy-makers. Personal political convictions were 
tolerated so long as they did not actively pose a danger to the continued security and 
stability of the United Kingdom, the machinery of state security was not exploited to 
undermine the British left nor impinge upon its traditional independence except in cases 
where radical elements demonstrated a willingness to undermine British security in 
favour of a foreign power. The development of domestic anti-communist policy in Britain 
during the early Cold War provides an admirable example of how to conduct a counter-
subversive campaign within a liberal democracy without fundamentally undermining 
democratic rights and freedoms. 
There remains, as ever, scope for further research on this topic. Whilst the vast majority 
of archival material regarding the subject has now been released, there are other factors 
not assessed in this thesis which remain to be explored. Most notably, it is clear that 
considerable parallels existed between the British and American national experiences on 
this subject. A comprehensive survey of the commonalities and differences between the 
two would be of particular historical benefit, as would an assessment as to what extent 
British and American reaction was governed by transnational forces occurring within the 
broader western/NATO alliance. An attempt was made to explore these questions during 
the course of researching this thesis, however a four month research trip to the US 
National Archives and Midwestern Presidential Libraries produced only frustration. There 
is evidence that the necessary archival material required to comment authoritatively upon 
these issues does exist within the US archives. However the sheer volume of material 
stored in US facilities, combined with these institutions’ relatively inefficient working 
practices, means that a far greater length of time would be required for research than was 
available over the course of this project.    
As regards the contemporary relevance of this thesis, though ‘subversion’ as a term has 
fallen from the current governmental lexicon essentially for political reasons, (the term 
was not included in the 1989 Security Service Act, whilst MI5 obtained formal 
permission to stop the routine monitoring of members of subversive organisations in 
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1992),705 it is clear that in practice subversive concerns are still of importance. The rise of 
Islamic extremism in particular demonstrates that ideological threats to Britain are still a 
real and pressing danger. Indeed, such ideological threats are arguably even more 
dangerous than those faced in the early Cold War period due to the inherently violent 
nature of extremism. Contemporary threats show that an understanding of counter-
subversive policy is important even beyond an abstract academic sense. It is interesting to 
note the parallels between current events and historical practice - the establishment of the 
Home Office Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) in 2007 in 
particular appears to have been created to fulfil a very similar role to that once managed 
by IRD. Meanwhile, recent actions by the Russian government to create UK-based quasi-
front organisations shows that the threat of state-sponsored subversive activity remains a 
real and present challenge to British stability.706 A thorough understanding of counter-
subversive policy in historical context is thus of continuing importance for historians and 
government officials alike. 
This thesis, with its focus upon the development of British domestic counter-subversion 
policy between 1945 and 1964, has hopefully demonstrated the broader significance of 
Whitehall’s counter-communist campaign as a vital component of post-war British 
political history. Counter-communist security policy both shaped, and was shaped by, 
wider British political culture. Analysis of counter-subversive policy in the early Cold 
War period serves to illustrate shifting official understandings of communism as both a 
threat and ideology. It also serves to illustrate how Whitehall understood the relationship 
between State and citizenry in post-war era in the face of an ideologically-based threat to 
stability and security. In this way, it is hoped that this thesis has made an original and 
timely contribution to the broader corpus of Cold War historiography. 
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Appendix: Suspected Crypto-Communist MPs 
Labour Members Included on Morgan Phillips List of ‘Lost Sheep’ MPs: 1945 Intake (in 
order of Phillips’ listing)707: 
 
 John Mack (Newcastle-under-Lyme) 
MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme from 1942 to 1951. Stood down at the 1951 
general election. Member of Liverpool City Council 1928 to 1946. Mack was of 
Jewish heritage and was a strong advocate for Jewish rights. Member of Poale-
Zion,708 which may explain his inclusion on the list. Agitated strongly during the 
war for greater protection of European Jewry. Became Vice-President of the 
Committee for a Jewish Army in 1943 and was influential in the creation of the 
Jewish Brigade (British Army group formed of Palestinian Mandate Jews, saw 
combat in Italy during spring 1945).709 Travelled to Romania and Bulgaria in 
1946 to attempt to improve conditions for Balkan Jewish communities. No 
available evidence suggests substantive investigation of Mack’s activities by 
either MI5 or the PLP post-1945.710 
 
 Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne) 
MP for Nelson and Colne from 1935 to 1968. Conscientious objector during the 
First World War, served three prison sentences at Preston, Wormwood Scrubs and 
Belfast prisons. Taught English at the University of Helsinki 1921 to 1925.711 Of 
Jewish heritage. Lifelong pacifist, though supported British entry into the Second 
World War on account of Nazi Germany’s rampant anti-Semitism. Sympathetic to 
the Soviet Union, but no available evidence suggests communist loyalties.712 
                                                          
707 See ‘Lost Sheep’ file, Morgan Phillips, General Secretary’s papers, Labour Party Archive, LP/GS/LS, 
National Museum of Labour History, Manchester 
708 Initially a movement of Marxist-Zionist Jewish workers, with various branches based around the world. 
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709 The Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History, ed. W. Rubenstein & Michael A. Jolles, (Palgrave 
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710 Ibid. 
711 ‘Sydney Silverman’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36093?docPos=1 
712 Silverman’s personal view on Anglo-Soviet relations is well summed up by: Sydney Silverman, ‘Socialist-
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Expelled from the Labour Party, along with Michael Foot, in November 1954 for 
opposing nuclear defence policy. Readmitted in April 1955. Went on to become a 
founding member of CND in 1957.713 Suspicions regarding Silverman’s loyalties 
lingered within the PLP and he appeared on Gordon Walker’s 1961 list of 
potential communists (see chapter four). The Security Service did not think he 
warranted further investigation however.714 
 
 Barnett Stross (Hanley) 
MP for Hanley from 1945 to 1950 and MP for Stoke-on-Trent Central from 1950 
to 1966. Born in Poland to Jewish parents in 1899, family immigrated to Britain in 
1902. Medical doctor prior to his parliamentary career. Close links with 
Czechoslovakia due to taking in Czech refugees following Nazi invasion in 
1937.715 Later became executive of the Anglo-Czech Friendship society and was 
highly involved in raising money for the town of Lidice, which was destroyed by 
the Nazis during the war due to its high Jewish population.716 Appeared on 
Walker’s 1961 list as a ‘possible’ communist, though not investigated further by 
the Service. Knighted in 1964. Posthumously named as a Czech agent by defector 
Josef Frolík in 1969.717 
 
 William Warbey (Luton) 
MP for Luton from 1945 to 1950. Lost his seat at the 1950 election. Re-elected as 
MP for Broxtowe following a by-election in 1953, serving until 1955. MP for 
Ashfield from 1955 to 1966. Strongly pro-Soviet, Warbey opposed the creation of 
NATO and co-authored (along with Konni Zilliacus) a pamphlet entitled Stop the 
Coming War in 1948 which was highly critical of British foreign policy.718 Listed 
in Margaret Thornhill’s notebook as having paid membership dues.719 Included on 
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Walker’s 1961 list as a member of the CPGB, though not investigated further by 
MI5. Later wrote a strongly pro-communist biography of Ho Chi Minh.720 
 
 
 Geoffrey Bing (Hornchurch) 
See chapter one. 
 
 Stephen Swingler (Stafford) 
MP for Stafford from 1945 to 1950. Lost his seat at the 1950 election, re-elected 
as MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme in 1951, retained position until his death in 
1969. Member of the pro-Soviet ‘Keep Left’ group within the PLP. Suspected by 
Attlee of crypto-communism, who voiced his concerns directly to Percy Sillitoe in 
1947.721 Listed as a crypto-communist by Douglas Hyde in his 1950 
autobiography I Believed: The Autobiography of a Former British Communist. 
Also included in Margaret Thornhill’s notebook as having paid membership 
dues.722 Subject of MI5 Personal File (unreleased).723 Listed as a CPGB member 
on Walker’s 1961 list. Subsequently investigated by the Security Service who 
concluded that Swingler had joined the Party in 1934, before leaving in 1940 and 
re-joining in 1945.724 Believed to have left the CPGB permanently by 1951. 
 
 
 George Wigg (Dudley) 
MP for Dudley from 1945 to 1967. Joined the Army in 1918, serving in the Royal 
Tank Corps from 1919 to 1937. Re-joined in 1940 and served in the Army 
Educational Corps until 1946.725 It is unclear why Wigg was included on Phillips’ 
1945 list other than the fact that he was good friends with several members of the 
‘Keep Left’ group.726 Appointed parliamentary private secretary to Emanuel 
Shinwell (Minister of Fuel and Power 1945-1947, Secretary of State for War 
                                                          
720 William Warbey, Ho Chi Minh and the Struggle for Independent Vietnam, (Merlin Press, London, 1972) 
721 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 837 
722 Ibid, p. 412 
723 Serial 401a, 9th June 1952, TNA, KV 2/3813 
724 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 932 
725 ‘George Wigg’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31830 
726 Ibid.  
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1947-1950, Minister of Defence 1950-1951) by Clement Attlee. Later close friend 
of Harold Wilson and closely involved in Labour plotting against Profumo in the 
early 1960s.727 Paymaster-General from 1964 to 1967. Elevated to the House of 
Lords in 1967. 
 
 Herschel Austin (Stretford) 
MP for Stretford from 1945 to 1950. Austin was of Jewish Heritage and was 
mainly noted for opposition to Ernest Bevin, whom he personally disliked.728 
Authored a satirical pamphlet in 1948 entitled The Importance of Being Ernest 
(Bevin).729 Seems to have been included on Phillips’ list for this reason. Left-
wing, though little available evidence of ties to communism. 
 
 Geoffrey Cooper (Middlesbrough West) 
MP for Middlesbrough West from 1945 to 1951. RAF pilot during the Second 
World War and mentioned in despatches.730 Reason for inclusion on Phillips’ list 
unclear. Noted critic of the BBC, however further available information regarding 
Cooper is slight.731 
 
 Hadyn Davies (St Pancras South West) 
MP for St Pancras South West from 1945 to 1950. Journalist prior to 
parliamentary service. Reasons for inclusion on Phillips’ list unclear. Only 
parliamentary activity of note was advocating for the creation of a Royal 
Commission on the Press in 1946.732 
 
 Ian Mikardo (Reading) 
MP for Reading from 1945 to 1950 and again from 1955-1959. MP for Reading 
South from 1950 to 1955. MP for successive Bethnal Green constituencies from 
                                                          
727 ‘Sinister backbench MP played key role in downfall’, The Guardian, 11th March 2006 
728 Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History, p. 42 
729 Lilliker, Against the Cold War, p. 120 
730 Who Was Who 2016 as accessed via: 
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731 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Volume IV: Sound and Vision, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1979), p. 272 
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1964 to 1987. Left-wing MP of Jewish heritage. Involved with Poale Zion during 
the 1940s. Leading member of the ‘Keep Left’ group, though little available 
evidence to suggest close ties to communism.733 Served as chairman of the 
national executive committee of the Labour Party from 1970 to 1971. Later 
campaign manager for Michael Foot during his leadership campaign in 1980.734 
 
 Julius Silverman (Birmingham Erdington) 
MP for Birmingham Erdington (under various descriptions due to boundary 
changes) from 1945 to 1983. Of Jewish heritage. Called to the bar in 1931, served 
as Birmingham City Councillor from 1943-1935. Believed by the Security Service 
to be a crypto-communist and subject of Personal File (unreleased).735 Listed as 
member of the CPGB on Walker’s 1961 list. Subsequently investigated by the 
Security Service, who concluded that ‘He has for a long time, had extremely close 
relations with the Soviet Embassy, and may well be considered a useful source of 
Parliamentary information, if nothing more.’736 
 
 Charles George Percy Smith (Colchester) 
MP for Colchester from 1945-1950. General Secretary of the Post Office 
Engineering Union from 1953 to 1972. Identified by the Security Service as a 
crypto-communist within Geoffrey Bing’s file.737 Created a life peer in 1967 and 
served as Minister of State for Technology from 1969 to 1970.  
 
 Wilfrid Vernon (Dulwich) 
MP for Dulwich from 1945 to 1951. Active member of local communist group at 
Farnborough during the 1930s whilst employed at the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment. Prosecuted in 1937 under the Official Secrets Act for retaining 
secret documents.738 Later admitted to spying for the Soviet Union whilst 
employed at Farnborough. Case was brought before Attlee by the Security Service 
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in 1948 who expressed ‘complete surprise’ that Vernon was a spy.739 Unable to be 
prosecuted due to his status as an MP, subsequently interviewed by the Security 
Service again in 1952 in order to ‘augment their historical knowledge of Soviet 
espionage activities’.740 
 
 Ron Chamberlain (Norwood) 
MP for Norwood from 1945 to 1950. Secretary of the National Federation of 
Housing Societies prior to parliamentary service. Voted against joining NATO in 
1949 however was not expelled from the Labour Party. Founding member of the 
Trotskyite ‘Socialist Fellowship’ group in 1949, which was later proscribed by the 
Labour Party in 1951.741 
1945 intake Labour MPs not included on Phillips’ List, but noted as communist 
sympathisers by Douglas Hyde in 1950: 
 
 William Griffiths (Manchester Moss Side) 
MP for Manchester Moss Side from 1945 to 1950 and Manchester Exchange from 
1950 to 1973. Listed as crypto-communist by Hyde, though believed to have left 
the Party by 1951.742 Included on Walker’s 1961 list of possible CPGB members, 
though his case was not investigated further.743 Noted pro-Zionist MP.744 
 
 Hugh Lester Hutchinson (Manchester Rusholme) 
MP for Manchester Rusholme from 1945 to 1950. Son of Mary Knight, one of the 
founding members of the CPGB. Hutchinson had been arrested in India in 1932 
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whilst investigating arrests of communists there.745 Listed by Hyde in I Believed 
as a crypto-communist in 1945 though was believed to have left the CPGB shortly 
after 1945.746 Nevertheless, identified as a crypto-communist by the Security 
Service to Attlee in 1947.747 Voted against joining NATO in 1949 and was 
subsequently expelled from the Labour Party as a result. Never returned to the 
Labour Party following the incident. Faded into obscurity following the loss of his 
seat at the 1950 general election.748 
 
 Harold Lever (Manchester Exchange) 
MP for Manchester Exchange from 1945 to 1950, Manchester Cheetham from 
1950 to 1974 and Manchester Central from 1974 to 1979. Served as Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster from 1974 to 1979 and subsequently elevated to the 
peerage. Names as a crypto-communist by Hyde, though believed to have left the 
CPGB by 1951.749 His name did not reappear on Walker’s 1961 list. 
 
 Arthur Lewis (Upton) 
MP for Upton from 1945 to 1950, for West Ham North from 1950 to 1974 and for 
Newham North West from 1974 to 83. Trade union official for the National Union 
of General and Municipal Workers from 1938 to 1948. Listed by Hyde as a 
crypto-communist and believed by MI5 to still be a party member in 1948.750 
Listed as a possible CPGB member on Walker’s 1961 list, though not investigated 
further by the Security Service.751 Served 38 years as a Labour MP before being 
deselected by his constituency party in 1983, who he denounced as ‘100 per cent 
Trotskykist, Militant Tendency, Communist and IRA supporters’.752 
 
 
 John Platts-Mills (Finsbury) 
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750 Ibid. 
751 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 932 
752 Richard Heffernan & Mike Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside Kinnock’s Labour Party, 
(Verso, London, 1992), p. 18 
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MP for Finsbury from 1945 to 1950. Expelled from the Labour Party for pro-
communist sympathies in 1948, though continued to sit as an independent until 
1950. Called to the bar in 1933 and became enamoured with the Soviet Union 
during the 1930s. Close friends with Indian intellectual Krishna Menon, who was 
also suspected of covert links to the CPGB.753 Infamous as a Stalin apologist 
during his time in the House of Commons.754 Identified as a crypto-communist by 
the Security Service to Attlee in 1947.755 Opposed the creation of NATO and 
called for Labour support of the Italian Communist Party, which lead to his 
expulsion. Believed by Hyde to be a crypto-communist. Active in the British 
Peace Committee (British arm of the Soviet World Peace Council) as of 1950.756 
Attended Stalin’s funeral in 1953. Later became a noted defence barrister who 
represented the Kray Twins and members of the Great Train Robbery gang.757 
Readmitted to the Labour Party in 1969, by which point his communist 
sympathies had mellowed.758 
 
 Leslie Solley (Thurrock) 
MP for Thurrock from 1945 to 1950. Barrister prior to his parliamentary service. 
Believed by Hyde to be a crypto-communist at the 1945 general election. Solley 
was a signatory to John Platts-Mills petition in support of the Italian Communist 
Party and also voted against Britain joining NATO. Expelled from the Labour 
Party as a result of these transgressions and never re-joined.759 Solley attempted to 
contest Thurrock as an independent candidate in 1950, however was defeated and 
subsequently retired from politics. Later served as vice-president of the 
Songwriters Guild of Great Britain. 
 
 Konni Zilliacus (Gateshead) 
                                                          
753 ‘John Platts-Mills’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/76388. Krishna 
Menon was also a subject of Security Service interest, particularly during his time as Indian High 
Commissioner in London, see files TNA, KV 2/2509 to 2/2514 
754 ‘Obituary of John Platts-Mills’, The Telegraph, 27th October 2001 
755 Serial 333a, 21st May 1947, TNA, KV 2/3812 
756 MI5 telephone intercept, 12th December 1950, TNA, KV 2/3813 
757 ‘John Platts-Mills’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/76388 
758 ‘Obituary of John Platts-Mills’, The Observer, 27th October 2001 
759 Harry Harmer, Longman Companion to the Labour Party, (Routledge, London, 2014), p. 162 
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MP for Gateshead from 1945 to 1950 and MP for Manchester Gorton from 1955 
to 1967. Worked within the League of Nations Secretariat prior to the outbreak of 
World War II. Noted left-winger, though not wholly pro-Soviet. Noted for his 
support of Tito over Stalin in 1948. However, Zilliacus did also travel to the 
Soviet Union on a number of occasions during his time as an MP and twice 
interviewed Stalin.760 Listed by Douglas Hyde as a fellow-traveller, rather than 
crypto-communist. Appeared within Margaret Thornhill’s notebook as having 
paid dues of some description to the Communist Party, which suggests that 
Zilliacus may have been a covert member of the CPGB.761 Also included on 
Walker’s 1961 list, though not investigated further by the Security Service. Voted 
against joining NATO and was eventually expelled from the Labour Party in 
1949. Readmitted in 1952 and went on to become a founding member of CND in 
1957. 
 
 
 
1945 intake Labour MPs independently identified as crypto-communists by the Security 
Service 
 Elizabeth ‘Bessie’ Braddock (Liverpool Exchange) 
MP for Liverpool Exchange from 1945 to 1970. Trade unionist in her early career, 
joined the Independent Labour Party in 1917 before moving to the CPGB in 1920. 
Ostensibly left the Communist Party in 1924 and joined the Labour Party.762 
Identified as a definite crypto-communist by the Security Service to Attlee in 
1947.763 Elected to the Labour National Executive Committee in 1947, serving 
until 1969. Split from the left-wing of the Labour Party over disagreements 
regarding the Korean War (Braddock supported the government’s position). 
Moved steadily rightwards from 1950 onwards, leading to an attempt by her local 
Party to deselect her in 1955. The attempt failed and Braddock increased her 
                                                          
760 ‘Konni Zilliacus’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/55670 
761 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 412 
762 ‘Elizabeth Braddock’, ODNB, accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37214?docPos=1 
763 Serial 333a, 21st May 1947, TNA, KV 2/3812 
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majority to 7,186.764 Supported attempts by Gaitskell and Morrison to expel 
Bevan in 1955. Fierce critic of communism later in life.765 Revered by the people 
of Liverpool, now immortalised as a statue at Lime Street Station. 
 
 Donald Bruce (Portsmouth North) 
MP for Portsmouth North from 1945 to 1950. Member of the Independent Labour 
Party during the early 1930s, before joining Labour in 1935. Officer in the Royal 
Signals during World War Two. Mentioned in dispatches for his conduct at the 
Normandy landings before being recruited for Eisenhower’s intelligence staff.766 
Became close to Aneurin Bevan following accession to the House of Commons 
and appointed Bevan’s parliamentary private secretary in late 1945. Listed as a 
crypto-communist by MI5 within Geoffrey Bing’s file.767 Lost his seat by 945 
votes in the 1950 general election, however remained active in Labour politics as 
an ordinary member. Appointed a life peer by Harold Wilson in 1974. Served as 
an MEP from 1972 to 1979, became a lifelong critic of the EU thereafter. 
 
 Leah Manning (Epping) 
MP for Islington East from February to October 1931, MP for Epping from 1945 
to 1950. Studied as a teacher at Homerton Training College Cambridge, during 
which time she joined the Independent Labour Party.768 Served on the national 
executive committee of the National Union of Teachers in the 1920s. Also served 
on the Labour NEC from 1930 to 1931. Organised the evacuation of circa 4,000 
children from Bilbao in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War. Identified as a definite 
crypto-communist by the Security Service to Attlee in 1947.769 Appointed as a 
Dame of the British Empire in 1966, a series of seminar rooms at Homerton 
College, Cambridge are named in her memory. 
                                                          
764 Ben D. Rees, A Portrait of Battling Bessie, (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 2011), pp. 91-92 
765 See John Braddock & Bessie Braddock, The Braddocks, (London, Macdonald, 1963) 
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Labour Party MPs included on Gordon Walker’s 1961 list of suspected crypto-
communists and subsequently investigated by the Security Service.770 
 Frank Allaun (Salford East) 
MP for Salford East from 1955 to 1983. Joined the CPGB in 1940 as a committed 
pacifist.771 Joined the Labour Party in 1945 and ran for the Moss Side seat in 
1951, though was defeated. Believed by MI5 to have ‘Trotskyist tendencies’, 
though not an outright crypto-communist.772 Highly involved in the CND and 
helped organise the first Aldermaston March. Served on the Labour NEC from 
1967 to 1983, including as Chair from 1978-1979. Refused to be appointed to the 
House of Lords on retirement. 
 
 John Baird (Wolverhampton North East) 
MP for Wolverhampton East/North East from 1945 to 1964. Practicing dentist 
prior to his parliamentary career. According to available records, never 
investigated by the Service during the Attlee administration. Soviet and Maoist 
sympathiser, Baird visited both countries during his time as an MP.773 Noted by 
MI5 as a Trotskyist rather than a crypto-communist.774 Assisted the Revolutionary 
Socialist League (better known as Militant Tendency) during its early years.775 
 
 Harold Davies (Leek) 
MP for Leek from 1945 to 1970. Associated with the ‘Keep Left’ group during the 
Attlee years. However, not identified in any available MI5 files from that period 
as a crypto-communist. Believed by MI5 to never have been a member of the 
CPGB though ‘in contact with leading members of the Party’.776 Notation next to 
Davies’ name on Walker’s list reads ‘not on IRD list’, indicating that the IRD 
were maintaining their own separate record of suspected crypto-communists.777 
                                                          
770 Walker’s list runs to twenty-five names, sixteen of whom were believed to be definite members on the 
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Parliamentary Private Secretary to Harold Wilson from 1967 to 1970. Appointed 
as a Privy Councillor in 1969. Elevated to the House of Lords as a life peer in 
1970. 
 
 Stephen Owen Davies (Merthyr Tydfil) 
MP for Merthyr/Merthyr Tydfil from 1934 to 1972. Trade union leader for the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation prior to his parliamentary career. Noted as an 
apologist for the Soviet Union and had visited the country in 1922 as a union 
delegate.778 Despite this was not investigated as a suspected crypto during the 
Attlee years. MI5 surveillance efforts in 1961 showed that ‘if he was not of the 
Party, he was very close to it indeed’.779 Finally split from the Labour Party in 
1966 following the Aberfan disaster (during which a coal tip collapsed on top of a 
school, killing 116 children) as a result of the National Coal Board’s refusal to 
fully compensate the Welsh mining town for the costs of the subsequent 
rebuilding efforts. Ran as an independent MP in the 1970 election and won over 
his official Labour rival by more than 7,000 votes.780 
 
 
 
 Richard Kelley (Don Valley) 
MP for Don Valley from 1959 to 1979. Mining union official prior to 
parliamentary career. NUM sponsored MP, believed by MI5 to have been a CPGB 
member from 1932 to 1955. Deemed to be a low threat as ‘The CPGB have, and 
quite rightly, a low opinion of his intelligence’. Denounced by the Social 
Democratic Alliance (what went on to become the Social Democratic Party) for 
communist associations in 1976.781 
 
 John Mendelson (Penistone) 
MP for Penistone from 1959 to 1978. Trade union official prior to parliamentary 
career. Service investigation found that Mendelson was a CPGB member during 
                                                          
778 ODNB, as accessed via: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47339 
779 Footnote 90, Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p. 932 
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the 1940s, however the Party erroneously believed him to be a MI5 penetration 
agent. Noted to have met with Czech intelligence in 1960, but no available 
evidence to suggest that he acted as an agent.782 Minor backbench MP for entirety 
of parliamentary career. 
 
 Leslie Plummer (Deptford) 
MP for Deptford from 1951 to 1963. Journalist during the 1920s through late 
1940s. Appointed chairman of the ill-fated Tanganyika groundnut scheme in 1947 
(which was intended to cultivate vast tracts of modern-day Tanzania for peanut 
crops) and knighted in 1949 before it was clear that the project was doomed to 
failure. Not believed to be a crypto-communist by the Security Service though 
‘the CPGB think well of his activities’.783 
 
 Thomas Swain (Derbyshire North East) 
MP for Derbyshire North East from 1959 to 1979. Mining union official prior to 
parliamentary career. F Branch reports indicated that Swain made donations to the 
CPGB and passed minutes from NUM executive committee meetings to 
communist leadership.784 Minor backbench MP for entirety of parliamentary 
career. 
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